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ABSTRACT
In 1970 four young racially moderate Democrats won the
governor's chairs of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and
Georgia.

These southern gubernatorial elections and the

subsequent inaugural speeches signaled a transformation of
racial politics in the region.

As the campaigns began,

however, persistent ambivalence concerning the pace of
integration and court-ordered busing of school children to
achieve racial balances tempted many politicians to exploit
these concerns.

Their efforts failed; southerners had

decided to obey the law.

The successful candidates

understood that the electorate had come to this decision
with varying degrees of enthusiasm and that their campaigns
must reflect this ambivalence; they must eschew the
rhetoric of resistance without uttering strong words in
favor of desegregation and busing.

The 197 0 gubernatorial

campaigns marked the first time in southern politics that
those who refused to exploit racial prejudice won office.
Elusive evasion of racially charged issues appealed to a
moderate electorate that had grown weary of upheaval.

The

finessing of race by the men who would become the New South
governors of 197 0, however, set an example that subsequent
candidates would follow and missed an opportunity to
establish a morally binding biracial coalition that could
have strengthened the southern wing of the Democratic party
beyond 1970.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
MIGHTY PECULIAR ELECTIONS

In 1970 four young racial moderates won the governor's
chairs of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia.
Although their campaigns each reflected unique aspects of
their states' contemporary circumstances, history and
political idiosyncrasies,

taken together the four races

reveal a great deal about the politics and condition in the
South at the time.

The winning candidates in each of the

four gubernatorial campaigns eschewed the traditional
politics of racial antagonism and demagoguery.

"Always

before, you could tell right easy how somebody stood on the
nigras," said a retired Georgia farmer, puzzled by the
racial stance of the gubernatorial candidates during the
election in 1970.

"I don't say it isn't a good thing, but

it does make for a mighty peculiar election."1
Peculiar elections did indeed signal a change across
most of the South.

South Carolina Governor John West

believed that 1970 marked the first southern election with
"racial overtones where the moderates won."

Florida

Governor Reubin Askew saw the election of moderates across
the South as "a departure from the custom wherein the
person who took the hard racial line always won."

Arkansas

Governor Dale Bumpers asserted that his election and the
victories of Governors Carter in Georgia, West in South
Carolina and Askew in Florida were not coincidences, but
1
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the result of "a cry for new leadership in the South."
These elections prompted both the southern and the national
media to herald a new South.

Time magazine placed Georgia

Governor Jimmy Carter on its cover and wrote of a "New Day
A'Coming in the South" in the accompanying story that also
included Bumpers, Askew and West.

"Something remarkable

and significant is happening in this part of the country,"
James Reston wrote of the South in the New York Times.
"The men who have been appealing to regional and racial
prejudice are declining."

The elections of 1970 signalled

the arrival of "a new market of southern governors,"
observed southern journalist Edwin Yoder,

"all young, all

anxious to put the slogans, the fears, the divisions, the
despairs of the sixties behind them."

Even a radical

journal, the Progressive, joined in the celebration:

"The

coming of a 'New South' that will reject race and regional
prejudice has been heralded prematurely a number of times,
but now, at last, it may be nearing a reality -- if some
new Southern governors keep the pledges they made at their
inaugurals."2
In Arkansas, Democrat Dale Bumpers won a Democratic
primary victory over former Governor Orval Faubus, who
symbolized southern intransigence when in 1957 he ordered
the state militia to prevent school integration in Little
Rock.

Bumpers downplayed the busing issue while Faubus

sought to make it the center-piece of his 1970 campaign.

2
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Bumpers took office promoting a vision of a future that
"must be shaped and shared by all Arkansans: old and young,
black and white,

rich and poor."3

In Florida, Reubin Askew defeated the incumbent
governor who during the campaign took over a school
district to thwart a court-ordered school desegregation
plan that included busing.

Askew took office with a pledge

of "equal rights for all of our people,

. . . black as well

as w h i t e .114
In South Carolina,

the incumbent Democratic Lieutenant

Governor John West ran against a Republican who frequently
voiced fiery anti-integration rhetoric.

"The politics of

race and divisiveness," West declared in his inaugural
address,

"have been soundly repudiated in South Carolina."

West promised to run a "color blind" administration that
would "eliminate from our government any vestige of
discrimination because of race, creed, sex, religion or any
other barrier to fairness for all citizens."5
In Georgia, Jimmy Carter, a peanut farmer and nuclear
submarine officer,

succeeded Lester Maddox.

Known for his

virulent anti-integration rhetoric, Maddox had established
and maintained his hard-line segregationist reputation by
autographing ax handles, mementos of the weapon he used
years earlier to prevent blacks from entering his chicken
restaurant.

But as Carter took office he declared "the

time for racial discrimination is over."6
3

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Three southern governors elected at about the same
time as Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter will not be
examined here, Lynwood Holton of Virginia, Winfield Dunn of
Tennessee and Alabama's George Wallace.

While Holton and

Wallace's inaugurations echoed the New South governor's
rhetoric of racial tolerance,

commentators at the time did

not consider them part of this political phenomena.
Although both the inaugurations and subsequent actions in
office of Holton and Wallace testified to the changing
political environment of the South, their elections did not
demonstrate the transformation of racial politics in
Democratic gubernatorial campaigns.

Lynwood Holton's

Republican candidacy in 1969, the year before the four
discussed here, reflected the collapse of an aging
Democratic machine rather than a transformation of racial
politics.

Holton, whose subsequent inaugural address and

actions in office diverged from the Republican southern
strategy of his president and party, later claimed that
black leaders promised him support at the polls that he
would not have to seek publicly.

Neither Holton nor his

Democratic opponent made race an issue in that campaign.
After the election the national media viewed Virginia more
as a suburb of Washington than the home of massive
resistance.7
In Tennessee a campaign that had little to do with
racial politics or partisan change in the South pitted a
4
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Republican dentist, Dr. Winfield Dunn of Memphis, against
Nashville attorney John Jay Hooker.

As the general

election campaign began, Hooker's involvement in the
speculative collapse of a fried chicken franchise business
led to his political demise.

The campaign's outcome

resulted primarily from the taint of scandal and does not
reflect the racial attitudes of the electorate or the
politicians who sought their votes.8
George Wallace, an old stalwart of southern racial
politics, ran true to form in 1970, warning of his
opponent's dependence on the "black bloc vote."

Only after

staging a narrow come-from-behind victory did Wallace
realize that the old style politics he had mastered had
changed.

At his inauguration he made no mention of

segregation and even sought to include blacks in the
inaugural festivities.

Although Wallace made his familiar

complaint about the "despotic tyranny" of the federal
government, one newspaper observed that "his heart didn't
seem to be in it this time."

The content and tone of his

speech clearly indicated that Wallace recognized "a shift
toward moderation on the part of the white electorate in
the South, a reluctant acceptance of change, a disillusion
with the old politics of race."9
Wallace had narrowly escaped defeat in 1970.

Even

though he learned from that near loss he can not be
included in the group examined in this work.

Wallace

5
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represents a figure from the demagogic past who recognized
a change in the South.

The New South Governors of 1970

embodied that transformation.

One of the distinguishing

characteristics of this new kind of politician was that
they were not associated with the discredited politics of
the past.
Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter shared several common
characteristics.

A campaign strategy emerged among these

candidates that some observers have called "new populism."
Like its antecedent of the 1830s, new populism promoted the
interests of common folk, but relied primarily on image and
style rather than issues to attract support.

Candidates

tapped into the pervasive alienation within the electorate
and portrayed themselves as good men who understood the
problems of the average voter.

Employing this strategy

political outsiders escaped association with the ills of
the past while sidestepping controversial issues of the
present.

Bright, ambitious young men could demonstrate

their knowledge of the issues without taking controversial
stands by convincing voters to trust them to do the right
thing.

Issues became subservient to style.

In portraying themselves in the style of populism the
successful candidates effectively employed a relatively new
and powerful political t o o l .

All these young candidates

came of age as the medium of television began to exert a
pervasive influence on society and culture.

The

6
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presidential elections of 1960, 1964 and 1968 swayed voters
with television images of candidates.

As southerners these

men had a special understanding of the power of the new
medium.

The civil rights movement capitalized on images of

persecution and injustice while southern demagogues
presented a picture of immorality and backwardness.

The

power of television was not lost on these young southern
politicians.

In their campaigns they employed effective

television strategies that emphasized their best qualities
or planted seeds of doubt about their opponents in voters'
minds.

All of them benefitted to some degree from their

opponents' lack of understanding of the new medium.

Some

of the losing candidates presented their competitors with a
gift by taking actions that produced negative television
images.

Others, employing demagogic practices of yore,

yelled and screamed on television in the same manner that
they had in open air rallies of the distant past.
Successful candidates perceived the diminishing power of
party loyalty, political machines and power brokers that
controlled large groups of voters, and began to appeal
directly to voters through the medium of television.
The new South governors of 1970 also shared political
ambitions that extended beyond the region.

All these young

men had aspirations that stretched beyond their home
states.

Dale Bumpers would leave the governor's office and

serve twenty-four years in the United States Senate.
7
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Reubin Askew twice campaigned for the presidency.

John

West became America's ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Jimmy

Carter's national ambitions actually affected the way he
governed Georgia.

Carter's gubernatorial administration

broke several symbolic barriers of racism, and he used the
office as a springboard for his candidacy for the
presidency in 1976.

These southerners realized that once

de jure segregation ended they could become viable national
candidates.
nation.
South.

Racial problems afflicted all parts of the

The country reflected the ambivalence of the
States outside the South, long accustomed to de

facto segregation, seemed unable to cope with the problems
spurred by that pattern of integration and challenged
busing desegregation plans in the courts and the streets.
President Richard M. Nixon seemed intent on slowing down
executive enforcement of desegregation.

The National

Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders had declared that
the United States "was moving toward two societies, one
white, one black -- separate and unequal."

Southern

leaders realized that they had more experience and, at that
moment in history, more success in dealing with racial
integration than northerners.

These four bright, young,

ambitious men realized that perhaps development of positive
measures to remedy segregation's problems could g a m e r
national political appeal for southerners who could
transcend the race issue, or at least the stereotype of

8
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racial demagoguery, associated with southern politicians of
the past.10
These four politicians also shared a final
characteristic; they all appreciated the fact that changing
attitudes dictated a new approach to the old politics of
race.

The southern gubernatorial elections of 1970 and the

subsequent inaugural speeches signaled a transformation of
racial politics for the region.

As the campaigns began,

however, persistent ambivalence concerning the pace of
integration and court-ordered busing of school children to
achieve racial balances tempted many politicians to exploit
these concerns.

The 1970 elections demonstrated that

southerners had decided to obey the law.

The successful

candidates understood that the electorate had come to this
decision with varying degrees of enthusiasm and that their
campaigns must reflect their constituents' ambivalence;
they must eschew the rhetoric of resistance without
uttering strong words in favor of desegregation and
particularly busing.

Noisy challengers conducting

campaigns of the past allowed most of the eventual winners
to conduct' quiet campaigns that included no overt gestures
to gain the support of blacks.
The subsequent elections of 1970 not only feature a
new type of candidate, but they also took place in a
drastically changed political context.

During the 1960s

the South flirted with the GOP for the first time since
9
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Reconstruction and elected many Republicans to office.
After the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, even the most
recalcitrant southerners realized that racial integration
had moved beyond politics and that the law would be
enforced no matter which party held office.

Politicians no

longer found it necessary to demonstrate a devotion to
white supremacy and segregation in order to gain office in
the region.

The implications of this acceptance of

integration affected the gubernatorial campaigns and the
candidates who participated in them.

Although black voters

constituted no more than twenty-five percent of the
electorate in any of the four southern states examined in
this work, the cohesion of black voters combined with the
growing white moderate vote often represented the balance
of power in statewide elections.

Because of federal civil

rights legislation and national appeals by the Democratic
Party, the black vote moved solidly into the Democratic
camp in the South.

Republicans lost a golden political

opportunity to control or influence a potential swing vote.
Instead, the GOP appealed to traditional southern
prejudices and politics.

It therefore attracted many

conservative voters, but the southern electorate had grown
jaded by decades of opportunistic racial appeals.
Even though southern Democrats knew how to count votes
and did not want to alienate black or moderate voters, they
still stopped short of forming a viable, morally binding

10
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coalition.

Partly this resulted from the knowledge that

black voters had nowhere else to go in the face of the
Republicans'

southern strategy that attempted to play on

white southerners' anxieties concerning desegregation.
Although not catering to racial fears, the successful
candidates in 1970 at least gave a nod to those
apprehensions by neglecting to reach out to black voters.
All the candidates both diverted attention from the racial
issue to some degree and made no substantial effort to
incorporate blacks into the Democratic coalition.

In

Arkansas Dale Bumpers could calmly respond to Orval Faubus'
frenzied attempts to make busing the main issue of the
campaign by simply saying that all the candidates opposed
busing but that until the Supreme Court made a ruling there
was nothing that any of them could do.

In Florida, before

the campaign season began, the incumbent Republican
governor unsuccessfully challenged federal authority over a
court-ordered desegregation plan that included busing.
When campaigning began in earnest, the eventual winner,
Reubin Askew,

could ignore the busing issue and emphasize

an issue that had economic appeal.

Similarly in South

Carolina, the Republican candidate drew unfavorable
national attention with his fiery anti-busing rhetoric that
seemed to contribute to an incident in which angry white
parents overturned a bus that had carried black school
children.

This allowed John West to follow a middle path
11
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that promised little more than compliance with the law.
Jimmy Carter in Georgia faced the most difficult campaign
because his main adversary had already established his
place at the middle of the political spectrum.

Running

against a moderate former governor, Carter had to stake out
a position that would appeal to those on the right of the
political spectrum without alienating the growing numbers
of black and moderate voters.

Successfully running a

campaign of subterfuge, diverting attention from racial
prejudice without condemning it, Carter set the pattern for
political campaigns for the future that ultimately
propelled him onto a national political stage.
Taken together the elections of these four moderate
southern governors reveal a great deal about a pivotal
period in Southern political history.

As Dale Bumpers'

asserted, his election and the victories of Askew, West and
Carter had not come about by happenstance,

they resulted

from a cry for new leadership in the South.

All four of

the newly elected governors demonstrated leadership
qualities in their inaugural addresses that announced that
the South no longer sought to perpetuate racism.

They

later took constructive steps toward establishing better
race relations, but an evaluation of the gubernatorial
administrations is not the topic of this study.
investigates their gubernatorial campaigns.

It

Electoral

pursuits provide a more accurate portrayal of public
12
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attitudes than the actions of a governor.

Candidates must

function in the political environment in which they pursue
election.

For that reason, the study begins by examining

the transformed political landscape of the South in 1970.
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CHAPTER 2
A CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Politicians seldom initiate social change, rather they
mirror the electorate that put them into office.

The

southern governors elected in 1970 won office because they
convinced voters that they held the same beliefs and would,
if elected, act on those issues important to voters.

In

other words, these politicians did not lead, but followed
the electorate from which they sought favor.
Writing at the time of the 1970 election of a "new
mood in the South," Tom wicker, of the New York Times,
noted that these new governors described themselves as
"products of a particular time and mood in the South,
rather than as creators of a movement."

Reubin Askew, the

newly elected governor of Florida, believed that southern
whites had changed their attitude on the race question.
"That question, is, I believe," said Askew,
an overriding political consideration."

"fading away as

Jimmy Carter, the

newly elected governor of Georgia, asserted that it would
be a serious mistake for a candidate to revive racism as a
campaign theme.

"I know my people, and I am saying what

they are thinking," Carter told T i m e .

"We have a lot of

problems still left concerning race, but we are no longer
preoccupied with this problem to the exclusion of others.
There is a new dynamic, a new freedom that exists
throughout the South."1
14
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Many things did seem new in the South of 1970,
although to herald change in the region was not new at a l l .
"New Souths" had been proclaimed since the 1880s when Henry
W. Grady, and other optimistic southerners envisioned a
region rising out of the ashes of Civil War and
Reconstruction.

The term "New South," according to

historian Paul Gaston,

"bespoke harmonious reconciliation

of sectional differences,

racial peace, and a new economic

and social order based on industry and scientific,
diversified agriculture -- all of which would lead,
eventually, to the South's dominance in the reunited
nation."

During the 1920s an infusion of new and expanding

industries in the region prompted Richard Edmonds, the
patriarch of southern boosters,

to claim that the region

was "writing an Epic of Progress and Prosperity in Letters
of Gold."

During World War II the South benefitted from

the increased presence of defense industries.

The region

emerged from the conflict, as H.C. Nixon said, with "a
standard of living for the common man that was undreamt of
in its prewar philosophy."

Although the postwar South held

promise, the region could not adjust to the onslaught of
social change brought on by economic and racial
adjustments.

Over and over,

southerners had sought

redemption from the past with optimistic proclamations for
the future -- while refusing to deal with the problems of
the present.2
15
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By 1970, however,

there seemed little doubt that the

South had changed for the better.

Some even called the

region the "Good South" to communicate the positive changes
occurring.

Evidence of a good South abounded.

The 1970

census reflected significant gains in education, wealth and
population in the region.

The number of people moving into

the South exceeded out-migration for the first time since
Reconstruction.

Many northern blacks returned to the land

of their ancestral roots,

feeling more comfortable there

than in other regions of the nation.

The South had

created, albeit reluctantly, a new society which most found
better than the old one they had been forced to leave
behind.

"By accepting the legal direction to obey the

Constitution and do what was morally right.." Atlanta
journalist, Ralph McGill observed in 1968,
white man was freed to advance his economy,

"the Southern
to remove his

political system from bondage, and to begin improving the
quality of his education so that it would give Southern
children equal opportunity . . . with children in the rest
of the nation."3
No change, however, proved more important in the 1970
election than those related to race relations.

By 1970

southern attitudes suggested less rigid, more accommodating
race relations.

The fact that these new more agreeable

relations came about after years of civil rights struggles
and federal pressure to alleviate de jure segregation did
16
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not diminish the transformation.

In the fall of 1970,

sixteen years after the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of
Education decision ended legal school segregation,

southern

schools became the most thoroughly integrated in the
nation.
As southerners grappled with desegregation they also
elected a group of governors who manifested an attitude of
racial moderation.

These southern politicians were not, as

the old saying goes, just whistling Dixie.
changed.

Their tune had

Although their election in 1970 did not mark a

total transformation of the South, it did suggest a subtle
shift in the balance of power.

Although the rhetoric of

racism, resistance and defiance could still be heard, by
1970 southerners had realized the futility of opposition to
federal civil rights policies and no longer wanted to hear
political candidates singing the old refrains of racial
antagonism. Political campaigns dominated by racial
harangues sounded discordant to a region attuned to the
harmonious sounds of moderation.
Although better race relations came about primarily
through federal coercion, individuals across the South
displayed a growing desire to work toward some sort of
racial accommodation.

Deeply held notions concerning the

impropriety of integration did not disappear easily.

Many

southerners required prodding before stepping outside the
circle of racial segregation that had surrounded them all
17
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their lives.

Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General

for Civil Rights, found that many school superintendents in
the South had desegregation plans in their bottom desk
drawers, but were unwilling to use them unless court orders
required implementation.

"Often they would tell us,

must make us do it if you want us to do it.'"

'You

Pat Watters,

of the Southern Regional Council, made a similar point:
"Many white southerners still need the excuse that they are
being forced to do what they know is right about r a c e . ” *
The transformation in southern politics and race
relations that shaped the electoral battle of 1970 came
about for several reasons.

The civil rights movement awoke

a sense of guilt over the costs of segregation in some
white southerners who now accepted integration without
question.

Many worried that the region suffered from the

stigma of segregation.

The taint of racism distorted how

some southerners pictured themselves, while others feared
that rancorous race relations threatened the prosperity
brought on by urbanization and industrialization.

Still

other southerners realized that they could not stop change
and either altered their racial attitudes accordingly or
remained opposed to racial accommodation.

The factors

mentioned above influenced southerners in various degrees;
some may have been affected to an extent by all of them and
some by one or a few.

Some southerners became true

converts, others moved grudgingly toward accommodation.
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But little doubt remained that most southerners, aside from
those few who held firm to the old notion of maintaining a
strict caste system, modified their racial attitudes.
By 1970 many white southerners had come to appreciate
the injustice of segregation.

R.A. Fennell,

school

superintendent in Williamsburg County, South Carolina,
found himself faced with the inequities of a social system
he had helped perpetuate.

After Fennell's mostly black

school district desegregated,

teachers tested 160 black

seventh graders and learned that one out of three could not
read.

"They're my product," lamented Fennell,

recounting

that all those children had started school while he had
been superintendent.

"I think that, as educators, we have

to level with the people and be frank about the kind of
education we've provided for the Negro children in the
past.

We haven't been candid in the past."

The civil

rights movement also stirred a deep-seated sense of guilt
that lay just beneath the surface of the southern
experience.

The media images of brutal repression toward

peaceful blacks seeking simple justice awoke many white
southerners to the injustices of a social system that most
had never questioned.

Richard E. Yates spoke for many

whites when he wrote of the shame he felt about the system
of segregation in which he had grown up, and to which he
"gave unthinking approval to until demagogues like Wallace

19

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

and Faubus, without intending, taught me the errors of my
w a y s ."5
A second group of southerners altered their thinking
about race relations due to the stigmas or the costs
associated with segregation.

Ironically,

southern leaders

who demanded defiance of desegregation changed racial
attitudes in ways that no one would have suspected.
Elected officials had presided over efforts to prevent
black children from entering schools, condoned the use of
fire hoses and attack dogs to thwart peaceful
demonstrators, promoted agitation that resulted in
violence, and defied civil authority while denying simple
justice to black citizens.

Such behavior began to alter

the thinking of many southerners, even individuals steeped
in segregation who believed that the alternative would
produce devastating results, and embarrassed a people long
convinced of the appropriateness of polite behavior.

The

incongruent behavior of their own public officials swayed
many southerners disgusted by the lawlessness of urban
rioters and student protests.
Some very practical costs and benefits also induced
changes in the attitudes of rank and file members of the
1970 New South. White southerners displayed a desire to
avoid further racial unrest.

A growing body of white

middle-class, business-oriented suburbanites in the region
realized racial turmoil stymied efforts to invigorate the
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business community, discouraged northern investment and
impeded the economic progress that accompanied urban
centers.

Bayard Rustin, widely recognized as one of the

leading tacticians of the civil rights movement, developed
a strategy of actions designed to portray segregation as
anachronistic.

By attacking urban focal points such as

hotels, lunch counters, transportation terminals,
libraries, and swimming pools, black protestors
demonstrated the glaring contradiction of segregation in a
modem,

industrialized region.

Jim Crow, Rustin contended,

impeded the flow of commerce in the broadest sense: "it is
a nuisance in a society on the move

(and on the m a k e ) ."

Business leaders across the South reordered their
priorities when they realized they could not maintain
traditional race relations and at the same time pursue
economic revitalization.

Boosters who sought to paint the

South in the colors of progress found their efforts
diminished by the patina of racism which covered the
region.8
The new concern with the southern image became acute
during the process of urbanization.

A pattern of

accommodation in the cities of the South preceded the more
moderate climate throughout the region in the early 1970s.
Atlanta led the way.

While other southern cities received

negative national media coverage of racial incidents,
businessmen, politicians, editors, and civic leaders in the
21
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Georgia capital decided to avoid confrontation and called
itself "the city too busy to hate."

Their decision to

accommodate rather than resist social change contributed to
the revitalization of the city and region.

Those governors

elected in 1970 often repeated scenes played out by mayors
of southern cities during the previous decade.

Atlanta's

Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., had rallied a black-white coalition
that sought to improve the city's image and also became the
first southern politician to testify before Congress in
favor of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

City

officials across the South eventually sought cooperation
from black leaders.

Some acquiesced after defiance

produced negative publicity for their cities; others sought
out black cooperation before harmful consequences could be
brought about by racial incidents and federal pressure.
Thus the urbanization of the South played a major role in
racial accommodation.

Southern cities, as Blaine Brownell

and David Goldfield have argued, always served as "links
between the traditional South and the contrary influences
of northern capitalism and the American 'mainstream.'"7
Some southerners, even if they were not truly
converted, grasped the inevitability of racial change.

By

the early 1970's even the most adamant segregationists
realized that school desegregation and black voting could
not be reversed.

As Governor Lester Maddox ended his term

in 1971, many liberals conceded that their fears of four
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years earlier had not materialized.

Although Maddox

noisily protested federal interference with desegregation
during his administration, he presided over more
integration than in any previous period in the state's
history and appointed blacks to state boards for the first
time in Georgia.

"He did not practice what he preached,"

said Charles Weltner, an Atlanta lawyer who gave up a seat
in Congress rather than run for re-election on the same
ballot with Maddox.

In August 1971, E b o n y . a magazine with

a predominantly black readership,
conditions in the South.

ran a special edition on

It included interviews with

several prominent political leaders, including George
Wallace.

The very fact that Wallace would agree to an

interview with Ebony spoke volumes about the changing
attitudes of the white South.

Wallace told the magazine

that the South had "fewer problems in regard to race than
does the rest of the nation.

The federal government can

use the South as an example for other states to emulate in
years to come."

In 1971 Senator Strom Thurmond,

the

Dixiecrat presidential candidate of 1948 turned southern
strategy Republican, appointed a black staff assistant.
Thurmond also spoke to Ebony and asserted that "we have
more in common as Southerners than we have reason to oppose
each other because of race."8
Indeed, it seemed something southern united its
inhabitants, whatever their color or background.
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Pat

Watters described a distinct southern culture belonging to
black and white alike, which "gave the most promise of
achievement finally of a real interracial society."

Using

thirty-two questions from ten national public opinion
surveys Leonard Broom and Norval Glenn concluded that
"Negro-white differences are smaller than the differences
between Southern and non-Southern whites."
somehow maintained its unique culture.

The South had

Once the onus of a

segregated social system had been removed, the South
offered hope of an integrated society that might work.9
Many southerners hoped that their region, long
despised, ridiculed, and pitied by the rest of the nation,
might somehow attain redemption by leading the way toward a
more just society.

A letter to the New York Times from

Baton Rouge, Louisiana,

suggested that the South "despite

its record of documented social injustices, has a great
opportunity to lead this country in the resolution of
racial conflict."

Jimmy Carter spoke of a feeling that

southerners had "been afflicted both personally and in the
national press with . . . unfair criticism because of the
racial problems in the South.

. . . With the alleviation of

this particular aspect of the South's problem -- which is
now a nationwide problem - - w e have been brought along with
some moderation toward the center and into a feeling that
the South is now truly representative of the finer
characteristics of all Americans."

Many believed that
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since the problems of integration extended to many other
parts of the nation, the South, with more experience, more
practical and realistic solutions, could lead the way
toward better race relations in America.

"Racial division

is the sickness of the nation, and the region longest and
most sharply afflicted has surely undergone the most
drastic treatment," observed Tom Wicker, a southerner and
columnist for the New York Times.

"Perhaps, therefore,

Southerners -- slowly but surely dealing with their racial
ills while other Americans only begin to face theirs -have found their energies more nearly freed, their spirits
more nearly lifted, than anyone else."10
Hope that the South might lead the nation toward a
racial reconciliation sprang from outsiders as well as from
many southerners.

Jon Nordheimer, of the New York Times,

after describing a vastly improved South reflected in the
recent census figures, wrote of the opportunity for the
South to help salvage the Union.

Richard N. Goodwin,

speaking before a meeting of the L.Q.C. Lamar Society, a
group of liberal southerners, said he believed that the
South was capable of not only solving its own problems, but
of imparting its values to an America which was "confused,
divided and in turmoil."11
The chance seemed to have arrived.

A new South

emerged in many facets of the southern experience.
1970 Southern Baptist Convention meeting in Denver
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The

displayed a general desire for moderation and middle-ofthe-road policies within the organization.

The members

selected a new president regarded as a moderate and, more
significantly, allowed an unscheduled appearance by a group
of black students who lectured the Baptists on following
the principles of Jesus in regard to race relations.

In

one Mississippi town, school board members could not decide
whether to desegregate on their own or take their case to
court.

The chairman decided to take a secret vote in the

town's service clubs.

The service club members -- all

white, middle class businessmen -- voted against
challenging integration.

The school board took this as the

mandate they needed to implement a plan.12
More than most aspects of life, it would be the
desegregation of southern schools that illustrated how the
South had changed, why it had changed,
ultimately how it had not changed.

and perhaps

By 1970 school

desegregation in the South seemed to work in the places
where it had taken hold.

In general, once exposed to

school integration, most people seemed to favor it.

In the

spring of 1969 the Department of Health Education and
Welfare conducted a survey in thirteen southeastern school
districts that had experienced substantial desegregation
over a two-year period or longer.

Teachers, parents, and

high school students answered questions concerning their
feelings about desegregation.

Almost every person
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interviewed stated that the process had gone better than
expected.

Seven out of ten black high school students

interviewed believed that they received a better education
in integrated schools.

More than nine out of ten white

students saw no difference in the education they received.
Both black and white students expressed satisfaction with
teacher desegregation.

The great majority of students felt

that the race of the teacher made no difference in the
quality of teaching and that the teachers generally taught
without racial favor.13
White southerners had indeed adjusted their attitudes
toward school desegregation.

Studying the period between

1961 and 1976, Earl Black and Merle Black saw a marked
transformation.

"The magnitude of cleavage separating the

races had moderated, with most of the change concentrated
among white southerners.

No longer does an atmosphere of

impending crisis pervade the region."

A May 1970 Gallup

Poll indicated that white southern parental objection to
sending their children to racially mixed schools had
dropped from sixty-one percent in 1963 down to only sixteen
percent in 1970.

This led George Gallup to remark that

this drastic reduction represented "one of the most
dramatic shifts in the history of public opinion polling."
By the end of 1970, a Harris Poll found that southerners
accepted the judgement that de -jure school segregation was
"wrong" by a forty-eighty to twenty-eight percent margin.14
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Southerners had not arrived at acceptance of school
desegregation easily.

Numan Bartley argued in The Rise of

Massive Resistance that southerners acquiesced in the
interest of social stability.

When the South realized that

the Supreme Court would not give in, and that the executive
branch would not allow southern state governments to defy
court orders, state officials could only close the schools.
"Such a policy of calculated anarchy assaulted public
education and threatened the whole structure of southern
society, the regions' economic future, and the vested
interest of southern institutions."

Thus, Bartley argued,

the central issues changed from desegregation to the future
of public education and the stability of the governmental
process.15
Earle Black and Merle Black, made much the same
argument using the Center for Political Studies of the
University of Michigan

(formerly the Survey Research

Center), SRC-CPS, presidential election year surveys.

They

found waning support for strict segregation after 1968,
with most white southerners opting for something in-between
segregation and desegregation.

The authors reasoned that

this change in southern white attitudes resulted from the
fact that "many whites appear to have decided that the
price of maintaining complete segregation . . . was
prohibitive.

To insist on total segregation in the face of

escalating black protest and increasing federal
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intervention meant that other valued goods -- public
schools, economic development, an orderly and peaceful
society -- might be denied white southerners."16
Most white southerners realized that if they did not
share social benefits with blacks, they would compromise or
lose those assets themselves.

Despite widespread

predictions of disorder, when the schools opened in the
fall of 1970, a resigned acceptance prevailed throughout
the South.

Implementation of near-total desegregation of

the region's schools proceed smoothly and with amazingly
little disruption.17
While many whites did not support school integration,
those politicians who sought to exploit the situation
received little support.

George Wallace, a private citizen

in September 1969, urged parents to defy court orders and
enter their children in the schools of their choice.

But

schools receiving desegregation mandates opened without
incident.

In 1970, Georgia parents ignored a newly passed

state law and the public urging of Governor Lester Maddox
to defy court ordered desegregation and sent their children
to their assigned schools.

And plans for white boycotts in

Richmond, Virginia, and Augusta, Georgia, never
materialized. 18
For most parents, welfare of the schools outweighed
any other considerations -- even local control or the
traditional culture of the South.

In 1970 Professor James
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H. Chubbuck, director of the Institute of Politics at
Loyola University in New Orleans, Louisiana,

saw a

coalition of blacks and middle-class whites forming because
of their concerns "about the needs of quality education and
economic development."

In an article entitled "The Schools

Must Survive," the Birmingham News urged the people of
Alabama to "avoid doing or saying anything which might
endanger the physical or educational well-being of the
children who will be attending the schools."

In South

Carolina state officials expressed relief and pleasure as
integration plans proceeded smoothly after one observer
labeled those efforts "the biggest social change to hit the
South since the abolition of slavery."

Virginia Governor

Lynwood Holton set an example of southern resolve not to
disrupt schools when he escorted his thirteen year old
daughter to a school where most of her classmates would be
black, even though as governor he could have legally sent
her to any school in the state.

In an unusual tribute from

a political foe, Virginia's Democratic Lt. Governor, J.
Sargeant Reynolds issued a statement calling Governor
Holton "a man of rare courage and deep dedication to do
what is right for right's sake."

The Washington Post

described the mood over desegregation in Virginia as one of
"passive resignation."

Many southern state officials urged

obedience to the court's edicts, even when challenging
their validity in higher courts.

In an article entitled
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"Making It Work," the Winston-Salem Journal, praised the
local school board for dealing with desegregation orders
with "dignity, decorum and common sense."19
The metamorphosis in southern white attitudes and the
relatively successful desegregation of southern public
schools did not escape the recognition of victims of past
discriminations.

African-Americans provide the most

convincing evidence of a change in the South.

John Shelton

Reed and Merle Black, studied southern public opinion and
discovered that black attitudes toward the South had
improved.

Using the SRC-CPS presidential election studies

between 1964 and 1976, Reed and Black, evaluated a series
of questions that asked respondents to rate several
politically relevant groups on a "feeling thermometer."
The data showed a steady rise among southern blacks in
their feelings toward southerners.

"Southern blacks were

as likely as Southern whites -- very likely -- to express
warmth toward Southerners."

Reed and Black attributed the

rise to the social and political changes in the South since
the mid-1960s.

Historically blacks faced extensive

discrimination, pervasive segregation and widespread
exclusion from the political system, which led many blacks
to cast negative aspersions on those values which seemed
embedded in the traditional image of a southerner.

Changes

in the South, after the civil rights movement, enabled
southern blacks to claim full citizenship in their native
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region.

Reed and Black suggested that the region's blacks

responded,

in the 1970s, by evaluating white southerners

more favorably and "by laying claim to the label
'Southerner.' "20
Although generally pessimistic about race relations in
1970, Vernon Jordon, director of the United Negro College
Fund, believed that "to the extent that there is a ray of
hope, it doesn't come from Washington; it comes from the
state capitols of the South."

Jordon cited the recently

elected "New South" governors' remarks made "not in the
quiet before the election but from the inaugural platform .
. . Perhaps a new day is dawning.

I hope."

Dr. Norman C.

Francis, President of Xavier, a predominantly black
Catholic university in New Orleans, Louisiana, saw in the
South "the emergence of a just reconstruction which the
nation as a whole might well emulate."21
Many northern blacks began to see the South as an
agreeable place to live.

Now that segregation no longer

prevented educated and skilled black workers from taking
advantage of employment opportunities, many favored living
in the South.

After decades of black outmigration, a

reverse migration from the North back to the South had
commenced.

Economic opportunities now existed for blacks

which had previously been inpossible.

Black movement in

and out of the South now began to resemble migration
patterns of the white population.22
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John Lewis, a veteran of civil rights struggles, and
director of the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project,
reported that his organization received fifteen to twentyletters a month from young blacks wanting to move South.
Northern cities no longer held their previous promise for
southern blacks.

Lewis spoke of employment opportunities

for young, trained blacks which had opened up in the South
during the 1960s.

"Segregation barriers are gone.

And,

more than in any other area, there has been a tremendous
amount of progress in the political arena.

I think we will

see a complete drop-off in the next few years of migration
out of the South by black y ouths.1,23
Many black Americans yearned to return to the land
they had deserted and believed that the South offered them
"the best potential for a better life," according to the
New York T imes.
Carolina,

A black activist from Charleston, South

said that southern blacks were preparing "a

refuge" for northern blacks who had grown tired of "beating
their heads against the integration w a l l ."

One recent

transplant, a public relations executive who had moved from
Detroit to Atlanta said: "The potential for success is
simply so much greater here in the South where people,
black and white are getting themselves together."

Carol

Hall, a Memphis television news reporter from New York,
both economic and social changes in the South and
attributed the improvements to more open communication
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saw

between the races.

After leaving Memphis when he was four

years old, Larry Shaw, a vice president of Stax Record
Company,

characterized the region as

upon his return.

"the promised land"

"I find that the things we blacks are

anxious to have straightened out are more possible in the
South.

People are warmer no matter how caught up they are

in their racial prejudices."

Charles Scruggs, moved to

Memphis from Cincinnati in 1970. "I think white people in
the South are more decent.

They haven't changed enough,

and the changes they made were not because they wanted to - they were forced to.

But at least they're different from

the average white in the North."24
Many of the blacks who returned seemed to share the
belief that southern hospitality was no longer strictly for
whites only.

"Here, you go into a store, and people take

time to say,

'How are you today?'" said Daniel Lane who

moved South from Boston,
'Come back, you hear?'

"and when you leave they say,
In the North, they act like they're

mad because you even walked into the store."

The Rev. C.

T. Vivian, active in the civil rights movement throughout
the South, moved to Chicago in the mid-1960s.

He described

blacks who migrated from the South to the North as being
"homesick for just plain folk.

There is more a sense of

humanness in the South than in the North."25
James Meredith, the first black student to enter the
University of Mississippi in 1962, left the South after he
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was shot during a march across that state in 1966.

Five

years later Meredith called a press conference announcing
that he and his family were moving from New York to
Jackson, Mississippi.
basis,

"On a person-to-person, day-to-day

the South is a more livable place for blacks than

any other place in the nation."

The Gallup poll repeated

Meredith's comment and asked people if they agreed.

Blacks

agreed by a margin of forty-eight to thirty percent.

These

improved opinions did not mean that prejudices had
disappeared.

The South did not become the promised land

for northern blacks.

By the early 1970s, however, many

blacks felt more comfortable in that region than in other
parts of the United States.2*
By 1970 southerners, both black and white, had altered
their perceptions and accommodations in regard to race
relations.

Several factors contributed to changes in the

electorate.

But what motivated the moderation in the

politicians who sought to represent this changing
electorate?

The racial demographics of the electorate

presented the most obvious drawback to the use of racial
shibboleths.

Although blacks controlled no state they did

represent a powerful portion of the electorate since the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 dramatically increased the
numbers of black voters in the South.

Most southern

politicians knew how to count, and the political numbers
added up.

Southern Regional Council figures showed that
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between 1968 and 1970 alone, black registration jumped by
212,000 to a regional total of 3,357,000.

The increased

numbers coupled with black voting solidarity compelled
political candidates to take heed of their needs and
desires.27
In the 1960s southern politics opened up in other ways
as well.

The abolition of the poll tax, court-ordered

reapportionments and redistricting of state and federal
legislatures all led to a more broad-based electorate.
More moderate groups of middle-class urban dwellers and the
infusion of two-party competition upset the traditional
mechanics of Democratic politics.
form.

New coalitions began to

The metamorphosis of the electoral system in the

South led to the rise of what some called the "new face
syndrome" in gubernatorial politics.

While having obtained

enough political experience to prove their competence,
candidates such as Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter had not
drawn any negative publicity.

They carried no stigmas of a

segregationist past; they had not been scarred by the
battles of civil rights resistance.

An important part of

their appeal lay in their relative anonymity.

Most voters

did not know them or associate them with a discredited
political system.28
To secure a wining margin a candidate still needed to
appeal to some white voters who remained hostile to
integration.

All southern voters did not welcome the
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zephyr of change, but the politics of blatant racism proved
unacceptable in the South of 1970.

The new climate of

moderation in the region made open appeals to racial
prejudices unacceptable.
not be ignored.

The power of the black vote could

The number of black elected officials in

the region had increased dramatically.

Some black

candidates, such as Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young in
Atlanta, had captured sizable segments of the white vote in
their campaigns.

This suggested that nonracial appeals to

the economic interest of both low-income whites and blacks
might achieve success at the polls.

A politician in

Louisiana described the Democratic Party in the South as
"evolving into a coalition of low-income whites, labor
elements, some intellectuals and blacks - - a new type of
constituency."

And Bill Welsh, the national Democratic

Party's chief southern strategist,

saw a real chance for a

natural black-white coalition in the South.29
In the early 1970s, candidates across the South began
voicing appeals that transcended color lines and spoke to a
pervasive alienation that permeated the electorate.

Voters

in the early 1970s displayed impatience, discontent and
anger toward political candidates as well as the entire
political system.

Vocal and often violent minorities had

dominated the turbulent sixties.

Citizens across America

belonging to what President Richard Nixon called the
"silent majority" felt excluded and exhibited a sense of
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powerlessness.

Candidates who gave voice to the problems

of the average man increased their chances of success.
Many political observers attributed southern voter
discontent solely to resentments concerning desegregation,
but that assessment overstated and oversimplified a
sentiment that ran deep and wide throughout America.

In

the South a sense of powerlessness formed into a pattern of
populism that defended the little man and attacked the
Establishment.

Polls in several southern states

demonstrated widespread alienation among both whites and
blacks who strongly endorsed statements that the average
man was neglected or abused by politicians or public
officials.

So while voter discontent may have included

those who held racial antagonisms,

it also contained many

who simply found government distant and unresponsive to
their needs.30
The South's new found economic progress made biracial
coalitions more palatable for working-class whites.

"In

prosperity, you don't need scapegoats," Emory University
political scientist James Clotfelter Jr. explained.

"You

don't have to blame or apologize for giving blacks jobs if
you have enough jobs to go around."

Clotfelter and William

Hamilton attributed the success of moderate southern
politicians to a new populism.

They described how a

politician might go about changing traditional campaign
methods:

"To meet his constituents' need for scapegoats, a
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nonracist candidate might identify new targets for attack .
. . to replace blacks.

The most appropriate targets would

be powerful economic groups . . . that embody sharply
contrasting class styles."31
In Florida's 1970 gubernatorial campaign Reubin Askew
focused on his plan to tax corporations in the state.

In

Georgia Jimmy Carter said the real issue of his campaign
was "who will control the government -- the people or a
small band of men?"

And, Carter left no doubt about the

kind of men in that small band when he characterized the
former governor as a rich, citified dandy who could not
understand the problems of common folk.

Many political

observers believed Carter had patterned his campaign on the
populist appeals of George Wallace.

Even though Wallace

had used blacks as scapegoats, his campaigns also included
a populist, anti-establishment rhetoric that lay at the
core of his political appeal.

Wallace's attacks on

powerful economic groups such as the "big newspapers, banks
and utilities,"

Stewart Alsop keenly observed in 1970,

"account for that electric current in his shirt-sleeve
crowds at least as much as the race issue."

Southern

politicians learned, in the words of historian David
Goldfield,

"that hollering 'class' was as effective as

hollering 'nigger' once had been."32
Southern Democrats thereby practiced a new brand of
politics that allowed a discreet appeal to blacks, while
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maintaining a large portion of the rural white vote,
heretofore the mainstay of the party.

Democratic

candidates now tried to perch between two difficult and
conflicting elements of the electorate.

Candidates such as

Bumpers, Askew, West, and Carter benefited from this new
brand of politics.

Blacks could not associate them with

racist rhetoric or defiance of desegregation measures, and
yet, as David Goldfield observed, their "populist rhetoric
and modest background appealed to the traditional element
of the party.

This was a facile merger of class and race,

and it became the standard of Southern Democratic strategy
of the 1970s."33
Candidates in 1970 who sought to exploit resistance to
desegregation,

such as Orval Faubus in Arkansas, Albert

Watson in South Carolina and Claude Kirk in Florida, found
voters unsympathetic to their p l o y s .

So it would seem that

those candidates, no matter what their party affiliation,
who caught the wave of reform rode it to electoral victory
in the South.

The willingness of white southerners to vote

for moderate Democrats in 1970 contradicts the theory that
most southerners did not change their hearts and minds but
their partisan loyalties in the 1960s.

The interpretation

that a white backlash against Democratic support of civil
rights created gains for the Republican Party in the South
has come to enjoy widespread acceptance.

For its

adherents, the 1964 election marks the point at which
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southern Democratic loyalties began to wane.

Before the

early 1960s, the public did not see much difference between
the two parties on race relations.

The image presented by

both parties reflected sufficiently ambiguous records to
permit voters to come to whatever conclusion they chose.
Supporters of segregation or integration had little trouble
squaring their racial attitudes with party loyalties
regardless of which party they supported.

The Civil Rights

Bill of 1964 and the subsequent presidential campaign
changed that.

A Democratic president proposed the bill, a

Democratic Congress enacted it, and another Democratic
president signed the bill into law.

Whatever

identification with civil rights Republicans in Congress
may have achieved by their role in passing the legislation
was quickly lost by the presidential nomination of Barry
Goldwater, who made no secret of his intention to ignore
the black vote in the South and go hunting "where the ducks
are."

The popular impressions of the two parties' civil

rights positions changed dramatically.

The Democrats

assumed a liberal image on racial issues, and the
Republicans a conservative one.

Among southern whites who

perceived any difference between the parties on these
issues the percentage viewing the Democrats as the more
liberal rose from thirty-five percent in the early 1960s to
almost eighty percent by the end of the decade.34
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The differentiation in parties' perceived support for
racial change, however, did not necessarily determine how
people voted.

"Greater voter awareness of party

differences does not in itself create a mandating election
system," cautioned Gerald Pomper in a study of party image.
"It would also be necessary to show that votes are actually
cast because of issue preferences."

Common perceptions of

the Democratic party as pro-integration,

it has been widely

assumed, caused widespread defections among a largely
segregationist electorate.

But, as Paul Beck points out,

"aggregate relationships only imply individual ones, they
do not prove them."35
Analysis of aggregate voting patterns through 1968 led
Kevin Phillips, in his Emerging Republican Majority, to
conclude that a white backlash had contributed
substantially to Republican growth.

Other more detailed

analyses of survey data, however, suggest that civil rights
had little to do with partisan change in the South.

In a

study of native white conservatives, Paul Beck found racial
issue partisanship in the South surprisingly low.

Beck saw

the high number of Democratic loyalties as a major
constraint.

"That no more than one in ten," Beck said,

"have brought their partisan loyalties into line with their
racial attitudes and party images belies the popular image
of whites motivated largely by their racial prejudices in
establishing their long-term loyalties."

While Beck
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conceded that a significant portion of the partisan change
within the native white electorate may have deserted the
Democratic party because of its racial policies, he argued
that an even larger share could not be traced to the racial
question which Beck saw "losing its position as an
important issue to southern voters."36
Bruce Campbell saw the civil rights struggles, which
so profoundly affected blacks,

as having only a passing

influence on white partisanship in 1964 and 1968.
Similarly, Raymond Wolfinger and Robert Arseneau, examining
the SRC-CPS election year "likes and dislikes" questions
concerning parties,

found that few native white southerners

ever mention civil rights or racial issues as reasons for
liking either party.

Racial matters became less important

after 1968 and by 1970 almost disappeared as a component of
either party's image.

Democrats continued commanding the

loyalty of native segregationists, and although Republican
strength grew at the expense of Democratic declines,
1970s racial issues faded in importance.

in the

One South

Carolina political authority asserted in 1971 that the time
when the Republican Party could expect large gains merely
on a protest vote against the Democrats was over.

"As a

live issue, integration is fast losing its potency.
Translated into politics,

this means the momentum of the

Republican Party is slowing down." 37
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When the partisan loyalties of the South are compared
to the rest of the country, the supposition that a partisan
shift in the South occurred because of the racial policies
of political parties loses more of its persuasiveness.
many voters,

For

the Democratic Party represented the turmoil,

dissention, and pain suffered by the nation during the
1960's.

Wounded, the Democrats spilled blood not only in

the South, but all over America.

According to a Harris

Survey in February 1970, the Democrats lost their position
as the nation's majority political party for the first time
in the m o d e m political era.

Among the national

electorate, those who called themselves Democrats slipped
to forty-eight percent, down from fifty-two percent in
1968.

The South, with sixty-four percent of the electorate

calling themselves Democrats, remained the most loyal
region in the nation.

Even considering the strength of

black Democratic partisanship in the South, continued
Democratic strength in the region suggested that the
indications of a national weakening of its strength more
accurately explained Republican gains in the South than
assumptions of a white backlash.

Jimmy Carter saw the

South as a reservoir of support for the Democratic Party.
A national Democratic candidate, Carter believed, no longer
needed to devise a special appeal on the race question
because the southern voter had become "just like the voters
in the rest of the nation."38
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Since southerners no longer voted in accordance with
segregationist tendencies, and the region's electorate had
become more diversified and less provincial,
politicians began thinking national thoughts.

southern
Charles

Morgan, a southerner who led the American Civil Liberties
Union in the South, saw positive changes in the countryoriginating in the South.

He pointed to the "new South"

rhetoric of the newly elected southern governors'
civil rights.

stance on

Morgan believed these politicians harbored

national ambitions, and that a southern governor who
reflected a segregationist line did not stand a chance of
being tapped for vice-president.

Lawrence O'Brien,

chairman of the national Democratic Party, said that the
South had "finally resumed its place in the national
Democratic Party."39
Southern politicians saw themselves playing to a
national audience.

They also viewed maintaining the

improved status of southern race relations as an
opportunity to offer leadership on the racial problems
raging in the rest of the nation.

Just as outside pressure

on the South had helped cure their racial ills, perhaps an
outsider to national politics could guide the North toward
better racial relations.

Ghetto riots had rocked urban

centers across the North beginning with Watts in 1965 and
erupting at frequent intervals throughout the rest of the
decade.

Perhaps a politician from the region long beset by
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racial difficulties who demonstrated success in dealing
with racial turmoil might offer true leadership in a
country that the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders concluded was "moving toward two societies, one
black, one white -- separate and unequal."40
A southern politician who renounced the bad old days
of segregation represented the prospect of a more viable
practitioner of political equality than a glib northern
liberal who had never dealt with the problems of
integration.

Having taken that most difficult step of

publicly repudiating a social system that had been a part
of a white southerners' upbringing,

these politicians

achieved a sort of redemption in the eyes of black
southerners as well as the rest of the nation.

After his

election John West spoke candidly about the evolution of
his attitudes:

"I won't say that I'm completely free of any

racial prejudice.

Anybody raised in the South has been

exposed to that and a certain amount is bound to rub off.
But I've watched here in South Carolina some great
leadership during this period of transition, and I've
watched what happened in other states where governors
defied federal court orders on desegregation.

I've watched

and I think I've learned a great deal."41
West was not the only politician who had grasped these
lessons.

Southern governors across the region attracted a

national audience, and the South enticed a nation, racked
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by racial turmoil and violence, to look away toward Dixie.
After years of ostracism and scorn, America embraced the
South.

The civil rights movement isolated the white South.

To the rest of the nation the South seemed different,
somehow "other."

Most whites outside the South saw the

practice of legal segregation as different from their
racial attitudes, anathema to accepted norms of behavior in
America.

The brutal scenes played out in the national

media of southern whites attacking peaceful black
demonstrators, convinced many that white Southerners
behaved not only differently, but unjustly.

These actions

reinforced and intensified the image of the South as
outside the mainstream of American thought and behavior.
The South became a pariah.
By 1970 several factors came to bear on the racial
attitudes of the nation as a whole.

Most southerners had

joined the majority of northerners in viewing legal
segregation as unjust.

Many Americans had deemed a

repudiation of de jure segregation as necessary for the
South to rejoin the Union.

It had taken more than a

century, but now the North welcomed the return of its
prodigal son.

The South was "in."

America had "always

loved the ideal of the South, even as it hated the region,"
according to historian David Goldfield.

"Like an errant

though beloved child, the South's periodic tantrums evoked
national reproach; but after 1965, when Southerners had
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seemingly adjusted to new race relationships, and racial
harmony and peace prevailed where everywhere else there
existed only turmoil, the South could be taken to the
nation's heart again."42
Literature of southern renascence writers such as
William Faulkner, Tom Wolfe, and Robert Penn Warren had
become required reading throughout the country.

Modem

southern writers such as William Styron, Flannery O'Connor,
James Dickey, and Eudora Welty had become enormously
popular outside their native region.

The long-running

television show the "Beverly Hillbillies" continued with
ever increasing popularity.

"Hee-Haw," a vaudevillian send

up of southern culture, became the prime-time prize of
Sunday night.

"The Waltons" television show achieved

enormous popularity attracting forty million viewers a
week.

Based on the novel Spencer's Mountain and set in the

Blue Ridge mountains,

the tales of this rural southern

family reflected a southern sort of conservative stability
that appealed to a country racked by the civil strife of
the 1960s.

Southern cooking also became the fad across

America as the Kentucky Fried Chicken chain swept the
country with astounding success.43
Country music, the music of the South, swept across
America.

The nation had gone "country-crazy," according to

a New York Times Magazine feature story on country singer
Johnny Cash.

George Wallace made country music a part of
48

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

his 1968 presidential campaign.

President Nixon ordered

his chief of staff to invite country music stars to perform
at the White House.

Country music seemed a welcome

alternative to rock music that reeked of student protests
and black music that reminded many of race riots.

Country

singers, Glen Campbell and Johnny Cash, hosted popular
prime-time network television shows.

By 1970 six-hundred-

fifty "all country" radio stations spread across the United
States and Canada appealing to northern whites who
identified with the conservatism that characterized the
southern value system.

These forgotten Americans made up

the core of Richard Nixon's "silent majority."

These were

the working-class Americans most directly affected by
integrated schools and neighborhoods, who approved of Spiro
Agnew's stinging criticism of the media, young protestors
and race rioters who seemed to be shaking the moral
foundation of America.44
So it would seem that the white non-South had
embraced its other h a l f .

Statesman below the Mason-Dixon

line must have welcomed the region's new found acceptance.
Having seen the frightening images of southern demagogues
displayed in the national media, those who sought
leadership roles in the early seventies tempered their
actions, lest they be portrayed in a similar fashion.
Southern candidates could now aspire to a national
political forum that had never been possible for their
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predecessors.

Political actions, therefore, must be guided

by what would play in Peoria as well as Podunk.
Despite all the evidence of change and acceptance of
integration in the South, some within the electorate held
fast to the segregation of the past and detested federal
intervention in race relations.

These beliefs and

resentments were gaining adherents outside the region and
the issue of busing made matters even worse.

By 1970 most

southerners had accepted integration in principle and in
fact.

But a decided ambivalence concerning race relations

lingered in the South.

Uncertainty resulted largely as a

result of decisions by the federal judiciary.

"The

protests being heard throughout the Southland," wrote Hank
Drake, political editor of Jacksonville's Florida Times
Union. "come not from the arch-segregationists or the Klan
element who in past years have violently opposed equal
educational opportunities for blacks.

They come instead

from parents who are sympathetic or have resigned
themselves to neighborhood integration of schools but not
to integration by gerrymandering or a federal mathematical
formula. "4S
What many deemed as federal interference seemed to go
beyond affording all citizens equal opportunity and moved
into social engineering.
minds of most southerners,

"Freedom of choice" plans,

in the

symbolized the notion of

equality for all races and demonstrated southern acceptance
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of integrated schools.

In 1968 the Supreme Court, however,

concluded in Green v. School Board of New Kent County that
"freedom of choice" plans did not result in significant
school integration and rejected those plans as an
acceptable remedy.

Several southerners expressed

consternation at the ruling.

Until the Green decision

state-segregated school systems satisfied the courts by
removing legally imposed attendance assignments based on
race.

Previously even the NAACP had urged southern schools

to follow "freedom of choice" plans.

With Green. however,

the federal courts required what Brown had condemned -racially based pupil assignments.46
In August 1969 Georgia's Governor Lester Maddox hosted
a conference to challenge federal guidelines on ending dual
school systems in the region.

Participants of the

conference included the governor of Mississippi,

five

southern congressman and school authorities from nine
southern states.

Maddox called on the gathering to defend

the South's "freedom of choice" in school desegregation.
The 120 delegates adopted a resolution by Mississippi
Governor John Bell Williams urging President Nixon to
substitute maximum individual freedom for bureaucratic
directives."47
Some parents,

frustrated at the new tack taken by the

Court, withdrew their children from public schools and
placed them in private segregated academies springing up
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around the South.

By August 1969 these schools contained

300,000 white students.

As white flight increased, only

busing could achieve Green's objective.

Numan Bartley has

argued that by the early 1970s the principle purpose of the
state government of Georgia, and other southern states, had
altered from safeguarding "white supremacy and social
stability" to the "protection and promotion of economic and
industrial progress."

However,

the advent of court-ordered

busing for the purpose of desegregating schools adversely
affected not only working class whites who had always borne
the brunt of integration, but also suburban, middle-class
whites who had led the movement toward racial
accommodation.

More than a few southerners saw busing as

an issue that transcended race.

Once the South accepted

integration it seemed to many that the Court intended to
force on the South a social system that did not exist in
other parts of the nation.

Busing represented a loss of

parental control over the education of their children.

In

some areas parents feared for the safety of their children
being bused into dangerous neighborhoods.

In short, busing

represented an issue that could potentially galvanize a
coalition that cut across party and class lines.

Southern

politicians seeking to embrace the more moderate climate of
the region also had to consider very strong feelings of
voters who saw their children's lives disrupted by busing
plans.48
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Although the large majority of white southerners
disapproved of busing,

some believed that the resistance to

busing was merely an attempt to maintain the duplicity of
segregated school systems.

In January 1970 G. Holmes

Braddock, chairman of the Dade County school board called
his fellow southerners "hypocrites'' and criticized their
complaints about cross-busing.

"We cross-bused in Dade

until three years ago," said Braddock,

"and I never heard a

white family complain, because we were busing to maintain
segregated schools."

People like Braddock remained a

minority, however.49
Early in 1970 a dozen southern senators demanded a
busing ban and attached an amendment to an education bill
pending in the Senate that would prohibit busing to "alter
racial composition." In January 1970 the chief executives
of Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama and Florida promised to defy
federally designed student busing plans in their home
states.

Louisiana governor John McKeithen vowed that his

own children would not participate in busing to achieve
racial balance.

McKeithen described himself as a person

standing firm and "drawing a line in the dust."

Governor

Albert Brewer declared that the Supreme Court did not have
the constitutional authority to order busing in Alabama.
Governor Claude Kirk said he would issue an executive order
to Florida school boards to defy the Supreme Court even if
it meant "going to jail."

Governor Lester Maddox, called
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on the Georgia legislature to abolish the compulsory school
attendance law in order to defy the federal busing
mandates.50
Many southerners shared a deep indignation over what
was being called "forced busing."

Southerners must decide

if they would cling to their new-found moderation or elect
leaders who would return the region to defiance and
resistance of federal pressures over integration.

Could

southern politicians resist taking advantage of the
emotional furor associated with the busing issue?

Would

the issue of busing divert the swelling moderation of the
region back toward racial intolerance in an altered form?
In order to answer these questions the next few
chapters will take a closer look at the 1970 gubernatorial
campaigns of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia.
The campaigns in these states represent various degrees of
racial recidivism.

Some candidates emulated demagogues of

the past and sought to tap into the rancor associated with
busing.

Other new style candidates appealed to disparate

segments of the electorate with campaign subtleties.

These

representative of the New South avoided overt racism that
would insult the region's improved self-image, while at the
same time they offered quiet assurances to those in the
electorate who had not embraced the notion of total
integration.
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The 1970 gubernatorial campaign in Arkansas presented
the starkest contrast between the old and new style of
politics in the South.

Orval Faubus, a candidate out of

the past, who attained notoriety with his defiance of
desegregation, decided to attempt a political comeback in
that election.

The former governor believed he could

employ the old politics of race he had mastered and
capitalize on the resentment toward busing in the state.
The voters would have to decide if they would cling to the
past or embrace the future.
In Florida Republican incumbent Claude Kirk, a man who
was not even a native southerner,

sought to fashion himself

into a defiant demagogue of the past.

Four years earlier

Kirk had represented an alternative to the decaying,
corrupt Democratic political machine.

But in 1970 he

sought to enhance his chances for reelection by defying
federal authority.

The governor revived the old and

discredited notion of interposition and seized a school
district to prevent irrqolementation of a desegregation plan
that included busing.

The Florida voters faced a choice

similar to that confronted by Arkansans.

Would they return

to the grotesque specter of racial politics or trust an
attractive candidate who appeared to represent the
moderation of the New South?
In South Carolina Albert Watson, the Republican
nominee in the gubernatorial campaign sought to test the
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limits of the southern strategy and reinstitute defiance in
the home state of secession.

His fiery anti-busing

rhetoric contributed to mob action involving angry white
parents who overturned a school bus that had carried black
children.

The South Carolina electorate chose John West,

lieutenant governor in the previous administration that had
signalled an end to defiance.
The political landscape of Georgia differed from the
other southern states electing governors in 1970.

Carl

Sanders, the leading Democratic contender represented, not
the defiant past but, one of the few southern governors of
the previous decade who attempted to pull his state out of
the mud of racism and onto the plateau of economic progress
and social respectability.

But Jimmy Carter, an unknown

candidate succeeded in portraying the former governor as
part of the corrupt and discredited political past.

Carter

seemed at first glance to have cut his campaign out of the
pattern of the old time politics, but in reality he was
fashioning a new strategy.

He appealed to class

resentments without making overt references to the racial
animosities harbored by many of the "redneck" voters he
identified with.
trust.

He cast himself as a man the people could

A wide spectrum of the voting public believed him

and allowed him to guide them into the future.
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CHAPTER 3
ARKANSAS
The gubernatorial campaign of 1970 presented the
Arkansas electorate with a unique assortment of candidates
representing the past, present and future.

Former governor

Orval Faubus, attempting a political comeback, hoped that
the rhetoric of the past would appeal to an electorate
frightened by the uncertainties of the present.
Rockefeller,

Winthrop

the Republican incumbent, after dragging

Arkansas into the twentieth century,
escorting the state into the future.

seemed incapable of
Dale Bumpers, a

political novice, did not make promises or even say much
about the issues, but sought to convince voters that an
honest, principled approach to the problems of the day
would serve to answer the difficulties of the morrow.
Three very different men brought diverse backgrounds and
visions to the same campaign.
Winthrop Rockefeller single-handedly molded Arkansas
Republicans into a viable opposition party and in 1966 won
the governor's chair in the process.

He achieved electoral

success by incorporating Republicans, black voters and the
growing body of disaffected moderate white Democrats into a
winning coalition.

Once in office he dispelled the legacy

of the corrupt Faubus political machine, dedicated his
administration to reform and equal opportunity, and brought
business and industry into the state.

Nevertheless,
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in

1970 many believed that the Republican governor had
political liabilities.

Rockefeller's image, in the minds

of many Arkansas voters, remained that of a rich yankee
playboy.

He drank too much, divorced his first wife, and

seemed to spend more time flying around in his private
planes or at his mountaintop ranch than he did in the
governor's office.

On top of all this, Rockefeller's

inability to work with the Democratic legislature had
stifled many of his reform measures.
Sensing Rockefeller's vulnerability, eight candidates
sought to capture the Democratic nomination to challenge
him.

The field of Democratic challengers included Attorney

General Joe Purcell, former House Speaker Hayes McClerkin - both moderates -- and archconservative Bill G. Wells.
One candidate, however, led the field from the day he
entered.

Previously elected to six two-year terms, Orval

Faubus, remained the longest serving governor in Arkansas
history.

After a self-imposed political exile, Faubus

believed he could reclaim his political crown.
Faubus came from a desperately poor little place
called Greasy Creek in the Ozark region of northwestern
Arkansas.

His father, Sam Faubus, scratched out a meager

living as a hardscrabble farmer in order to support Orval
and the six children that followed.

He provided them with

little more than a steady diet of political radicalism.
The elder Faubus went to jail during World War I for anti63
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war activities, resented Wall Street, and supported
Socialist causes.

Sam named his oldest son Orval Eugene

Faubus, the middle name in honor of Eugene Debs, a
political hero of Sam Faubus.1
After completing eight grades in a one-room school,
Orval walked to Huntsville, Arkansas, where he passed the
teachers' examination.

He began teaching and completed his

formal education by taking night courses.

During summer

breaks he worked as an itinerant fruit picker, saw-mill
hand, farm laborer, and lumber jack traveling from the
Ozarks, to the Midwest, to the Pacific Northwest.

At

twenty-one Faubus married a minister's daughter named Alta
Haskins.

Faubus joined the U.S. Army shortly after the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the ambitious Arkansan
rose from private to the rank of major, serving with
distinction in General George Patton's Third Army.

During

his time in the army he wrote a column for his hometown
paper, the Madison County Record.

When Faubus returned

home he became the county postmaster and with his first six
months salary bought the Record and soon turned it into the
third largest weekly newspaper in the state. At the same
time another World War II veteran, Sidney McMath, sought
the governor's chair by calling for a reform-minded
political revolt.

Faubus was attracted by his moderate New

South approach, and actively supported McMath in his
newspaper.

After McMath won he appointed Faubus to the
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Highway Commission, an agency Faubus went on to head.

In

1954 Faubus captured the governor's chair by promising to
bring roads, schools and prosperity to rural Arkansas.2
During Faubus' bid for re-election in 1956, his
opponent, Jim Johnson, accused Faubus of covertly
supporting school integration by not resisting the federal
government's assault on Arkansas' state rights.

Johnson

campaigned on a "mish-mash of distortions, half-truths, and
deliberate lies," wrote the Arkansas Gazette, labeling the
effort "demagogy, with the addition of racial overtones."
The governor labeled his opponent a "purveyor of hate" and
accused him of stirring up "strife and racial hatreds and
tensions ... to the detriment of the state as a w h o l e ."
Faubus pointed to the accomplishments of his first term and
promised more progress if reelected.3
Faubus easily won another gubernatorial term in 1956,
and soon decided he would seek an unprecedented third term.
To break the Arkansas mold of no more than two-terms Faubus
would need a compelling issue.
an unlikely choice.

School integration seemed

The University of Arkansas admitted

black students even before the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling,
and by 1955 five of the six state-supported white colleges
had admitted blacks as well.

Faubus' predecessor, Governor

Francis Cherry, promised compliance with court ordered
integration and announced that Arkansas would "obey the
law."

In 1954 and 1955 ten school districts in the state
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began programs of gradual desegregation.

Governor Faubus

himself had given no indications in his first term or
reelection campaign that he would employ the powers of his
office to resist school integration.

When the Little Rock

school board, in cooperation with the federal district
court, began limited integration of Central High School by
enrolling nine black students for the fall, no one expected
significant opposition.4
As the date approached, rumors of trouble threatened
to disturb the peace.

Only hours before the opening of

school Governor Faubus announced that bloodshed and
violence might result if "forcible integration" ensued.
Faubus called out 270 Arkansas National Guardsmen to
maintain order.

Claiming he had information that

"caravans" of unruly whites were speeding toward Little
Rock, Faubus decided to preserve the peace by ordering the
guardsmen to prevent the nine black students from attending
Central High.

Harry Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas

Gazette, described the day school opened:

"Little Rock

arose to gaze upon the incredible spectacle of an empty
high school surrounded by National Guard troops called out
by Governor Faubus to protect life and property against a
mob that never materialized."

But in the days that

followed white mobs did form to heckle the black students.5
Governor Faubus had set up a confrontation between
state and federal authority in which he and Arkansas would
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certainly lose.

Winthrop Rockefeller, heading up state

industrial development efforts at the time, spent two and a
half hours trying to dissuade the governor from intervening
in a local affair that was none of his business.

"I

reasoned with him, argued with him, almost pled with him,"
Rockefeller recalled years later.

But Faubus told

Rockefeller that he was already committed.

"I'm going to

run for a third term, and if I don't do this, Jim Johnson
and Bruce Bennett

[two segregationist politicians] will

tear me to shreds."6
Faubus met with President Eisenhower on September 13
and seemed to acquiesce.

"I have never expressed any

personal opinion regarding the Supreme Court decision,"
Faubus announced after the meeting.
law of the land and must be obeyed."

"That decision is the
But by then the

confrontation had taken on a life of its own, and Faubus
found he could not control the situation he had created.
White mobs rioted in an orgy of defiance and anger.

On

September 23, President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas
National Guard and ordered in paratroopers to disperse the
mob and to protect the nine black students.

The soldiers

would remain for the remainder of the school year.

In

response Governor Faubus pushed through the legislature a
bill that authorized him to close schools that he deemed
had been integrated "by force."

He then invoked it to

close the Little Rock high schools during the 1958-9 school
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year.

In June 1959 the federal district court ruled the

school closing unconstitutional and the schools reopened.
Faubus continued his defiance in an unsuccessful drive to
add a "close the schools" amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution.7
In the Little Rock crisis Faubus latched onto racial
politics as a means to improve his political fortunes.

He

believed that a failure to take a stand against integration
would make him vulnerable in the next election.

In an

interview the year before his death Faubus said of his
actions in 1957: "It's true in politics as it is in life
that survival is the first law."

And he added: "One of my

black friends came in during 1957 and said,

'Governor,

if

you hadn't done something, you'd have been a goner.' Voted
o u t ."e
Faubus had grasped an issue that would g a m e r
political favor in the state.

He won a landslide victory

in 1958 and three subsequent terms as well.

The

integration issue held great potential for political
capital.

Many white southerners believed that the federal

government had overstepped its proper role, interfering
with a social system deemed appropriate by the majority in
the region.

Further, a loss of local control over schools

disturbed even moderate southerners.

The act of defiance

by a governor against federal authority touched most
southerners.

The governor's recalcitrance evoked state's
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rights rhetoric that permeated southern history and
elicited the memory of southern defeat and subjugation.
Most southerners, regardless of their political beliefs,
admired seeing the representative of the state fighting the
intrusion of federal forces.

But the governor's actions

also carried consequences that many Arkansans would
eventually come to regret.

On the day Faubus died, 14

December 1994, a Little Rock KTHV television news
commentator, Robert McCord,

summed up Faubus' legacy as

having given Arkansas a "reputation of racism and
lawlessness throughout the world."
not like this reputation.

Many in the state did

A decided ambivalence lurked

within white Arkansans; while overwhelmingly opposed to
integrated schools, most whites nonetheless expressed a
reluctant willingness to go along with court-ordered
desegregation rather than see their schools closed and
their reputations besmirched.
Faubus reaped tremendous immediate political benefits,
and seemed politically invincible after the Central High
incident, but he also came to symbolize racial demagoguery
and abuse of political power.

An opposition faction

quickly formed within the state's electorate.

The Arkansas

Gazette led the way with critical editorials of Faubus'
actions in the Central High affair that won it Pulitzer
prizes.

The Women's Emergency Committee of Little Rock

fought the governor over school policies.

Staunch
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segregation had a price that most Arkansans did not want to
pay.

The center of the political spectrum began to grow

and move toward tolerance,
integration.

if not total acceptance, of

The racial card that Faubus played so

effectively in 1957 soon lost its political potency.
According to a 1961 Arkansas poll, the public expected a
candidate for governor to do the impossible:

"do not mix

the races, keep the schools open, but do not go so far as
to disobey the law."

Five years later a plurality of

voters believed that Arkansas had improved in terms of
racial integration, even though a great deal more of it
existed.

Only eighteen percent wanted the governor to

contest federal desegregation guidelines.

In 1966 two out

of three Arkansas voters attached primary importance to
maintaining racial peace.

Even if white Arkansans did not

enthusiastically support integration,

they preferred it to

racial turmoil.9
In 1966 Faubus decided not to run for governor.

After

twelve years of earning the governor's salary of $10,000
per year, Faubus moved into a home valued at between
$100,000 and $200,000.

Faubus explained that his Scotch

blood enabled him to marshal his resources wisely.

He soon

divorced his wife of thirty-seven years, and three weeks
later, married a woman twenty-nine years his junior.

After

the divorce Faubus moved out of his luxurious home and into
a trailer where he published a handful of weekly newspapers
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until he became president of "Dogpatch USA," an amusement
park featuring A1 Capp's cartoon characters.

All the

while, Faubus longed to return to the political lime
light.10
Winthrop Rockefeller presented a tempting target for
Democrats, but Faubus seemed an unlikely candidate to
unseat the sitting Republican governor.

The Republican

ascendancy in the statehouse had come about because of
voter resentment to the entrenched political power Faubus
represented.

Nevertheless, Faubus believed his political

acumen could overcome these o d d s .

The Democratic primary

season began gearing up in early May for a vote in late
August, and the old master believed he had time to
reassemble the most powerful state political machine ever
built.

He planned to call in political favors and carry

the crowded Democratic primary with his old supporters
while the other candidates cancelled out each other's
support.
In early May Faubus purchased thirty minutes of
television time to announce that he was ready to run for
governor and asked for support.

He began his speech by

pointing out that most voters wanted Governor Rockefeller
out of office, and the voters realized not just any
candidate could do that.
experience.

It would take a man of

"Thus," Faubus said,

"many people have turned

to me and urged that I again seek the governor's office."
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Faubus then presented what would become the central theme
of his campaign.

While not directly contesting racial

integration, Faubus focused a great deal of attention on
that controversial topic.

He opposed the busing of school

children to achieve racial balance.

Faubus said his

administration would encourage the establishment of private
schools like the ones springing up around the South to
avoid desegregation.11
Faubus pointed to the latest racial incident in
Arkansas and sought to make political hay by associating
Governor Rockefeller with troublesome blacks.

Faubus

claimed that state officials ordered state troopers to
transport Lance "Sweet Willie Wine" Watson "and two of his
girlfriends" from Little Rock to Memphis.

Watson, a civil

rights activist from Memphis, had led a march across east
Arkansas to protest discrimination against blacks.

Many

saw Watson as an outside agitator who exacerbated an
already tense racial situation in Forrest City, Arkansas.
Faubus went on to point out that "Sweet Willie has a police
record as long as your arm."

Instead of catering to people

like Watson, Faubus said, state officials should be
concerned about "children of all races and creeds who need
protection while getting an education," a thinly veiled
reference to disturbances among students at several
integrated schools.

That point led Faubus into an embrace

of the law and order theme that had garnered support in the
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1968 presidential campaign for both Wallace, who carried
the state, and Nixon, who eventually won the election.
These concerns struck a resonate chord with voters.

Even

in a state where there had been very little campus unrest,
sixty-eight percent of voters polled that year answered
affirmatively when asked,

"Do you feel there is a serious

need for more law and order on Arkansas campuses?"

Tapping

into these concerns Faubus claimed lawlessness had reached
an all time high and cited as an example a recent
demonstration by black college students at the state
Capitol.

Faubus described the students "rudely" occupying

the governor's office, burning holes in the carpet with
cigarettes, taking over the House chamber, scattering
files, swinging from the chandeliers, and shouting the
"vilest obscenities."

It mattered little to Faubus that

his details of the behavior of the demonstrators
embellished and contradicted those of newsmen who covered
the event.12
Faubus' speech then reached a crescendo.

Small lies

amplified into bold, unsubstantiated, attacks of outright
innuendo.

Faubus knew Rockefeller's political weaknesses.

According to an Oliver Quayle poll done for the Democratic
Committee of Arkansas in 1968, the state's voters thought
Rockefeller seemed "strange, alien, and foreign."

Many

believed he wanted too much power, that he drank too much,
that he did not spend enough time in his office, and a
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majority believed that Rockefeller could not understand the
real problems of common people.13
Faubus, the ultimate Arkansas insider,
himself in the role of outsider.

sought to cast

In his first term, the

former governor claimed, he had been invited to a meeting
at "the mountain."

Although providing no details

concerning this vague location, everyone in Arkansas knew
that Winthrop Rockefeller had a large mountaintop farm
home.

Faubus went on to say that powerful people there

said they should make plans for the state because the
people were too dumb to be trusted.

Faubus said he

objected to this "hidden government" and as a result had
lost financial contributions and suffered thereafter from
bad publicity in the press.
Faubus said.

"I did not become a puppet,"

"I rejected the role with all its

implications of power, wealth and popularity."

Faubus

ended his speech by reminding voters of Rockefeller's great
wealth and urging supporters to help raise campaign money.
"We cannot hope to match the Rockefeller millions in a
campaign but there must be enough money to pay proper
expenses.1114
Faubus' television speech drew mixed reactions.
very negative response came from Faubus' former wife.

One
"Oh,

it's the same old story," said the woman Faubus divorced in
1969.
me.

"Just a lot of promises.

They don't mean a thing to

He promised to love, honor, and obey me and he broke
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all those promises."

Faubus' speech fared somewhat better

among other viewers of the telecast.

A spokesman for the

television station said that about sixty people had called
after the speech.

Thirty-four callers said they did not

want Faubus to run again and twenty-five said they
supported the former governor.

The negative phone calls

did not bother Faubus, who did not take long to make up his
mind; he entered into the Democratic primary race as the
clear front runner.

"I am not aperfect man nor the

perfect candidate," Faubus humbly noted.

"I

will be glad

to withdraw when one is found."15
The former political kingpin who had once controlled
the Democratic organization in the state still had
political friends in every county and meant to reclaim
their loyalty.

Faubus said he wanted to return to the

governor's mansion in

1970 because he got tired of

"watching Arkansas go

to hell in a handbasket." Only a

seasoned politician

could defeat Rockefeller, Faubus told

those who asked why

he should be the party's nominee, and

an experienced governor could quickly straighten out the
state's affairs.

The

learn what it was all

others would have to take time to
about, Faubus added.16

Faubus wanted to take advantage of rising resentment
over crime and racial disturbances without alienating the
growing body of moderates who now disdained racist
posturing.

While never making overt racial connections,
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Faubus expressed alarm about the rising crime rate in the
state and peppered his speeches with accounts of recent
criminal attacks that happened to have been committed byblacks.

Disorder in the schools became another favorite

example of lawlessness.

And with the now heavily

integrated Central High School in Little Rock experiencing
interracial student conflicts, Faubus even sought to
capitalize on memories of his defiance of integration there
in 1957.17
During the campaigning season leading up to the
Democratic primary Faubus reserved most of his scorn for
the Republican governor.

Concentrating on the enormous

wealth of Rockefeller, one of his campaign flyers asked the
question: "Will you be bought or will you be free? Vote
Faubus."

The former

governor acted as though the

Democratic primary would serve as a mere formality.

Faubus

hesitated in attacking Democrats whose support he would
need in the general election.

Faubus held to this strategy

until the week prior

to the Democratic vote when one of his

opponents claimed an

issue Faubus felt he could not

relinquish.18
In the last week of the primary Democratic candidate
Bill Wells gave a speech in which he advocated standing in
front of any bus used to achieve racial balance in schools.
In response, Faubus delivered a state-wide televised
address four days before the primary vote claiming he had
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staked out the anti-busing issue first.

The people

"pushing such an idiotic policy as busing," vowed the
former governor, would "not be permitted to prevail."

When

he returned to the governor's chair, Faubus promised his
audience, he would introduce legislation requiring written
parental consent before children could be transported to
school by bus.

If the federal courts and agencies

continued to "destroy public education,

forcing citizens to

start private schools," Faubus promised tax breaks for both
the parents and the schools.19
As the Democratic primary vote neared, newspapers from
around the state published their own opinions on the
campaign.

The Eagle Democrat of Warren, Arkansas, pointed

out that everybody seemed "to be getting on one side for
massive potshots at former Governor Faubus."

The Paragould

Daily Press described a Democratic rally in their town.
The crowd had obviously come to see Faubus "like a crowd
waiting to see Jesse James."

Faubus lived up to local

expectations with "a rousing speech," concerning crime in
Arkansas.

The editorial pointed out that for a candidate

so concerned about the rising crime in the state, Faubus
had a poor record.

"We all know how miserably he failed in

carrying out the law of the land in 1957.

It took the

President of the United States plus the conscience of a
nation to put Orval back on the straight and narrow p a t h ."
The Jacksonville News wrote: "Faubus doesn't sound all that
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bad this year,

it's just that we can't help thinking of the

twelve dark years when the Huntsville king-maker was in the
capitol.

Those were the years when the state was

embarrassed nationally and internationally over Central
High School's integration.1,20
One of those Arkansans who had been embarrassed by
Faubus was a forty-five year old Democrat named Dale
Bumpers.

The youngest of three children, Bumpers grew up

in Charleston, Arkansas,

a town with a population of less

than 1,400 in the foothills of the Ouachita Mountains.
Bumpers' father owned a hardware store and was active in
the Methodist church and area politics.

William Bumpers

served in the state legislature for one year and passed on
his love for politics to his youngest son.

During the

depression Dale worked as a field hand and as a butcher in
a local grocery store.

In 1943 Bumpers graduated from high

school and joined the Marines.

When he returned home in

1946 he entered the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville
and graduated two years later with a degree in political
science.

From there he went on to Northwestern University

in Evanston,
1951.

Illinois, where he received a law degree in

While he was away both his parents were killed in an

automobile accident.

Bumpers returned to Charleston with

his new wife, a former Charleston classmate, Betty Lou
Flanagen.

He became the only attorney in Charleston and

practiced law there for eighteen years, losing only three
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jury trials, and also took over the operation of his
father's store.

In 1966 he sold the hardware store and

began operating a 350-acre Angus cattle ranch.21
While running the hardware store and practicing law,
Bumpers became an important part of his community.

He led

the choir and taught Sunday school in the Methodist church.
He served as city attorney as well as president of both the
school board and the chamber of commerce.

Bumpers' first

entry into politics outside his hometown proved
unsuccessful.

In 1962 Bumpers ran for the office his

father had once held in the state house of representative.
Although he won ninety percent of the vote in Charleston,
his opponent carried the other districts and won the
election.

Bumpers considered running for governor in 1968

but decided to wait and prepare for the future.

Bumpers

criss-crossed the state speaking to youth groups, civic
clubs, and local bar associations.22
Although Bumpers had already begun preparing himself
for a gubernatorial campaign,

Faubus' attempted political

comeback finally convinced him to run.

Bumpers entered the

race saying that he could not look his children and
grandchildren in the eye if he sat idly by while Faubus
came back to power.

Many voters recognized a voice of

concern that echoed their own fears.

Virtually anonymous

outside his home-town of Charleston, Bumpers sought to
capitalize on his political obscurity.

He conceded the
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difficulty of overcoming so many old pros in the race, but
also saw advantages to his situation.

"I think the people

are honestly looking for a new face," said the political
novice.
define,

Bumpers downplayed campaign issues as difficult to
focusing instead on several broad themes.

The

state faced "a crisis of confidence.”

The people had lost

trust and respect for their leaders.

Arkansans yearned for

a fresh new leader who "really cares."

Bumpers sought to

portray himself as a leader voters could trust, a word
seldom associated with his main opponent.

The young

challenger traveled the state incessantly that summer
talking with people.

Bumpers told them all that he wanted

to change the political climate of Arkansas.23
The zeal of the young candidate as well as the
sophistication of his campaign were described in a memo to
Faubus from one of his supporters in northeast Arkansas:
Bumpers was on our local television as well as
Memphis stations almost constantly during the last
week.
He sent a computerized letter to every woman
in our county seeking support.
He attached a door
knob card to every door in Jonesboro.
He advertised
heavily in our daily paper and had tapes on all three
radio stations and he personally campaigned in
Jonesboro, not one but on four different occasions.24
His energetic stumping of the state produced results.
Dale Bumpers had charisma, his personality served as his
greatest asset,

"exposure to the voter was all it took,"

wrote Bill Lewis in the Arkansas Gazette.

Bumpers did not

make personal attacks on his opponents, but emphasized the
stark contrast between himself and the politicians of the
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past.

"I think the day of the screaming speech is over,"

Bumpers told voters familiar with the Faubus style of
campaigning.

"I'll tell you what sells better than

anything else, and that's candor and sincerity."

Bumpers

sought to convey this emotional sense of trust through the
relatively new political medium of television.

"It was the

first time television was used appropriately," said Deloss
Walker, Bumpers' political advertising consultant in 1970,
"by appropriately,

I mean communicating emotion."

And

television could be utilized to convey that emotion dearest
to politicians: trust.

"Voters don't know how to solve

issues," explained Walker years later.

"They want to elect

someone whose motivations they trust."

Bumpers

communicated this sincerity better than any of the other
candidates.

Ernie Dumas, reporter for the Arkansas Gazette

and one of the most astute political observers in the
state, recalled later that his mother had alerted him to
the candidate's talent.

Mrs. Dumas told her son that she

was going to vote for "that Bumpers fellow" she had seen on
television.

Archie Schaffer, Bumpers nephew and campaign

manager, believed the turning point in the campaign came on
television about three weeks before the preferential
primary election.

The Little Rock NBC affiliate televised

a forum for the eight Democratic candidates that featured a
five minute statement by each.

Bumpers spoke first and

gave a sincere talk that the other candidates could not
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match.

When the McGehee Times endorsed Bumpers during the

run-off they wrote that the candidate came across on
television "like a polished professional and leaves you
feeling that he is absolutely right about everything he
says."

Arkansans began to see something special in this

candidate and they began to listen to what he said.2S
Most of the $95,000 in Bumpers' campaign chest, raised
in part by the sale of the candidate's cattle, went for a
television blitz in the final two weeks of the contest.
Articulate and appealing on screen, Bumpers left viewers
with an impression of sincerity.

No desk came between the

candidate and the viewers; Bumpers sat on a stool, used no
script, looked into the camera and spoke in a sincere and
effective manner.

One sixty-year-old man, after seeing

Bumpers for the first time on television,

remarked:

"He

just looks like he's a cut above the kind we usually have
running for governor."26
Orval Faubus, who also depended heavily on that
medium,

realized that he could reach a great many more

voters through television than by traveling around the
state.

But the former governor did not understand the

essence of television nor could he adapt his stump-speech
oratory to this new campaign t o o l .

Faubus taped black and

white programs sitting at a desk alternately reading,
preaching,

shouting from a script.

employed short color messages,

Bumpers, by contrast,

talking quietly as if
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sitting in the viewer's living room discussing the problems
of the state and suggesting common sense, moral solutions.
"When a voter lets you into his home by watching your
television broadcast, you don't scream at him when you get
there," explained Bumpers, contrasting his own style with
that of Faubus without ever mentioning the former governor.
On the night before the election Bumpers held a live
question and answer session that furthered the candidate's
effort to portray himself as someone whose openness,
sincerity and judgement voters could trust.27
Dale Bumpers did not vilify Faubus, or denigrate the
other candidates, or malign busing, or even say much about
the issues.

He ran a positive campaign emphasizing that he

was not running against anybody, but running for governor.
Bumpers' refusal to engage in slander about other
candidates not only deviated from the political norm, but
actually cost the inexperienced challenger some powerful
support.
Almost every moderate to liberal Democrat opposed
Faubus' return to political power and feared that the
former governor would somehow pull off another victory.
After all Faubus had never lost an election in Arkansas.
The opposition therefore sought to marshall its forces
against Faubus.

Influential elements within the Democratic

power structure, including the Pulaski County (Little Rock)
Democratic Party head, assessed their party's contenders.
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This group of powerful Democrats decided that, with the
proper guidance, Dale Bumpers just might win.

Moderate,

attractive and unencumbered by ties to the old political
machine, Bumpers seemed the perfect beneficiary for their
support.

These politically savvy individuals reminded

Bumpers that he stood little chance of success, indeed had
almost no state-wide organization.

Then they offered

Bumpers a deal: in exchange for their powerful political
backing, which would almost certainly guarantee at least a
spot in the runoff, he would malign the record of the
former governor.

The Faubus record of corruption and

political favors provided a great deal of ammunition for
such attacks.

When Bumpers replied that this was neither

his style, nor the type of campaign he wanted to run, he
received an admonition and ultimatum.

Their support rested

on these requirements, he should think it over and let them
know the next day.58
Bumpers left the meeting and called Ted Boswell for
advice.

In the last governor's race, Boswell had, much

like Bumpers, risen out of obscurity, come on strong, only
to barely miss the run-off.

Boswell had run against what

remained of the Democratic political machine of the Faubus
days in power.

When Bumpers explained the situation and

asked Boswell what he would do, Boswell told him no one
would have had to ask him to attack Faubus; he would have
been attacking him from the start.

But, Boswell said that
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Bumpers would probably lose the election anyway and,
afterwards, would have to live with himself.

If Bumpers

did not feel comfortable attacking Faubus, Boswell
reasoned,

then Bumpers should follow the positive path he

had been traveling.

When Bumpers informed his erstwhile

supporters that he would not agree to their terms, their
response strongly suggested that Bumpers possessed little
intelligence.

"Some people have advised me to really take

the gloves off and get rough," Bumpers said publicly,

"but

I decided not to."29
Shortly thereafter he delivered a speech remarkable
not only in its dissimilarity to the politics of the past,
but extraordinary in its assessment of the moral malaise
present in society and its appeal to the better angels of
Arkansans' nature.

Bumpers called on voters to look inward

to find the root of their problems.

Selfishness and a

"complete disregard for others," according to Bumpers, had
become the "predominant driving force" in society.

"For

the common good of mankind, we must rekindle the attitude
of concern for our fellowman," Bumpers said.
conservatives hated each other.

Radicals and

"The whites and blacks

seem to be directing more ill-will toward one another than
ever before.

The energy squandered in hating could be put

to "countless worthwhile uses," Bumpers asserted.

"With

the right spirit and leadership, we can get our state
together."

This candidate sought something very different
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from the electorate.

Rather than exploiting emotional

issues or pandering to polls, Bumpers called on voters to
look within.
brilliant.

The basis for this appeal was both risky and
If people would accept moral suasion as a basis

for solving the dilemmas of the uncertain present,

then

perhaps the candidate who suggested it, who seemed sincere
and trustworthy,

could lead them into the future.30

On the Friday before the primary vote, the Arkansas
Gazette highlighted four Democratic candidates whom they
considered responsible and "capable of restoring principle
and respect to the Democratic Party in Arkansas."
Bumpers made the short list; Orval Faubus did not.

Dale
Bumpers

was "probably the most articulate and polished candidate in
the race," wrote the paper.

The Democratic Party could

"either turn backward into a discredited past or move
forward with principled new leadership toward brighter
horizons."31
One political analyst commented on the eve of the
election that the most remarkable aspect of the campaign
had been Bumpers meteoric climb out of political obscurity.
Indeed the obstacles overcome by the young challenger
constituted nothing less than a political miracle.

Fifty-

five days before the election Bumpers could expect only one
percent of the vote.
percent.

A month later he hung well below ten

The next week only five percent of Democrats

polled thought Bumpers would make it into a runoff, while
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only one percent of those Democrats believed he could win
the party's nomination.32
But Bumpers took off in the last week.

The last poll

before the preferential primary, conducted by Area Market
Research Associates,

indicated that Attorney General Joe

Purcell would capture a spot in the run-off with Faubus,
who led in everyone's polls.

The poll predicted that

Purcell would g a m e r twenty-three percent with Bumpers in
third with a little over eighteen percent.

On election

day, Tuesday August 25, Faubus held to his front-runner
status, leading all other candidates with thirty-six
percent of the vote.

During election night Bumpers and

Purcell, moved back and forth between the second and third
positions.

The outcome remained in doubt until Saturday

when Purcell conceded.

Bumpers, with twenty percent of the

vote, would face Faubus two weeks later in a two-man race
to determine who would capture the Democratic nomination.33
When reporters asked the runoff candidate if he
intended to begin attacking Faubus, Bumpers responded by
saying that he was running for governor, emphasizing for.
Bumpers expressed confidence that he would win the runoff,
asserting that Faubus received "substantially less" than
enough votes to assure a victory in the runoff.

"We expect

to get virtually all of the votes cast for all of the other
candidates but Faubus," Bumpers s aid.

Not everyone agreed.

"Bumpers has plenty of ammunition if he chooses to use it,"
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wrote the Twin City Tribune at West Helena during the run
off.

"We doubt that he will -- he's conducted a clean

campaign thus far and probably sees no reason to change his
style.1,34
No one had to ask Orval Faubus his strategy.

He

opened the runoff by attacking his opponent, and revealed
that he had selected busing as the major issue in the run
off campaign.

"I understand that Mr. Bumpers doesn't think

it is an issue," Faubus said.

When a reporter pointed out

that Bumpers said that busing could not be an issue because
all the candidates opposed it, Faubus responded that
Bumpers was trying to "softpedal."

Did Faubus mean that he

was more against busing than Bumpers was?
do," he answered.

"I certainly

When pressed Faubus conceded that the

governor could do nothing about busing, but asserted that
the governor must speak up for the victims of forced
busing.

As Faubus put it in a televised address on August

30: "The governor is the representative of the people.
speaks for the people many times.

He

Who would be the better

person to stand up and tell Washington that the people of
Arkansas are opposed to this busing?"

If Bumpers won the

governor's chair, Faubus declared "every bureaucrat in
Washington and every federal judge is going to say,

'Why

this busing is all right that we're pushing on the people
because down there they have elected a man that says busing
isn't an issue.'"

The reaction by many to Faubus' attempt
88

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

to make this the issue was reflected by an editorial
cartoon in the Arkansas Gazette.

It showed a banner that

read: Faubus for Gov. Again and Again and Again and Again,
ad infinitum.

Under the banner the former governor spoke:

"Busing is the only issue in this campaign although there's
nothing a governor could do about it"35
Few in Arkansas could forget that Faubus had acted as
the point man for resistance to federal pressure to
integrate thirteen years earlier.

Therefore, busing seemed

the perfect issue for the former governor.

While the

changing climate of politics in the state militated against
appeals to racism, the busing issue struck a chord of
resentment among even the growing number of moderates in
the electorate.

Students from the Little Rock area would

ride buses as part of a court-approved desegregation plan
beginning September 8, the same day voters would choose the
Democratic nominee.

A letter to Faubus from a woman in

Little Rock during that primary season reflected the
attitude of many voters.

"I would definitely like to see

our schools remain segregated but that is impossible and we
might as well accept it.

The 'busing' for no other purpose

except to mix races is another matter entirely."

This

reluctant acceptance of integration led Faubus to realize
that the electorate had changed.

While staking out the

busing issue as his own, he also claimed his stand against
busing had nothing to do with race.

Busing constituted a
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burden for parents and children of both races and an
unnecessary expense for taxpayers, declared Faubus.

He

even sought to distance himself from his own school closing
in Little Rock during the 1958-9 school year.
close the schools," Faubus claimed.

"I didn't

"The people voted to

close them and I merely acted to carry out the l a w ."
Faubus failed to mention that he had sponsored the bill
that gave the governor the power to close integrated
schools and pushed it through the legislature.

Faubus

realized that the current electorate would not stand for
school closings even if those schools faced integration.36
Many saw through Faubus' charade and criticized his
exploitation of the busing issue.

The Times of North

Little Rock ran an editorial cartoon of a man labeled
"demagogue" whipping a school bus labeled "busing issue" as
if riding a horse toward a sign pointing to "political
goals."
O n e ."

The caption under the cartoon read "Riding the Hot
Bumpers refused to ride the hot o n e .

debate over who opposed busing more.

He avoided the

"The people are in

the mood for common sense," Bumpers said rejecting what he
called "sensationalism."

When asked what he considered

Faubus' greatest weakness Bumpers pointed out that his
opponent had been governor for twelve y e a r s .
nothing new to offer.

"He has

His election would be a step

backward.1,37
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Bill Wells did not think so.

The fifth place

candidate in the recent Democratic primary quickly endorsed
Faubus because of what he called the "liberal tendencies"
of Dale Bumpers.

Even though Wells and Faubus had battled

over possession of the busing issue during the primary
campaign, they still shared the same ideological bed.

When

the Citizen Council of Arkansas circulated an eight
question "Report of the Candidates" to all those running in
the primaries, Faubus, Wells and Walter Caruth, running on
the George Wallace inspired American Independent third
party, had all responded favorably.

These three candidates

had checked boxes indicating that they favored states'
rights and opposed federal control of public schools and
busing.

Bumpers and Governor Rockefeller refused to even

reply to the questionnaire.38
With Wells' support for Faubus the right side of the
political spectrum had solidified around Faubus.

The left

and the large center, however, moved toward Bumpers.

Joe

Purcell, the third place Democratic candidate, endorsed
Bumpers saying that he more closely shared his own v i e w s .
When the state AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education
threw their support behind Bumpers, Faubus said he had
confidential information that labor leaders from the North
dictated the endorsement.

Such antiquated antics though,

no longer stirred the electorate.

A man from Stuttgart,

Arkansas, writing to the Arkansas Gazette, compared Dale
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Bumpers to "a fresh breeze on a hot summer night."

The

Stuttgart writer did not dislike Orval Faubus, and even
admitted to voting for him in the past.

"I could enjoy his

showmanship if the times were not so fraught with
danger. "39
Faubus called Bumpers a "country clubber" with no
experience in government who had deserted the Democratic
party in previous elections and reached the runoff as part
of a plot directed by Rockefeller and the editor of the
Arkansas Gazette.

Faubus accused Bumpers of being linked

to the "colossal Rockefeller machine which has fastened its
hold upon the state."

Faubus said that his run-off

opponent had been stalled in fourth place until the
Rockefeller people "moved for Bumpers."

Faubus claimed

they aimed to defeat him in the primary so Rockefeller
would win the governor's chair again.
ring true.

The charges did not

One elderly black man rejected these claims as

he ate hot dogs at a Bumpers political rally.

"I know

Rockefeller didn't put you in the race," the man told
Bumpers,

"'cause he feeds better'n this."

Faubus charged

that Bumpers and Rockefeller appealed to the same type of
voters.

"Therefore," Faubus said,

"if the choice is

between two flaming liberal look-alikes, that vote will go
to the flaming liberal with 500-million dollars."

When

Faubus claimed that a lot of Democrats for Rockefeller
supported his runoff opponent, Bumpers agreed and responded
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that he had invited them back into the party.

Bumpers

noted that it took 220,000 crossover votes to elect
Rockefeller to his first term.

"These people left the

party because of Faubus," Bumpers pointed out.
them to come back . . .

"I want

I say the only way we can win in

November is for them to come back, and they are not going
to come back if Faubus is our nominee."40
Perhaps sensing the veracity of Bumpers' statement,
Faubus' political tactics became increasingly desperate and
bizarre.

Faubus even launched an attack when a news

service quoted a member of Dale Bumpers' Sunday School
class.

The man said that Bumpers always made their class

interesting and gave as an example speculations as to
whether God parted the Red Sea when Moses led the
Israelites out of Egypt or an earthquake might have caused
it.

Bumpers had read this out of a book to stimulate

discussion, but Faubus saw grave danger in this questioning
of biblical authority.

"This kind of teaching by the bogus

liberals," charged Faubus,
Bible."
asking:

"will destroy faith in the

Faubus even took out newspaper advertisements
"What about the Bible, Mr. Bumpers?

isn't all true, can any of it be true?"

If the Bible

Bumpers turned the

incident around to portray Faubus as a political
anachronism lacking the confidence to face the future.

In

a televised appearance Bumpers asserted that the strength
of his religious faith allowed him to consider rationally
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new concepts without being shaken.
faith," Bumpers insisted,
afraid of new ideas."

"It is not men of

"but men of secret doubts who are

The incident emphasized the

different characters of the two candidates.

Faubus seemed

stuck in the past, while Bumpers embraced new ideas.
Faubus had given Bumpers an opportunity to affirm his
religious faith for the many fundamentalists in Arkansas
and made himself look foolish by attacking a man for the
way he taught his Sunday school class.'41
In early September Faubus leveled new charges at his
opponent.

In a thirty-minute telecast carried on ten

stations in the region, Faubus accused Bumpers of believing
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren was "a
great c o u r t ."

The Warren Court had earned a special

disdain in the South because of its many liberal rulings,
including the Brown decision which outlawed segregation in
public schools.

The charge was vintage Orval Faubus: focus

on a point of voter discontent, link that complaint with
your opponent, then exploit, challenge, accuse, and finally
seem to prove the charge by innuendo.

This must be

Bumpers' view, the former governor reasoned in a typical
Faubusian leap of logic,

because the

not have supported Bumpers if he did

Arkansas Gazette would
not hold that opinion.

Bumpers calmly responded

by pointing out that many other

newspapers not known for

liberal leanings had

him.

also endorsed

These included the Blytheville Courier News, the
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Springdale N e w s , the Marked Tree Tribune, and the Paragould
Daily Press, the last of which had not supported any
political candidate in twelve years.42
The Arkansas Gazette threw its support to Bumpers as
did virtually every small town newspaper in the state.

The

McGehee Times, for example, depicted the candidates in
stark contrast.

Orval Faubus was "a face, a politician and

a man of the past . . . his administration was pocked with
scandal, riots and, in the end, a splintering of the
Democratic Party from the dissatisfaction.

Now he's asking

the people of the state to give it all back to him."

The

paper characterized Bumpers as "a dynamic, energetic young
lawyer from a small town who has literally exploded on the
Democratic scene."
man of dignity,

The Springdale News called Bumpers "a

integrity and ability."

The Helena-West

Helena World maintained that "the state needs some new
political blood and that is what Bumpers will give u s ."
The Eaale Democrat at Warren asserted Bumpers offered .
"every asset of the clean young unknown who catches the
imagination of the electorate."

The Times of North Little

Rock believed Bumpers would breathe new life into Arkansas'
sagging Democratic Party," while the nomination of Faubus
"would guarantee a fall campaign based on innuendo and
emotion . . . and place the Democratic Party back under the
sway of the wheeler-dealers.1,43
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As journalistic support around the state grew in favor
of his opponent, Faubus said that these newspapers wanted
to set up in the general election "the same sort of gentlycontested race you would find for king and queen of a
charity ball at some country club -- Bumpers versus
Rockefeller, battling it out, tux-to-tux, cocktail-tococktail, boyish-grin to boyish-grin.

No hard feelings,

i t 's nothing serious."**
The attempts by Faubus to link Bumpers to Rockefeller,
to portray himself as a man of the people battling against
great odds and wealth and power, had worked for him in the
past.

He had been raised in the traditions of populism and

had used these appeals successfully in his many political
campaigns.

But times had changed and Faubus could no

longer portray himself as tilting against entrenched power.
The brand of populism that Faubus had employed had been
replaced.

This new populism favored outsiders who could

convey trust and respectability over screaming demagogues
who railed against a few basic issues held dear by rural
farmers.

No one understood the appeal of character more

than the self-styled country lawyer from the small town of
Charleston, Arkansas.

Bumpers discounted conservative or

liberal labels for himself or his future administration.
"What the state of Arkansas, needs and deserves now as
never before is a man of common sense, good judgment and a
man who will be dignified and conduct the affairs of the
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state in a decent manner."

Perhaps sensing that he had

staked out a position too far on the right of the political
spectrum, Faubus tried to remind people that he had cut his
political teeth as an economic populist.

Heretofore

accusing Bumpers of being a "flaming liberal," Faubus now
claimed credit for implementing liberal programs during his
administrations instead of just talking about them.
Calling himself "the true liberal" in the race, the former
governor said he had brought "social progress instead of
just going out and talking about it in platitudes and
generalities as Mr. Bumpers is doing and as Mr. Rockefeller
has been doing."

Faubus also told the Commercial Appeal in

Memphis that he considered himself a liberal.

When the

reporter asked why he championed so many conservative
views, Faubus responded that the first duty of a politician
was to get elected,

so that he could get things done.

"I

wish none of us had to say the things we have to say,"
Faubus lamented.45
Apparently most of Arkansas' voters agreed.

They did

not like the things the former governor said during the
campaign either.

As ballots came in during election night

Bumpers took an early lead and watched it increase to 58.7
percent of the vote.

Faubus called his own showing

"remarkable," considering the odds against him.

He blamed

his defeat on Senator Fulbright, the AFL-CIO, the Arkansas
press,

"and every other 'liberal' and 'pinko' force."46
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Rather than sinister forces out to get Faubus, the
Democratic run-off demonstrated the political realities of
1970.

The campaign presented a stark contrast between the

two figures contending for leadership of their party and
state.

The newly chosen Democratic nominee voiced

motivations that may have explained his admirable campaign.
"My father taught me that politics is a noble profession,"
Bumpers said,

"and I wanted to prove it."

The candidate,

who had nothing to lose, gambled that a campaign of
"visible honesty" might succeed.

Bumpers got his message

across by constant stumping of the state and by employing
television in a manner that no other candidate in Arkansas
could manage.47
When Faubus bellowed about busing, Bumpers spoke
soothingly.

All the candidates opposed busing and the

Court had not yet made a definitive ruling so that was not
really an issue.

When Faubus admitted that a governor

could not do anything about busing other than raise his
voice, Bumpers seemed to benefit from the electorate's
desire for quiet moderation.

When Faubus attacked his

opponent's religious beliefs, Bumpers' Sunday school
teacher character stood in stark contrast to the former
governor whose administrations held the taint of corruption
and whose recent divorce and remarriage bothered many of
the moral minded voters of Arkansas.

Once the issue of

trust became central to the campaign all the invective
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Faubus hurled at his opponent did not seem to matter.

The

unflappable Bumpers turned every assault to his advantage.
Dealing with problems in a quiet, calm, rational manner
Buxrpers further demonstrated the dissimilarities between
himself and the former governor.
Several erstwhile supporters lamented Faubus' personal
life.

One woman from Hot Springs wrote to Faubus

identifying herself as "a humble female public servant,"
and suggested that the former governor lost this race
because he left his wife for his young secretary.
principle I could not vote for you this t i m e ."

"From

The note

had attached a picture of Faubus' new wife cut out with
pinking shears.

Another unsigned letter claimed:

"Arkansas lost the best governor she ever had because of a
young ambitious girl who looked like an Indian squaw."
Other Faubus supporters contributed different assessments
of the campaign.

A Baptist preacher from Stuttgart,

Arkansas, wrote Faubus that of all the candidates in the
first primary he had feared Bumpers would be the most
difficult for the former governor to defeat in a run-off.
"He was 'new' and all the enemies of sixteen years jumped
on his bandwagon," wrote the preacher.

"He had no record

and never really said what he would do about anything.
Couple this with a nice set of dentures and you have a
winner."

Faubus' own later assessment characterized the

election as inevitable.

No one could have defeated Bumpers
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in 1970, Faubus reasoned, because "a man and the mood of
the voters suddenly and inexplicably got in tune."48
State Republican chairman Odell Pollard, said that the
Democratic primary reflected the electorate's appreciation
of the two-party system that the GOP had brought to the
state.

The public now knew of "the evils of machine

politics."

In other words, the large vote for Bumpers

essentially indicated a rejection of Faubus.

"I distinctly

think it is an anti-Faubus vote," said Governor
Rockefeller.

"Remember, you've got a predominance of

Democrats in the state of Arkansas and I think they were so
refreshed to have a fine, honest, attractive young man who
might come in and give the Democratic Party that which it
had been denied for 16 years."

The governor's assessment

of the primary also accurately portrayed his own precarious
position.

Thousands of moderate and liberal Democratic

voters who had rejected the legacy of Faubus machine
politics by supporting Rockefeller returned to their
political home.

John Harkey, a former insurance

commissioner under Governor Rockefeller, returned to the
Democratic fold to support Bumpers.

"Yard signs are

sprouting all over this town in front of homes of people
who always voted for Rockefeller," Harkey said, "now we've
got someone to vote for rather than having to vote against
someone."

State Democratic chairman Charles Matthews saw

"tremendous appeal" in Bumpers' campaign,

"a new face, new
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leadership, the themes of unifying the state and the
Democratic Party."49
The rejection of Faubus signalled a new day for the
state and the South.

Arkansans felt proud of themselves,

and observers near and far vindicated their self-esteem.
"If in Arkansas Orval Faubus has been beaten
overwhelmingly,

then there must be some message," wrote the

Arkansas Gazette.

"The message may be that segregation is

fading as the overpowering issue in Southern politics."
Many agreed and commented further on the importance of the
Faubus defeat.

The Paragould Daily Press applauded

Arkansas voters because they had "told the world that they
are ready to look to the tomorrows -- rather than the
yesterdays

. . .

They chose the high road . . .

They

chose a man as Democratic standard-bearer not identified
with racial hatred and strife or demagoguery."

National

commentators also heralded the political demise of Faubus.
"Old demagogues like old prizefighters keep coming back for
more," the New York Times observed.

When the former

governor retired in 1966 "most Americans were more than
content to see and hear the last of him, but there was no
way of telling for certain whether his fellow Arkansans
shared that view.

On Tuesday evening he found out that

they d o ."50
With Orval Faubus dispatched, the general election
could proceed without the specter of demagogic demons of
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the past.

Bumpers would face a very different sort of man

than his rival in the Democratic primary.

Winthrop

Rockefeller could only claim Arkansas as his adopted home,
having moved there in 1953.

Not surprisingly, the wealthy,

liberal, cosmopolitan Rockefeller seemed oddly out of place
in the Ozark state.

He sprang from one of the richest

families in America and benefitted from the education,
cultural background and refinements that come with great
wealth.

Although not a typical Arkansan, Winthrop was not

a typical Rockefeller either.

At six feet four inches and

240 pounds, Winthrop did not even look like the rest of his
family, and he certainly did not act like a Rockefeller.
He dropped out of Yale and worked as a roughneck in the
Texas oil fields.

Then almost a year before the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor Winthrop enlisted in the United
States Army as a private.

He later attended Officer

Candidate School and quickly rose to the rank of major.
Rockefeller saw a great deal of combat in the Pacific.

He

fought in the battles of Guam and the Philippines and
suffered wounds in the invasion of Okinawa during a
kamikaze attack.

By the end of the war he held the rank of

lieutenant colonel and had received the Bronze Star with
Oak Leaf Cluster as well as a Purple Heart.

After the war

Rockefeller returned home to New York where he worked a
desk job and pursued the pleasures of bachelorhood.

In

1948 he married a model carrying his child, but divorced
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her a few months later.

Winthrop needed a change; he

called an army buddy in Little Rock who suggested he move
to Arkansas.

Rockefeller accepted the offer and bought

50,000 acres atop Petit Jean Mountain seventy miles
northwest of Little Rock.
began farming and ranching.

He called it Winrock Farms and
The operation included 6,000

head of Santa Gertrudis cattle, 17,000 acres devoted to
rice, soybeans and grain.

He built roads,

silos, b a m s ,

an

airfield, and a mansion.51
Although Winthrop may have been a maverick, he could
not escape his family tradition of public service and
Arkansas became the beneficiary of Rockefeller's
philanthropy.

Education, medicine, the arts, all received

millions in contributions.

Rockefeller also initiated an

economic rebirth of the state as head of the Arkansas
Industrial Development Corporation.52
A life-long Republican, Rockefeller by 1959 had seen
enough of the Faubus political machine and decided that the
state desperately needed a two-party political system.

In

a 1960 address, broadcast on both radio and television, he
argued that a two-party system would create a "healthier
condition in Arkansas politics."

Rockefeller established a

Committee for Two Parties, and funded the Arkansas Election
Research Council to monitor electoral corruption.

A year

later, Rockefeller became the Arkansas Republican national
committeeman presiding over a small, reticent party driven
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by patronage.

No party organization existed.

not even have a list of potential supporters.

The GOP did
Whatever

voter information that might benefit the party resided in
county courthouses controlled by Democrats.
began collecting names in a haphazard manner.

Rockefeller
These early

efforts would eventually lead Rockefeller to become the
first politician in America to maintain and pay for his own
private computer and experts, used strictly for political
analysis.

Rockefeller also ran public opinion polls.

In

late 1960 and early 1961 voters rated four well-known
Arkansans including Faubus and Rockefeller.

The results

suggested that Rockefeller was "a potentially strong
candidate for governor."53
In 1964 Rockefeller decided to challenge Faubus for
the governor's chair, and began his campaign pointing to
the corruption within the Faubus administration.

Faubus

emphasized his own seasoning in office compared to an
"untried, inexperienced former New York playboy."

Faubus

had a field-day contrasting Rockefeller's lifestyle to that
of most Arkansans.

Faubus criticized the outsider's

admission that he got his haircut in New York, that he
served liquor to guests, and that he divorced his first
wife.

The Rockefeller fortune served as the perfect foil

to play on the prejudices of an abundant underclass in the
state.

"This election will show if a poor boy can still

beat a millionaire.

. . . Why, his grandaddy was that oil
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magnate who raised the price of kerosene sold to the po'
folks . . . if we owe the Rockefellers anything, we've been
paying it a long time."54
Faubus often reminded voters that he, unlike his rich
northern opponent, shared a common heritage of hardship
with Arkansans.

One day on the campaign trail, passing a

wagon drawn by mules, Faubus remarked that he had driven
such a wagon in his youth.
car to stop.

His publicity man ordered the

Faubus got out and drove the wagon.

The

accompanying press entourage dutifully lapped up this
homespun photo opportunity.

When the pictures made the

newspapers Rockefeller commented that Faubus would keep
Arkansas in the mule-drawn wagon era while he wanted to
move the state into the jet age.

But the stunt portrayed

Faubus as a man of the people, while Rockefeller remained a
city-slicker who could not imagine the difficulties of
poverty.55
Rockefeller failed in 1964, although the forty-three
percent of the vote he received topped any Republican
candidate since Reconstruction.
contributed to the loss.

Several factors

The challenger's own post

election polling showed that Faubus' personal attacks had
found a receptive audience.

Also the Republican challenger

had failed to unite his own party.

The presidential

campaign of 1964 had increased divisions because
Rockefeller supported the candidacy of his brother, Nelson
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over the eventual nominee Barry Goldwater.

Winthrop

conceded to the New York Times that his brother's campaign
hurt his own bid for governor of Arkansas because "Nelson
is branded throughout much of the South as a liberal."5*
In the South the word liberal almost always held
racial connotations.

And Rockefeller worked hard to

overcome his liberal image as he laid out his beliefs
cautiously.

Integration should be solved on a local basis,

he suggested,

"with encouragement."

While advocating

better educational opportunities for blacks, he opposed the
pending 1964 Civil Rights Act fearing the bill granted
"certain police powers to the administrative, Executive
branch of the government."

Faubus accused Rockefeller of

being an "ardent civil rights advocate" and suggested
Rockefeller's moderate stance was an attempt "to change his
spots on the racial issue."

Rockefeller's caution went for

naught in 1964 but his moderate approach to racial issues
continued.

After the election, John Ward, a Rockefeller

aide, outlined an approach that reflected the changing
temper of the times among southern vo t e r s .

Rockefeller

"should never become completely identified with either
extreme.

He should maintain an attitude that takes into

account the feelings of both sides of the issue, offering
guidelines for both leading to a solution both can accept."
This advice fit well with Rockefeller's own views and
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feelings about race and served the candidate well in the
next campaign.57
Although Rockefeller could not slay the race king in
1964, he did begin to form a coalition that would destroy
the efficacy of racial politics in the state.

Along with

the eight traditionally Republican counties in the
northwestern part of the state, Rockefeller carried the
four counties that contained Arkansas' largest cities.
More important for building a winning coalition in the
future, Rockefeller had made inroads into the black vote.
The poll tax had kept the number of registered black voters
low in 1964 and the eighty-four percent of the black vote
Faubus received in that election indicated that the
Democratic political machine controlled those votes.

On

the same day that he made his concession speech,
Rockefeller announced he would run again in 1966.

In the

next two years Rockefeller traveled the state attacking the
political abuses of the "Faubus Machine."

The news that

Faubus was building a palatial new home added credence to
the Republican charges of corruption.58
In 1966 Faubus decided not to seek reelection.

The

Democratic primary eliminated the candidates that early
polls suggested held the best chances of success.

Jim

Johnson, a staunch segregationist, captured the Democratic
nomination.

The nominee had founded the Arkansas White

Citizens Council and his outspoken criticism of school
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integration in 1957 had prompted Faubus to resist the court
ordered integration plan in Little Rock.

On the campaign

trail in 1966 Johnson refused to shake hands with black
voters.59
But these tactics would no longer serve Arkansas
politicians.

The increased black vote could constitute a

significant portion of a winning coalition.

The poll tax

ended in 1964, and the even though the 1965 Voting Rights
Act did not require federal monitoring of elections in
Arkansas it encouraged thousands of independent minded
blacks to register.

Jim Johnson was the last candidate

that newly liberated black voters would choose in a
governor's contest, particularly in a year in which no
national campaign competed for party loyalties.
Approximately ninety-five percent of the seventy-five
thousand black votes cast went for Rockefeller and provided
his margin of victory.

The Republican candidate could make

outright appeals to black voters without fearing a white
backlash in this more moderate electorate; the strong
segregationists stood solidly behind Johnson anyway.

And

the growing white moderates in the state had moved out of
the shadow of ardent segregation.

According to an August

poll a plurality of voters believed racial integration had
benefitted the state and that Rockefeller would handle the
racial situation better than his Democratic opponent.

In

late September only eleven percent of voters polled wanted
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to see the next governor fight integration guidelines with
"all forces at his command," while sixty-six percent wanted
him to "keep things as orderly as possible."

Arkansans

wanted racial peace and they believed this would improve
their national image.

Fifty-nine percent believed

Rockefeller would make their state look better in the eyes
of the nation.60
On election day in 1966 Rockefeller garnered 54.4
percent of the vote.

In addition to capturing the black

vote and the traditional Republican vote, Rockefeller won
the support of industrialists seeking an improved business
climate for the state as well as hundreds of thousands of
disaffected Democrats.

Most agreed the election had not

reflected a desire for a two-party system.

Republicans

captured only three of the 135 seats in the state
legislature.

Even the newly elected governor saw the

election as an anomaly.

"In '66 the people were not

necessarily voting for me," Rockefeller admitted.
"Certainly they weren't voting for a Republican.
voting against a system they had wearied of."

They were

John Ward, a

Rockefeller aide agreed, he believed that people voted for
his boss because "they didn't think he would steal from
them, and they liked his positive attitude, he was someone
they could be proud of and they could feel good about his
going off and representing the state."61
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As governor, Rockefeller seemed intent on reforming
and modernizing the state.

He pushed through the state's

first minimum wage law, expanded state aid to public
education,

increased teacher and university faculty

salaries, a Freedom of Information law requiring
governmental bodies to allow public access to meetings, a
code of ethics for government executives,

some

administrative reorganization, ending illegal gambling,
legalizing liquor by the drink, rewriting the century old
state constitution, major prison reforms, continued
incentives for luring new industries to the state, and
appointment of blacks to important government jobs.62
However, Rockefeller faced some real problems in his
bid for reelection.

Rather than his reform efforts and

accomplishments in office the public focused on his
personal flaws.

One element of indignation concerned the

governor's enjoyment of strong drink, which he never tried
to hide.

Many voters resented the fact that Rockefeller

seemed to spend too much time out of his office, and out of
the state.

And when he was in the state he could never

make it anywhere on time.
ineffectual.

To many Rockefeller also seemed

Even one of the governor's chief aides called

Rockefeller a "terrible" administrator.

And, when the

governor called a special session of the legislature that
achieved nothing, people began to believe that a Democrat
could accomplish more.

In early September 1968 Eugene
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Newsom,

the governor's pollster, reported that at that

moment a Democratic challenger could win sixty percent to
Rockefeller's forty percent.63
But the Democrats blundered when they nominated Marion
Crank, a remnant from the Faubus political machine.
Sterling Cockrill, a long-time Democratic force in the
state house of representatives said that the party
leadership was handed to Crank "by the status-quo
Democrats,

the county politicians, the Court House group,

the whatever machine there was left."

If any doubt about

Crank's connection with the corrupt political past existed
it disappeared when information surfaced about, what
Republicans called, the "Family Plan."

While Crank had

served in the legislature, his entire family, including his
eight-year-old daughter, drew a state payroll check.

The

Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor, Bill Wells, a
former legislator, had the same problem.

The increasingly

large group of moderate Democrats who had deserted their
party's ranks in 1966 would not return to support an Old
Guard politician and stayed within the Republican fold.
Arkansas' two major newspapers, the Democrat and the
Gazette endorsed Rockefeller over Crank.

Rockefeller's

pollster forecast a fifty-one to forty-nine percent victory
for the incumbent.

The projection proved nearly perfect.

Rockefeller received 322,782 votes to Crank's 292,813.64
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Rockefeller's coalition had held firm.

Rockefeller

carried eleven of the twelve counties with black population
majorities,

including three that had gone for Hubert

Humphrey for president.

Once again Rockefeller won the

Ozark and northern counties where GOP strength dominated.
Metropolitan counties gave the incumbent fifty-nine percent
of their vote and counties with at least one city of 10,000
contributed fifty-five percent.

Rockefeller did well among

affluent voters, receiving fifty-nine percent of the vote
of the highest category of per-capita income.
Arkansans did not embrace the GOP.

And yet

Republican strength in

the legislature increased from two to only five.

All

Republican candidates for statewide races lost with the
exception of the GOP's candidate for Lieutenant Governor,
who barely beat out the Wallace Democrat.

Independent

George Wallace carried the state in the presidential
balloting with a plurality of thirty-eight percent ahead of
the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon.

And a liberal

Democrat, J. William Fulbright, won reelection to the
Senate.

The 1968 election that produced Rockefeller's

second victory did not demonstrate a rise of Republicanism
in the state, but that a moderate on civil rights who
emphasized good government and economic progress could
sustain a majority even in a state holding an eighty-three
percent Democratic majority.6*
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During Rockefeller's second term his difficulties in
accomplishing his desired reform measures increased.

The

obstinate Democratic legislature turned downright hostile
and Rockefeller did little to make it easier for the
legislators.

He refused to engage in the kind of quid p ro

quo that previous Arkansas governors had practiced.
Rockefeller disdained politics as usual and described the
legislators as "shortsighted, petty men" unwilling to face
up to the state's real problems.66
Arkansas' real problem,

in Rockefeller's mind,

stemmed

from a lack of revenue, so he began his second term in a
determined effort to raise taxes.

Upgraded services and

new programs that would keep the state "in step with the
rest of the nation" would require millions per year,
Rockefeller told voters on television.

If the legislature

would pass his fiscal program it would contribute ninety
million the first year in new revenues and $105 million the
next with fifty percent going to education.

His proposals

to raise sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes,
cigarette, tobacco, and alcoholic beverage taxes would have
amounted to an increase of about ninety percent in general
taxes.

Rockefeller called on citizens to sacrifice.

He

launched into a public relations campaign using the slogan
"Arkansas is Worth Paying For."

Although taxes never

command a great deal of voter sympathy, Rockefeller's
proposals garnered outright hostility.

Most Arkansas
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voters found it difficult to accept the notion of sacrifice
on their part when one of the richest men in America had
made the suggestion.

Critics of the tax increases began to

turn the slogan around: "Is Rockefeller Worth Paying
For?"67
Although the campaign to increase revenues did
eventually sway the majority of voters to the inevitability
of some tax increases, the huge increases that Rockefeller
proposed found little support with the public or in the
legislature.

Lawmakers rejected the governor's tax

proposals outright, passing their own modest revenue
measures that produced less than a quarter of those
proposed by Rockefeller.

Even those voters who applauded

the governor's reform efforts could not ignore the fact
that this Republican governor could no longer accomplish
much,

if anything, when faced with a stubborn Democratic

legislature.68
Rockefeller had promised back in his first campaign
that he would only seek two terms, but the governor
despaired of accomplishing his goals within his selfimposed deadline.

In October 1969 some of his aides

prepared a memo debating the pros and cons of another
campaign.

Recognizing the governor's political

liabilities,

such as drinking and marital problems,

difficulties with the legislature and their candidate's
tarnished reform image, it gauged the chances of success in
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1970 with "at best a cautious optimism."

Nevertheless,

the

memorandum held that "the best interests of Arkansas and
the Republican Party would be served," if Rockefeller
sought a third term.

An opposing group within the

administration observed that support had dropped lower than
"it had ever been in previous campaigns," and that the
governor's chances of winning a third term seemed remote.69
Rockefeller chose to act on the more positive
assessment.

In April he wrote to the state's Republicans

to warn them that he might break his two-term pledge.

"It

is painful to admit an error, and reverse oneself, but my
commitment to the Republican Party and to my own
convictions are more important than my one statement.

. . .

Yes, we have made great progress, but we have not yet
dismantled the Old Guard!"

It was the specter of the Old

Guard that motivated the incumbent to run again.
now," said Rockefeller in his formal announcement,

"To quit
"would

impose on me a feeling of guilt all of the rest of my
d a y s ."

A large part of that guilt sprang from the fear

that Orval Faubus, the leading Democratic contender, just
might win.

Rockefeller could not bear the thought of

seeing his fledgling reforms trampled under Faubus' feet.
"Well that's it," said Rockefeller when he learned that
Faubus had entered the race.

"I can't hand it back to

him.1,70
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All of Rockefeller's research and polling had
targeted Faubus.

Ample evidence of corruption, an old

guard political machine run by cronyism, and regressive
policies provided potent ammunition to use against him.
But a candidate very different from Orval Faubus emerged
with the Democratic nomination.
Faubus' liabilities.

Dale Bumpers had none of

Rockefeller would have to try to tie

Bumpers to the Democratic political machine and emphasize
the need to prevent corruption by retaining a two-party
system in the state.

In addition, the incumbent governor

would campaign on his administration's record.

Rockefeller

could point to his four years in office and boast of the
creation of a new job every thirty-eight minutes, a new or
expanded industry opening every one and a half days,
teachers received three pay raises, the state passed its
first general minimum wage law. Despite these achievements,
the task of securing a third term against Bumpers seemed
near impossible.

A poll conducted after the Democratic

run-off vote indicated that the challenger led the
incumbent seventy percent to twenty percent with ten
percent undecided.71
An intensely shy man who had never enjoyed
campaigning,’ Rockefeller found it difficult to motivate
himself against such overwhelming o d d s .

Shortly after

Bumpers secured the Democratic nomination, the governor
publicly doubted if he could "muster the spontaneous
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enthusiasm" of his opponent.

In 1966 and 1968 Democrats

had deserted their party because they opposed "bigotry and
machine politics," said Rockefeller.

Now he conceded that

he might lose that support to Bumpers.

"I think many

Democrats are happy that they do have a Democrat whom they
can rally around -- an honest new personality."

The major

issue in the race, according to the governor, would be
which candidate could do the most for the state.
the advantage of a record to stand on.

He had

"I think it will be

very interesting for Mr. Bumpers to come forward with a
program to outdo the ongoing program of the present
administration," Rockefeller said.72
Two weeks later in a poll conducted between the first
and third of October Bumpers led sixty-one percent to
Rockefeller's twenty-four percent with two percent favoring
Walter Carruth, a candidate running on George Wallace's
American Independent Party.

In this same poll dozens of

voters commented about the campaign.

A sampling of their

responses speaks volumes about the race.

When asked for

their candidate preference some Rockefeller supporters
alluded to his strong points.

"He 'sho' has helped us

colored folks," said one respondent.
underprivileged," remarked another.

"He likes to help the
A few voters saw the

one glaring weakness of the Democratic nominee.
hasn't got a program that I can see.
chicken."

"Bumpers

He is just a fresh

Those voters who preferred Bumpers seemed to
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define their support by the things they did not like about
Rockefeller:

"Mr. Rockefeller can't accomplish too much

with a Democratic legislature.
for.

Two terms are all he asked

Bumpers will give the state a good image.

own man," answered one of those polled.

"Just don't want

Rockefeller in office again," said another.
once in awhile -- makes a better ride."

"Change horses

Some voters liked

the challenger enough to switch parties.
doesn't drink and is very good on TV.

He is his

"Bumpers - - H e

I'm a Republican,

but when it comes to the Governor's race I'm voting for
Bumpers.

I think he's a good Christian man, an educated

man, and a sincere man."

The pollster summarized the range

of comments on the two candidates.
fresh face.

"Bumpers is the new,

He has said nothing of consequence.

He

probably will get better cooperation out of the
legislature.

But Rockefeller's sincerity comes through.

He says what he means and is not afraid to take a stand."73
Seemingly more interested in sparing their client from
the harsh realities of the campaign than furnishing him
with accurate predictions, Rockefeller's pollsters grasped
at every straw of hope.

After the early October poll

positioned Bumpers thirty-seven percentage points ahead of
the governor they predicted:

"The guess on Bumpers' win is

down to just about an even plurality."

Two weeks later

another poll indicated that Bumpers still held a commanding
lead of sixty-three percent of the electorate, but that
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Rockefeller had increased his support by seven percentage
points.

The summary of the poll referred to a recent

British election that had gone against projections.

"I

don't think this race is over by any means," wrote one of
the pollsters.

"Bumpers has played his cards well --

although I don't really think he has much of a hand to play
with.1,74
Two weeks before the election Bumpers' support had
dipped to fifty-one percent while Rockefeller's had climbed
to thirty-five percent.

Bumpers began to campaign in

earnest with public appearances and addresses on radio and
television.
issues.
silence.

He also began to state his position on the

Rockefeller had criticized the challenger for his
Now Bumpers began to state his position on the

issues in a calm and reasonable manner that once again
instilled confidence in the voters without inciting
controversy.

Rockefeller, desperately trailing, went on

the offensive with an advertising blitz and appearing
around the state transported by jet helicopters.

This

obvious display of campaign spending carried consequences.
Polls indicated that Bumpers' lead was growing while the
governor's support had peaked.75
The polls showed just how difficult achieving a third
term would be for the incumbent, and events conspired to
stack the odds even more heavily in favor of the
challenger.

National leaders of Rockefeller's own party
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did irreparable damage to the governor's campaign.

In

September a reporter for Women's Wear Daily quoted Attorney
General John Mitchell as saying that Rockefeller could
defeat Bumpers by buying enough votes from "the far left or
the hard right or the black v o t e ."

Although Mitchell

denied the remark, the comment struck a raw nerve among
many voters.

The Fordyce News-Advocate believed that

Mitchell's statement "pretty well put the finger on the
situation in Arkansas."

Although Rockefeller had a squeaky

clean reputation without a hint of scandal, people could
not help but suspect wrongdoing, or at least take offense
at the large amounts spent on Rockefeller's campaign.76
Some spoke directly to the resentments many Arkansans
held toward Rockefeller's great wealth.

"We're not going

to let our state be bought by any jitterbugging dilettante
New York liberal with a bag full of money," said Bob Riley,
the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor.

Senator J.

William Fulbright also spoke out about Rockefeller's
campaign spending. "The use of his tremendous private
fortune to subvert the democratic process is what offends
me," Fulbright said.

"If we are going to restrict

candidates for governor to millionaires, how many
candidates are we going to have?"

The Democratic

challenger conducting a low-key, low-cost campaign
complained about his opponent's extravagant spending.

"The

expenditures of my opponent in this campaign -- the callous
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disregard for money and the amount of it that's being
spent, so much of it wasteful--," said Bumpers,

"lends

credence to the idea in people's minds that money is spent
lavishly in state government."
campaign spending rang true.

The charges of excessive

When expenditures of the two

gubernatorial candidates became public, the figures
indicated that Rockefeller had outspent Bumpers by more
than four to one.77
While Mitchell's statement still buzzed in voter's
ears, Spiro Agnew came to town to show the Nixon
administration's support for the state's Republican
gubernatorial candidate. Divisions developed among the
governor's staff over the wisdom of inviting the vicepresident, and although Rockefeller decided in favor of the
invitation he conceded that Agnew would probably cost him
some votes.

The problems for Rockefeller began as soon as

the vice-president arrived.
Senator Fulbright.

Agnew began by attacking

This did not sit well with many of

Rockefeller's supporters who also voted for the senator.
The comments also offended many who saw no reason for the
Vice-President to attack Arkansas' senior senator who was
not even running in the election.

Agnew compounded the

damage by making a gratuitous and insulting attack on
Rockefeller's opponent calling Bumpers a "grin and grunt"
candidate.

This did not ring true.

"Anyone who has seen

Dale Bumpers in action," wrote the Arkansas Gazette, "knows
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that he is one of the truly articulate on the Arkansas
political scene."

The visit had cost the governor votes,

the paper believed, because "Agnew knows nothing about
Bunqpers except what Rockefeller's speechwriters have told
him. ”78
Perhaps most damaging, the Agnew visit associated the
very vocal anti-desegregation rhetoric of the vicepresident with the Republican governor who had proven that
racial politics no longer guaranteed success in the state.
Black voters, Rockefeller's most solid group of supporters,
as well as the white moderate Democrats who had supported
the governor in the past, had no stomach for the politics
of racial divisiveness championed by Spiro Agnew.

The

Arkansas Gazette called the governor "bold (not to mention
ambidextrous)

to bring Spiro T. Agnew, the lion of

Mississippi segregationists,

for a GOP rally even as the

Rockefeller organization banks once again on getting 90% of
Negro votes."

The paper also reminded blacks that "as they

lined up with the party of Winthrop Rockefeller, that they
were lining up with the party of John Mitchell and Spiro
Agnew as well."79
Indeed party politics in Arkansas offered peculiar and
incongruent enticements for black voters.

While the party

of Richard Nixon developed a strategy designed to appease
southern whites unhappy with federal desegregation
mandates, the Arkansas Republican party, under the
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leadership of Winthrop Rockefeller,

included blacks in

party politics as well as state government.

Rockefeller

had transformed the specter of racial politics by openly
appealing for black votes.

These appeals demonstrated the

political sagacity of building an inclusive coalition.
Rockefeller's past support included not only Arkansas
Republicans and black voters but the large body of moderate
whites weary of fiery racist rhetoric and corrupt
Democratic machine politics.
The Rockefeller family tradition had long provided
financial assistance to black colleges and Winthrop had
been active in the National Urban League, but Rockefeller
did not come to Arkansas for the purpose of changing race
relations.

Although Rockefeller believed that everyone

deserved equal opportunities, he neither patronized blacks
nor gave special privileges to those who served in his
administration.

Rockefeller represented a turning point in

Arkansas race relations.

The governor filled state jobs

with qualified blacks and had special assistants to keep
close tabs on the hiring of minorities.

After the

assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., Governor
Rockefeller became the only governor in the nation to call
for and lead a memorial prayer service for the slain civil
rights leader on the steps of the state capitol.

When U . S .

News and World Report reported that racial disturbances
racked Arkansas in the wake of the assassination,
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Rockefeller telegraphed the editor calling the report
"misleading and unjustified."

The governor expressed pride

in the conduct of Arkansans during this tense situation.
"In this spirit we are moving forward and hopefully will
set a pattern for the nation, but such reporting . . .
makes our job unjustifiably more difficult and may even be
a disservice to those of us who are sincere."80
Although racial incidents did occur in Arkansas,
Rockefeller exhibited his sincerity in trying to ameliorate
racial tensions.

In 1969 when racial disturbances racked

Forest City, Arkansas, the governor worked diligently to
avert a crisis.

When black activists planned a "poor

people's march" there Rockefeller met with blacks and
whites to ease racial tensions.

The governor opposed the

march, but did not believe he should prevent a legal march.
Instead he persuaded black leaders to postpone the march,
allowing tempers to c ool.

In the next year Rockefeller

tried in vain to prevent confrontation in Earle, Arkansas.
Still many people appreciated the exertions of the governor
in response to racial problems.

"We in Earle were spared

from what might have been a far worse situation," wrote one
woman from that troubled town to the Arkansas Gazette,
"above all, we needed and had the attention of a governor
who remained in close touch all night, and in those days
following, ready and anxious to help in bringing . . .
peace in the most beneficial manner for both races."
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The

Earle woman went on to place the actions of the governor in
a wider context.

"Arkansas has had less racial difficulty

than any other state in the South," the woman reminded
readers,

"with more advancement in the field of human

relations than any other southern state."
this direction, she continued,

The movement in

"had to have strong

leadership, and it received a dynamic push from one Win
Rockefeller .1181
In April 1970 Rockefeller sought to ease the tension
over school desegregation.

Arkansas at the time was

operating forty-nine dual system school districts in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The governor

asked the Justice Department for a delay in order to give
the districts involved time to comply voluntarily.

But

unlike southern governors of the past who sought to delay
desegregation by any means available, Rockefeller seemed
sincere in his desire to work toward an amicable solution.
Two months later Rockefeller telegraphed President Nixon
when the Administration backed off an earlier decision to
force a desegregation deadline for the fall school term.
Rockefeller inqplored the President not to "break faith with
the black community" by slowing the pace of school
desegregation.

The relaxation of the deadline, the

governor warned, would compromise "the position of those
who have courageously gone ahead with objectivity and a
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sense of justice -- if not always with enthusiasm -- in the
implementation of Federal desegregation guidelines."82
Yet Rockefeller wavered in his firm rejection of
racial politics and succumbed to the politically popular
position of opposing busing.

Rockefeller did not believe

that as governor he should interfere in local school
districts with busing problems.

He had supported the

Southern Governor's Conference statement in 1969 calling
for a "quality, nondiscriminatory education for every
child" and urging "restraint and good judgement in the use
of any busing to . . . achieve racial integration."

In

January 1970 Rockefeller said that busing should not be
disregarded "in implementing the court orders, and the law
working toward sound integration."
governor for his stand.

Some praised the

The Arkansas Gazette, applauded it

and called the southern cry against busing "hypocritical"
considering that "whole generations of whites and blacks
alike were bused all over kingdom come to keep the schools
totally segregated."

But the Gazette did not speak for the

majority of Arkansans and Rockefeller knew it.
Rockefeller backpedaled on the busing issue.

In February
"I have not

recommended busing -- and am not recommending it now."

In

a futile attempt to g a m e r support from conservative
elements, Rockefeller compromised his coalition.

"If the

governor's strategy was to antagonize those who have
admired his courage and candor," observed the Pine Bluff
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Commercial after the Rockefeller statement on busing,
he succeeded this weekend."

"then

In that same month previewing

his role as chairman of the 1970 Southern Governor's
Conference, Rockefeller called on the President to issue a
"forthright statement we can understand" on busing school
children to achieve integration.

When Harry Dent, Nixon's

southern strategy advisor, contacted Rockefeller, the
governor agreed "to avoid this subject from a critical
standpoint."

Rockefeller also admitted to Dent that big

delegations of blacks and whites taking opposite positions
on busing caused him "to waffle his position by saying he
wanted the President to clarify his stand."

Dent added in

his memo that "his position really is that he favors all
kinds of busing."

Dale Bumpers, the Democratic nominee for

governor, had no such qualms about letting his real
position be known.

Once again he handled the politically

explosive issue adroitly as he had during his primary
contest against Faubus.

The challenger maintained his

opposition to busing, yet told voters that if the Supreme
Court mandated busing to achieve racial balance in
classrooms that the state would have to comply.

"If they

[the Court] declare busing mandatory, then, of course, that
is the direction we will move," Bumpers said.83
Rockefeller had wavered from a brand of politics that
he pioneered in the state, maintaining a moral position
regardless of where the racial chips might fall.
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Ironically, Rockefeller's approach had by 1970 benefittea
his political opponents.

His inclusive coalition made it

possible for a Democratic moderate to reclaim state
leadership,

as Dale Bumpers admitted after his election.

Many others noticed the transformation as well.

"The day

Arkansas changed," observed Leroy Donald of the Arkansas
Gazette. "was the day after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
assassination when Rockefeller stood on the capitol steps
singing,

'We Shall Overcome.'"

shared this opinion.

Black and white Arkansans

"While Governor Rockefeller helped

free the black man in Arkansas from the oppression of Jim
Crow," said Sonny Walker,

the African-American Rockefeller

had nominated as director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity,

"he also helped free the white man of our

state from the prison of his prejudice."
state, however,

Some in the

saw the black vote as a liability

reflecting the ambivalence of many Arkansans.

While the

desire to move beyond the bad old days of racism pervaded
the body politic,

some resented a concentration of power

derived from a minority voting as a bloc.

The Helena-West

Helena World urged voters to support Bumpers because
"Rockefeller has a strong backing and a big block of voters
who will be all out for him," wrote the paper referring to
the overwhelming black support for the governor.

"These

people, will exert every effort to pool all their strength,
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while so many of the Tax Payers,

the people who support the

state government financially, will not take the trouble."3*
After Rockefeller's victories in 1956 and 1968 the
state Democratic Party reorganized and reassessed political
expediencies.

The party had moved away from the corrupt

political machine of the Faubus years and abandoned the old
political ploy of espousing segregation and white supremacy
at election time.

After Rockefeller's winning example of

appealing to the growing body of white liberal and moderate
voters,

open appeals for black votes no longer threatened

Democratic candidates.

Dale Bumpers could not be linked to

the bad old days of racist,
politics.
opponent,

corrupt Democratic machine

Refusing to concede the black vote to his
the Democratic nominee now sought to reclaim

those votes residing in Republican ranks.

After all, the

national Democratic Party spoke much more directly to the
needs and wishes of black voters in 1970 than did southernstrategy Nixon Republicans.

In October Bumpers told a

group of skeptical blacks that he wanted them involved in
the Democratic Party and the state government.

"I'm

opposed to discrimination in every form," Bumpers
maintained.

He reminded the black group that he had

campaigned all summer without appealing to emotions,
obvious reference to his calm response to Faubus'
rhetoric in the Democratic primary.

an

fiery

A faculty member from

a predominantly black college in the state asked Bumpers if
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his racial appeal might hurt him with other voters.

"It

might," Bumpers replied, but he added that he made the
appeals because it was morally right.85
At almost every campaign stop voters asked Bumpers
questions about race.

A Rabbi asked the candidate how he

felt about Rockefeller's appointment of a black leader to
the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University.
Bumpers responded:

"I would not hesitate to appoint black

men to such positions if I knew them and had confidence in
them."

A student at the University of Arkansas asked him

what he would do to make integration fact "rather than
fantasy."
a fantasy.

Bumpers said he did not believe integration was
He said that all Arkansas school districts had

gone to a unitary school system and that he was sure that
the federal government would enforce the law.

When asked

by another student why the only blacks seeking public
office in Arkansas ran as Republicans, Bumpers pointed to
his efforts to recruit blacks to return to his party.

And

he asserted that participation in the Democratic Party
would best serve the interest of black people.

Bumpers'

attempts to lure black voters demonstrated a transformation
of politics in the South.

The challenger's lead in the

polls suggested that he did not need to openly court the
black vote that would largely support Rockefeller anyway.
But the effort reflected the recognition of the changes in
the South.85'
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Winthrop Rockefeller knew he could count on most of
the black vote, but he had serious doubts about those
disaffected Democrats who had deserted their party during
the last two campaigns.

Rockefeller ran commercials

suggesting that the "same old crowd," would control the
Bumpers administration.

To support this allegation,

Rockefeller pointed to the fact that Bumpers had not spoken
to the issues but expected to take office by "looking
pretty on TV and trying to win with a smile, a shoeshine
and one speech."

Bumpers resented the commercials, saying

that if the old crowd was waiting in the wings they would
never get out of there as long as he was governor.

These

attacks fell on deaf ears for the most part; Bumpers had no
connection with the Democratic old guard and no record to
attack.

Rockefeller did sway some support by pointing to

Bumpers reluctance to discuss the issues or engage the
governor in a televised debate.

"Whatever one thinks of

Governor Rockefeller's program, it is clear that he has
one," wrote the Pine Bluff Commercial.

"While Mr. Bumpers

as late as this week was still getting away with
generalities like being in favor of both quality education
for all and a conservative spending policy.

He hasn't been

very specific about how the state could achieve both."

The

De Queen Bee lamented the fact that twice the governor had
challenged the Democratic nominee to debate the issues.
"And twice now . . . Bumpers has kept a tight lip before
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making any public pronouncement about said debate.”
Stone County Leader at Mountain View, Arkansas,

The

summarized

the two candidates positions as Rockefeller "dwelling on
the inexperience and shallow platform of Bumpers, while
Bumpers is picturing himself as being up against a Goliathtype financial machine."

The paper believed that Bumpers

should "dwell on the issues and problems, for although
money still plays a big role in electing politicians,
people are interested in his opinions and plans and most
votes will be cast on those merits."87
Even this chink in Bumpers' armor proved impenetrable.
Rockefeller's editorial endorsements from Arkansas
newspapers declined dramatically in 1970; his political
appeal could not match that of his young challenger.
Indeed Rockefeller seemed in an untenable position.

The

Arkansas Gazette, having supported Rockefeller's
gubernatorial attempts in the past now applauded his reform
proposals while at the same time backing Bumpers whom they
believed would have more success guiding Rockefeller's
reform measures through the Democratic legislature.

This

contention fit right in with Bumpers' general election
campaign theme.

Even if the two candidates agreed on every

problem and every solution, Bumpers insisted, the
overriding issue in the campaign remained:

"Whose judgement

do you best trust to deal with those problems, who do you
think will work the hardest and who do you think will be
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able to resolve the legislative stalemate and get our state
moving?”

When a student leader of a Young Republican

organization at the University of Arkansas asked Bumpers a
question concerning prison reforms proposed by Rockefeller
but stalled in the legislature, the candidate responded:
"If you want those things, vote for me."86
The final predictions in the governor's race had
Bumpers leading with over fifty percent of the vote.

But

on election day, pollsters, Rockefeller, Republicans and
even Bumpers himself expressed astonishment at how strongly
the challenger finished.

Bumpers' vote margin of sixty-two

percent exceeded that of any gubernatorial candidate in
Arkansas history.

Rockefeller had only thirty-two percent

of the vote with Walter Carruth of the American Independent
Party receiving six percent.

While Rockefeller received

his usual group of stalwart Republicans and dominated the
black vote with eighty-eight percent the incumbent governor
carried only two of seventy-five counties.

Bumpers

dominated northwest Arkansas where Rockefeller had always
done well, and still carried the moderate and conservative
Democratic areas of southern Arkansas.89
Jim Ranchino, a political scientist from Ouachita
Baptist University active in Arkansas' political polling,
thought that Rockefeller had fallen out of contention in
the last week because of a backlash over excessive campaign
spending.

Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt, the
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state's only successful major Republican candidate in the
general election, agreed.

Newspapers around the state

seemed to bear out this suspicion.

The Arkansas Gazette

ran an editorial entitled "The Arrogance of Spending"
denouncing the "fantastic level of spending" in the
Rockefeller campaign even employing "not one but two
helicopters."

Rockefeller had "saturated newspapers, radio

stations, billboards and recently, placed a conglomeration
of mail to the voters that would break any postmaster's
back," the Marked Tree Tribune remarked.

These lavish

practices may have been acceptable in large states, said
the paper,

"but in Arkansas, the campaign staged by Mr.

Rockefeller got to the point where it only negated his real
accomplishments."

The Dumas Clarion agreed that campaign

expenditures had become so lavish that the state should
implement some controls.

Even though "the Republicans may

well have spent six-fold as much as the Democrats," the
paper asserted that Dale Bumpers proved that "an
attractive, personable candidate can win a nomination even
if he is underfinanced."

The Times. in North Little Rock,

marvelled at the fact that Bumpers had won without the
Democratic Old Guard and states-rights factions.

The

Democrats who had deserted the party and independents
"found Mr. Bumpers attractive not only because he was a new
face in the Democratic Party unallied with any of the old
factions or leaders but also because he eschewed narrow
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partisanship and made no promises other than to work on the
state's problems as best he could."
Independent agreed.
Rockefeller,

The Newport Daily-

"Although we supported Governor

there is no question that the Democrats this

time came up with an able leader, one not identified with
formerly powerful factions that the Rockefeller forces
could link him with."90
One group of the electorate more than any other
contributed to Bumpers's success; white moderates returned
to the Democratic party in 1970.

The great middle class of

voters, that group responsible for Rockefeller's past
electoral successes, observed Jim Ranchino,

"had moved from

a rather conservative, intolerant posture in 1960, toward a
greater degree of tolerance and moderation in 1970."
Ironically, Rockefeller, who had done more than any other
politician in Arkansas to bring about this moderation,
suffered defeat due to what he had wrought.

The

Republicans experienced an electoral disaster statewide.
They ran candidates for thirty-six seats in the House, and
ten in the Senate.

None of the challengers made it and the

party held on to only two seats in the House.

According to

Philip D. Carter, of the Washington Post. Bumpers election
"proved that given a choice between a Democrat and a
Republican saying the same things, Arkansas -- like the
rest of the South -- will still usually choose a Democrat.
And so the New South in Arkansas was b o m ."

Indeed
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gubernatorial elections across the South in November 1970
seemed to prove that the Republican southern strategy of
catering to racial fears would no longer play to the
majority of voters below the Mason-Dixon line.91
"The future I envision must be shared by all
Arkansans -- old and young, black and white, rich and
poor," declared Dale Bumpers in his inaugural address.
"This administration will be one of concern, compassion,
and reality . . .
our people."

We must not waste the new awakening of

Perhaps a New South had indeed arrived.92
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CHAPTER 4
FLORIDA

Racial turmoil had not occurred in Florida with the
same frequency or intensity that other deep South states
experienced following the Brown decision that struck down
segregated public schools.

Floridians exhibited much more

interest in promoting growth and tourism than holding on to
a system of racial segregation.

During the 1950s, when

other southern governors shouted for massive resistance,
Governor Leroy Collins spoke quietly in favor of measures
to ease racial accommodation in the state.

In his

inaugural address in 1957 Collins presented integration as
inevitable and suggested that Floridians obey the law of
the land.

Collins pointed out that blacks did not enjoy

equal opportunity and accordingly were "morally and legally
entitled to progress more rapidly."

In 1970, however, a

different Florida governor would seek to enhance his
political career by creating a furor over busing and
challenging federal authority concerning desegregation more
directly than Orval Faubus or Ross Barnett, or George
Wallace ever had.

Although not a native southerner, the

governor seemed to pattern himself on southern demagogues
of the past.

His colorful speech and antics,

confrontational style and defiance of federal authority
combined to paint him in the colors of the past.

The

governor, however, had entered office four years earlier
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looking to the furture.

The first Republican elected to

the chief executive office since Reconstruction, he seemed
to represent a vibrant and growing party that would replace
the corrupt, decrepid and descredited Democratic politcal
machine of the past.1
The 1970 gubernatorial campaign did not bode well for
Florida Democrats.

They faced an incumbent governor who

led a growing Republican party.

The GOP had captured one

Senate seat in 1968 and when the Democrat who held the
other one announced that he would not seek re-election, the
prospects of a GOP sweep of the state's three top elective
offices seemed very real indeed.

Compounding the

Democrats' problems, Attorney General Earl Faircloth, who
seemed likely to gain the Democratic gubernatorial
nomination, represented the discredited old order that had
controlled Florida politics for decades.

Claude Kirk, the

Republican incumbent, could also take comfort in a poll of
legislators, elected officials and lobbyists, conducted in
January by the Sarasota Herald Tribune, that indicated that
the majority of these savvy political insiders believed
Kirk would easily win reelection.2
Claude Kirk had entered Florida politics in 1960 as
the state chairman of "Democrats for Nixon," but shortly
thereafter,

switched parties.

Two years after an

unsuccessful run for the Senate in 1964, Kirk became the
first Republican governor in Florida since Reconstruction.
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He seemed to offer a refreshing change from Democratic
machine politics in which small-county representatives
traditionally called the porkchop gang, had dominated state
affairs.

Under the gang's control,

the legislature had

neglected urban problems, divided up state-funded local
work projects, and merely approved the Democratic
governor's measures.

Kirk described himself as a "tree-

shaking son-of-a-bitch."

In fact, he did seek to use his

office as a bully pulpit; he would focus attention on some
difficulty or politically popular issue and attack with
little regard for compromise or real effort to solve the
problem.

His confrontational tactics seemed to gain

support, at least for a while, from an electorate tired of
politics as u s u a l .

Kirk set the tone of confrontation

during his inauguration address when he unexpectedly called
for a special session of the legislature to finish its work
on a new constitution to replace the existing eighty-five
year old document.

The complex work of drafting a new

constitution had been underway for some time, and the
governor's speech denigrated the efforts of the
legislators.

Kirk's words seemed calculated to win public

support at the expense of lawmakers and served notice that
compromise would be replaced by confrontation.3
The new governor continued his battle with the
legislature when he opposed a salary increase for that
body.

Early in Kirk's administration reapportionment broke
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the long-time legislative domination of the porkchop gang.
Without the graft and corruption of the old system,
lawmakers would be woefully underpaid and under-staffed.

A

bipartisan group supported higher salaries to attract
better qualified representatives, and Governor Kirk had
promised his support.

When the pay-raise reached his desk,

however, he refused to sign it.

Kirk delivered his veto

message before a joint session of the legislature seething
with bipartisan anger.

Kirk criticized the legislators for

ignoring public feelings and voting themselves an
"overwhelming” pay raise.

"As Governor,

I can have no

alternative but to respond to the people when the people's
cause is right and just."

Kirk not only opposed the salary

increase that he had promised to support, he publicly
accused lawmakers of incompetence, irresponsibility, and
even corruption.

He did so the same year that a

governmental audit revealed that the governor himself had
used state money improperly for a honeymoon to Europe,
flowers, cards, food, and travel associated with his bid to
gain the 1968 vice-presidential nomination.

Legislators of

both parties wasted little time in overriding the veto.4
Kirk's vice-presidential ambitions isolated the
governor from his own party, opened him up to criticism
from Democrats, and led to financial problems that plagued
his administration.

Just months after Kirk took office, he

hired a publicist for the state, William Safire, a speech
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writer for President Nixon, who received a $90,000
contract.

Opponents of Kirk quickly realized that Safire

spent more time promoting Kirk than Florida, and they
pointed to a secret memo from Safire to Kirk that said in
part:
soon?

"Is George Wallace planning an appearance in Florida
You ought to go and 'welcome' him as part of your

'confrontation' politics."

Safire advised Kirk to

challenge Wallace and supplied the words for the meeting.
"'You talk about crime in the streets, George.
crime in Alabama?'"

What about

Kirk did not confront Wallace, but he

did stump several Alabama courthouses telling listeners,

"I

know ole George and I like him, but he just can't win
across the country."5
Kirk, on the other hand, believed that he had a
realistic chance to capture the vice-presidential
nomination.

Richard Nixon had attended Kirk's inauguration

in 1967 and told Kirk's former father-in-law that he
intended to run for president with a young southern
Republican in 1968.

During the New Hampshire primary in

March of that year, William Loeb, the conservative editor
of the Manchester Union-Leader. urged a vice-presidential
write-in campaign on behalf of Governor Kirk.

Loeb

reasoned that selecting Kirk would convince southern
Democrats that the Republican party had its "foot in the
door of the South" and intended to walk in.

It would also

show George Wallace that "there is a difference between
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states' rights and racism."
another running-mate.

Nixon, however, selected

Never one to bow out gracefully,

Kirk then threw his support to the candidacy of Nelson
Rockefeller, which angered many Florida Republicans who
strongly supported Nixon.6
In addition to his very public squabbles, Kirk also
engaged in private battles with fellow Republicans.
had an enormous ego and wanted to control the GOP.

Kirk
Even

before Kirk won the governor's chair he had initiated a
feud with the most powerful Republican in the state,
Congressman William Cramer.

In 1954 Cramer had become the

first Republican representative since Reconstruction
elected in Florida and, until Kirk came along, had also
served as the guiding force of the state party.

In 1970 a

senate seat opened and Cramer, with the urging of President
Nixon, entered the race.

The prospects of recapturing the

governor's chair and an open senate seat made some sort of
accommodation between Kirk and Cramer seem compelling, but
the intense animosity between the two men coupled with
Kirk's confrontational political style solidified opposing
forces within the GOP and led to internecine warfare in the
Republican primaries.
against the other.

Both men sought to run candidates

Cramer found the perfect opponent for

Kirk in drugstore millionaire Jack Eckerd.

With little

hope of gaining contributions in a race against an
incumbent, Eckerd could spend large amounts of his own
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money.

He also had the advantage of statewide name

recognition and a powerful campaign team that included
William Murfin, the former state party chairman, and Roger
Ailes, a television adviser to President Nixon.

Adding to

Kirk's woes, a former ally and state senator, Skip Befalis,
also challenged the governor in the GOP primary battle.
The resulting competition within his own party seemed to
pose particular danger to the governor.

Conventional

thinking at the time, expressed in several newspapers and
supported by a number of polls,

suggested that Kirk could

defeat any of the Democratic challengers, but that he faced
real problems capturing his own party's nomination.7
While Cramer viewed Jack Eckerd's candidacy as
detrimental to his adversary, Kirk saw an opportunity for
revenge when the Senate rejected Judge Harold Carswell as
President Nixon's nominee for the Supreme Court.

Kirk

convinced Carswell to challenge Cramer in the senate race.
Kirk saw several positive benefits in a Carswell campaign.
He believed that sympathy for the judge's rejection could
be parlayed into votes.

Carswell's candidacy would also

embarrass many Florida Democrats who had offered profuse
endorsements of Carswell when he had been a Supreme Court
nominee.

Most important, if Carswell won the nomination,

it would solidify Kirk's hold on the party and strengthen
Kirk's chances for reelection.8
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Many believed that the judge's leap into the senate
race landed him well ahead of lesser known figures.

"There

ain't no way Carswell can be beat," said one GOP state
senator.

Carswell, who had dominated national headlines

for weeks, possessed instant name recognition.

And

Carswell's rejection as the second southerner Nixon sought
to place on the Supreme Court propelled him to a near
political martyr status.

Many also appreciated the irony

of Carswell seeking to enter the very body that had
rejected him.

"The poetic justice of this is beautiful,"

remarked a Republican legislator from Clearwater.9
On April 20, 1970, with Kirk and Republican Senator
Edward Gurney standing next to him, Judge G. Harold
Carswell announced that he was relinquishing his seat on
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and entering the race
for the Senate "to join President Nixon in his goals of
restructuring our country and its government along
constitutional, conservative lines."

Kirk also sought to

pin the presidential seal of approval on Carswell.

"What a

flagbearer for the strict constructionists," Kirk said of
Carswell.

"You have a leader here, a man singled out by

the President to be one of nine on the Supreme Court."
Senator Gurney called Carswell "a dream candidate," and
claimed that Harry Dent, Nixon's advisor on southern
political matters, and Rogers Morton, GOP National
Chairman, agreed that Carswell's candidacy was a "once-in150
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a-lifetime" opportunity.

Gurney further asserted that Dent

considered the Carswell candidacy "an ideal solution," and
that Morton had urged Cramer to pull out of the race.10
Florida's House Speaker Fred Schultz said that he
hoped Carswell was "not being used as an innocent pawn in a
back-room power deal based on publicity he received."
Former governor Farris Bryant, who intended to enter the
senate race himself and whom polls suggested could beat
either Osborne or Cramer, commented that sympathy for
Carswell should not win him the election.

"I don't feel

that a seat in the U.S. Senate . . . should be awarded to
anyone to salve his wounded pride," Bryant said.

"I don't

think you can base a candidacy for the U.S. Senate on a
rejection by that body."11
William Cramer, represented an important piece in this
political board game.

Although Kirk knew that he could not

pressure Cramer to withdraw, he hoped the entry of Carswell
would take the shine off Cramer's candidacy, and perhaps
even dispatch Cramer from power.

Cramer had no intention

of pulling out for the sake of party unity, instead he
sought to obstruct and frustrate the efforts of Kirk and
Gurney.

Cramer released a statement from his office in

Washington.

"President Nixon personally urged me to run

for the U.S. Senate.

This has not changed.

He also urged

Judge Carswell to remain on the bench, where strict
constructionists of the Constitution are needed.
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I am

heeding President Nixon's call and hope Judge Carswell
would do likewise."12
Even before Carswell entered the race the
administration had sought to distance itself from the
internecine battles of the Florida GOP.

"The President's

name has been kicked around in the Florida primary battle,"
Harry Dent told Bob Haldeman in a memo dated March 5, 1970.
"I have asked Ron Ziegler to get a question asked and
answered saying that the President is not taking any part
in the Florida primary."

But the next month Dent

unwittingly became the man in the middle of the feud.

Kirk

and Gurney misled Dent, whose endorsement of Carswell's
candidacy carried with it the implication of the
President's favor.

The two Florida Republicans told Dent

that Cramer had agreed to drop out of the race so that
Carswell could capture the Republican nomination unopposed.
In fact, Cramer had never been approached about withdrawing
and told Dent after the story became public that he was in
the race to stay.

A few days after Carswell entered the

campaign, national Republican leaders disavowed any part in
the political machinations of Kirk and Gurney.

Rogers

Morton angrily denounced Kirk and Gurney for "shocking"
behind-the-scenes tactics.

Morton denied Gurney's claim

that he had urged Representative Cramer to drop out of the
race.

"I'm not about to discourage any candidate to run on

the Republican ticket.

I'm in favor of open primaries."
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Morton criticized Kirk and Gurney for picking Carswell
behind the back of Cramer who had announced his candidacy
seven months earlier and then asking Cramer to withdraw.
"It's unconscionable for this to have happened," Morton
said.

"If a few candidates are selected in some smoke-

filled room, what's the use of having a primary?" Morton
asked.

The White House would remain neutral.

One party

spokesman said: "Kirk and company have put Nixon in one
hell of an embarrassing position at best and infuriated him
at worst."13
State GOP leaders also denounced the Carswell
candidacy ploy.

Gubernatorial candidate Skip Bafalis said

the GOP state committee should replace Chairman Duke
Crittenden if he was part of the "power play."

Bafalis

called Kirk and Gurney "kingmakers," trying to gain a
"hammer lock" on the party by using Osborne and Carswell as
"pawns."

Crittenden denied any involvement saying that he

was chairman of all the Republicans.

Alyse O'Neill,

a

state GOP committeewoman and wife of a Nixon appointee,

in

an open letter to the press urged Carswell to remain on the
bench.

"I refuse to substitute the temporary whims,

transitory caprices and shifting political ambitions of
Claude Kirk for the permanent well being of the Republican
party," O'Neill wrote.

Carswell responded that the

decision to run for the Senate was his own, that he had not
consulted with the President before he entered the race,
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and that he was not running "in tandem" with any other
Florida politicians.

He would be his own man, he said,

"beholden to nobody but the people."14
For all the hoopla and great expectations involved,
the Carswell candidacy did little more than fracture the
Florida GOP.

At a time when Kirk, running for reelection

himself, needed to lead a united Republican effort, he
divided his own party.

Whatever benefit Kirk hoped to

gain backfired as GOP regulars throughout the state
expressed resentment over Kirk's chicanery.

"It's one

thing to maneuver for power within the party," said one
Republican of Kirk's ploy,
and divide the party.
really divided."

"it is quite another to go off

And I'm telling you the party is

Carswell proved a poor candidate.

He had

not run for elective office since 1948 when he sought a
Georgia congressional seat and declared his support for
white supremacy, and that campaign had helped derail his
Supreme Court nomination.

Cramer would go on to defeat

Carswell easily for the Republican nomination only to lose
to Lawton Chiles, a young, little-known Democrat who would
walk around the state to emphasize contact with the average
citizen.15
The machinations of Kirk in the Senate race
demonstrated the continuing turmoil the incumbent created
within his own party at a time when he needed to marshall
all the support he could muster.

But Kirk knew that it

154

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

would take more than Republican support to win re-election.
Kirk believed that he could tap into the resentment over
busing and achieve a power base that would cleave across
party lines.

The disruption of public education became a

prime campaign issue in 1970.

Many school boards and

parents reacted with indignation at federally mandated
desegregation plans that would move students and teachers
that year.

In Sarasota County the school board voted 5-0

to defy a federal district court order to submit a new
desegregation plan with a more balanced black-white ratio.
Calls from irate parents inundated legislators,

according

to representative Lynwood Arnold, chairman of
Jacksonville's Duval County legislative delegation.

"It

seems to be the only subject people are interested in . . .
most of them seem to realize there isn't much the
Legislature can do.

But they still want to talk about it.

And a lot of the calls are from Negro parents who are just
as upset," Arnold said.

State senator Mallory H o m e

reported a similar bi-racial indignation in Tallahassee's
Leon County.

The rancor had nothing to do with race he

explained, complaints were coming in from "colored as well
as white communities."

In his fourteen years as an elected

official, the senator claimed, he had never witnessed "more
resentment, more fear and more bewilderment" from parents
who expressed frustration with their children being "tossed
about like a feather in a reckless wind."

Their
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frustration led the senator to entertain the notion of
defiance.

Mallory considered direct resistance, but

believed that the only hope for posterity lie in the
"capacity to use the avenues of constitutional protest open
to us under the law."

One woman, whose husband worked for

the HEW, had no such qualms.

"If my children are forced

out of their present classroom in February,
send them back.

then I will not

Period!" she threatened in a letter to the

Tallahassee Democrat, "as far as I am concerned the
government can go to h e l l ."1S
The uproar over busing did not escape the attention of
Governor Kirk.

Prior to 1970 Claude Kirk's position on

civil rights differed markedly from that of most southern
governors.

"I'm not one of those red-necked Governors like

Lester Maddox," Kirk told the Saturday Evening Post in
1967,

"I'm the only good guy in the South."

When Alabama

Governor Lurleen Wallace invited him to attend a conference
in Montgomery to discuss stopping school integration, Kirk
replied:

"We here in Florida who are pursuing a war on

crime cannot join in attempts to subvert or delay the law
of the land as interpreted by the Supreme C ourt."

Also in

1967 Kirk defused a potentially volatile meeting led by the
black militant H. Rap Brown.

Kirk won the crowd over by

urging a peaceful gathering even as he warmly welcomed
Brown.

As governor, he had also launched an "Operation

Concern" to deal with problems of the ghetto.

The
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governor's apparent lack of personal prejudice and past
record of civil rights support could have served the state
well in easing the final stages of school integration.

In

1970, however, Kirk decided that the political advantages
of defiance could not be ignored in an election year.

The

black constituency of the state accounted for only ten
percent of the electorate and voted solidly Democratic.
Kirk believed that electoral success rested in appealing to
those alienated Democrats who most objected to
desegregation pressures.17
The Fifth Circuit Court had ruled that the public
schools within their jurisdiction, including Florida's,
must be desegregated by February l, 1970.

In mid-January

Kirk petitioned the Supreme Court to delay that school
desegregation deadline until the governor could plead the
case himself.

Kirk seemed convinced in this and later

confrontations with the courts that only the Supreme Court
had sufficient stature to deal with him.

Kirk told the

Court that the immediate desegregation order would wreck
the state's budget.

Claiming he had brought "racial

harmony" to Florida, Kirk maintained that desegregation
could be accomplished in an orderly fashion in September
but that the February deadline would lead to "havoc."

The

Supreme Court wasted little time in rejecting Kirk's
petition; it ruled the same day that public schools
attended by about 300,000 students in five southern states,
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including Florida, desegregate by the ordered deadline.
"The courts apparently don't care about the education of
children," Kirk claimed, only about the "social
mechanics.1,18
Governor Kirk's last minute appeal to the Supreme
Court may have struck a resonant chord with some, but his
actions did not impress everyone.

An editorial in the

Tallahassee Democrat contended that intervention by the
state came much too late.

Many school board members from

the capital county of Leon, after agonizing for weeks over
the threatened desegregation plan, resented the governor's
political grandstanding.

"Big deal," said one school board

member of Kirk's actions.

Another, criticizing both the

governor and the Commissioner of Education, Floyd
Christian,

claimed that:

"Neither Kirk nor Christian has

ever gone to the press and said, look folks, the schools
are in a bad situation.

We have been left dangling without

any advice or help on an overall plan."19
Others criticized the governor's actions for different
reasons.

Two of the state's top black leaders tore into

Kirk for asking for the delay.

Reverend C. K. Steele, of

the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, characterized
the governor's actions as a "ridiculous" stand against
defenseless black children.

Steele also called Kirk a

political opportunist who thought he could get some
political mileage out of the controversy.

The Reverend
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Joel Atkins, president of the Florida NAACP, in a flurry of
mixed metaphors, accused Kirk of "shouldering up to the
segregationists.

He's changing colors like a lizard,

. . .

playing political football with the rights of black
people."

Atkins admitted that busing students was a great

expense for the state but reminded Floridians that the dual
segregated system that had operated in the state for years
had also been expensive.

"Governor Kirk is trying to pull

a farce over on the court when he says that this instant
desegregation will break Florida," concluded Atkins.

"Here

we are nearly sixteen years after the Supreme Court's
original ruling on desegregation . . . and it seems to me
mighty absurd that he should be asking for more time to do
it."20
Those directly involved with the implementation of
desegregation expressed opinions ranging from resigned
acceptance to adamant disapproval.

"The fact is that we

must either accept it or see our schools collapse," said
the education commissioner.

The legislature considered

calling a special session in order to allocate funds to
cover the immediate reassignment of students and teachers
to meet the deadline.

The Leon County School Board

unanimously passed a strongly worded resolution protesting
the court ordered deadline and sent it as an urgent message
to Congress.

The resolution called the court's action

"arbitrary, unreasonable and unrealistic" contending that
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the mandate would "have disastrous consequences to the
public school system . . .

in uprooting students, faculty

and equipment."21
Students and teachers also had mixed opinions about
the moves.

Many expressed concern about integration's

effect on student councils, clubs, sports, and friends.
think it stinks," said one ninth grader.
will have to stay here and I'll be moved."

"I

"My girlfriend
Another student

chimed in that sports were "going to be goofed up."

One

girl worried about moving students into the varying quality
of curriculums at different schools.

"They're doing it so

Negroes can learn as much as we are," responded one eighth
grade g i r l .

Another eighth grade girl from an all black

school wanted white students to come to her school.

"If we

can go to all white schools then they can come here," she
reasoned.

But a boy from the same school did not like it.

"If white boys come here, they're going to want to
participate in sports.

It's going to mess things up."

The

principal of the same black school seemed more optimistic.
"I think we can do it," he said,

"the attitude here seems

to be that whatever the School Board comes up with, we'll
do our best to make it w o r k ."

Another teacher from

Tallahassee contended that the school system could handle
almost any situation.

"I wish that we had accepted

complete integration years ago, and had not waited to be
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forced to do so.

If we were integrating under our own

steam we wouldn't feel so bad about it."22
The immediate desegregation controversy seemed bound
to occupy the center of the political arena in an election
year.

Hank Drake, political editor of Jacksonville's

Florida Times Union, believed that interference with
neighborhood schools coupled with the "fact that people
don't like to be shoved around is why the desegregation
decision may shape the course of politics in 1970 more than
any other issue," wrote Drake.

"Any politician who doubts

it is a major issue is far out of touch with reality."23
Claude Kirk had a firm grip on political realities.
He believed that the desegregation issue offered him a real
opportunity; even after his appeal to the Supreme Court
failed, he continued to press the issue.

After all, Kirk

excelled at confrontation and here was a chance to take on
the federal government.

On January 19, Kirk threatened to

suspend county school officials who followed the orders of
the Supreme Court and implemented desegregation plans
during the 1969-70 school year.

While maintaining that he

was not defying the court or "standing in the schoolhouse
door," Kirk again asked the court to reconsider its
February l desegregation deadline order.

Unlike the other

four southern states included in the Supreme Court
decision, Kirk argued, Florida had led the South in
integration and racial progress.

He urged the Court to
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give the state extra time to continue its orderly
desegregation.

"We are not defiant in Florida," Kirk said.

"We are accomplishing integration, desegregation.

The

reason I am here today is to show that I am sincere."

The

state cabinet joined in the governor's defiance and passed
a resolution that prohibited busing to achieve racial
balance in schools ordered to desegregate.

The general

counsel for the state board of education maintained that
there was no requirement in the Supreme Court order that
pupils must be bused to achieve racial balance in the
schools.

The governor agreed wholeheartedly.

"We can have

complete resistance to forced busing and still be in
compliance with the law of the land," Kirk reasoned.24
The education commissioner, however, disagreed.

"I

am strongly and unalterably opposed," declared Christian,
"to any action that would place Florida and Florida's
school personnel in violation of legal federal court
orders."

Christian accused Kirk of holding out "false

hope" while "looking for votes."
who objected to Kirk's actions.

He was not the only one
Marvin Davies, the state

NAACP field secretary, wanted to put the governor in jail.
David Cook, the associate editor of the Tallahassee
Democrat. characterized the governor's actions as "a
needless exercise in futility."

Cook believed that Kirk

might reap a political bonanza from the situation but that
he had set himself up for a conflict with the court that he
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was sure to lose.

"The court will prevail, no matter how

wrong it is," Cook wrote.

"It would be a shame, however,

if [Kirk] has raised any false hopes of avoiding complete
desegregation.

That can't be stopped -- even by the master

conf ronter of them a l l ."2S
Many Floridians not involved in politics also debated
the desegregation deadline in letters written to the
state's newspapers.

One black parent wrote the Tallahassee

Democrat that she had difficulty in regarding "the shouts
of woe for the suddenly imposed deadline as anything but
another 'last ditch' attempt at gathering public sentiment,
so the 'delay' may persist as usual."

A white woman

contended that their duty as citizens required implementing
integration plans ordered by the courts.

"There is no

looking back, there are no peaceful alternatives," she
wrote.

Another woman disagreed and urged parents to put

pressure on their legislators to repeal state compulsory
school attendance laws.

"Then those parents

(very few

percentagewise) who actually want their children to attend
racially mixed schools will have the privilege if such it
can be called, of keeping right on with it."

Some black

parents advocated neighborhood schools as strongly as white
parents.

A black woman in Panama City expressed outrage at

the massive reassignment of students.

"We have rights too

and they are being violated," she said.
kids removed from schools close to home."

"We don't want our
Another letter
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writer seemed genuinely ambivalent about the controversy
and wondered if "our government officials are really doing
the will of any of the people in their efforts to bring
about total integration."

She pointed out that many black

parents had protested the loudest when black schools were
closed in order to integrate.

One black parent believed

that the current furor had been raised mostly by
opportunistic politicians and racist parents.

She

empathized with the emotions of white parents who worried
about the welfare of their children.

"We black parents

understand only too well . . . but until the Supreme Court
began to listen to our pleas, we just suffered, hoped, and
prayed. "26
As citizens debated, Governor Kirk dug in his heels.
He again threatened to suspend county officials who
implemented court ordered desegregation plans.

The Leon

County school board attorney, Graham Carothers, pointed to
the difficult position in which Kirk's order put a school
board.

If the governor went through with his threat, he

would "place the board in the position of having to choose
between the risk of being in contempt of court . . .

or

being subject to removal by the governor," Carothers said.
State senator Frederick Karl of Daytona Beach also worried
about the school board's predicament.

Karl, chairman of

the committee that acted on all gubernatorial suspensions,
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said that school officials would be placed in an "untenable
position" should the Kirk order be implemented.27
Kirk maintained that the effect of his threatened
suspension of school board members would put him "in
between the Supreme Court and the boards."

A few days

later the governor said that he would be willing to go to
jail to prevent "forced busing" in Florida schools.

Kirk

asserted that such a jailing would be "for a philosophical
cause, just as our prisoners in Vietnam are in jail for a
philosophical cause."

The governor's legal aide, Gerald

Mager, blasted the Leon County school board for "abdicating
its responsibilities to the children" by "throwing in the
towel" on the February integration order.

Mager said he

was "shocked and surprised" that the board had not gone
back to the court to appeal the present order.

The Leon

County school board attorney answered Mager's attack:

"I

am frankly appalled at the irrational statement attributed
to the Governor's legal aide."

The attorney labeled the

free legal advice as "obviously politically inspired" and
"repugnant to an orderly solution of legal problems."28
One week before the February 1, deadline, Kirk filed
another suit requesting that the Supreme Court establish a
national standard for a unitary school system and direct
HEW secretary Robert Finch to apply these uniform
guidelines in funding for education.

"We are going to be

in compliance by September 1," said Kirk.

"We don't want
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to see our tax dollars shipped off to other states which
are not in compliance."

Kirk also blamed Education

Commissioner Floyd Christian for his inactivity,
him "about as useful as hip pockets on a hog."

labeling
Kirk

reasoned that Christian "implied support of forced busing
by doing nothing."

Christian responded to Kirk's statement

by contending that the governor had decided to cash in
politically on the emotions generated by the recent Supreme
Court decision.29

Others believed the governor's anti

busing stand coupled with his promises to go to jail rather
than succumb to pressure from the courts had made him
unbeatable in his bid for reelection.
elected," declared one Democrat.

"It's got him

Another political

observer wrote in the Florida Times Union that people out
in the hinterlands believed that at least the governor
tried to do something.

"That is what they will be reminded

of and remember in the fall when most of the court ordered
mixing plans take effect and the election campaigns are
under way."30

It seemed obvious that Kirk sought to

steer his ship of state into the channel of public opinion.
One political observer writing in the S t . Petersburg Times
contended that Kirk had solidified his position among the
racists of the state.

"And yet, in furtherance of his

attempt to be all things to all men as election time creeps
near," wrote Martin Dyckman,
segregationist."

"the governor insists he is no

The whole crisis, Dyckman believed,
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seemed designed to bolster Kirk's chances for reelection.
Kirk had little chance of going to jail, but the mere
threat of martyrdom would bolster his chances in November.
Two counties had already gained delays from district courts
and only two other counties were directly under court order
to desegregate in February.

The chances, therefore, seemed

favorable that some sort of delay would occur and allow the
governor to claim his tactics had succeeded.31
A need to court conservatives undoubtedly motivated
Kirk's attempt to defy federal orders to desegregate.

Drug

store chain millionaire Jack Eckerd, who had banned girlie
magazines from his stores, sought to capture the Republican
nomination by branding Kirk a liberal.
gives

"This anti-busing

[Kirk] a handle to latch onto conservatism," one

official at the Capitol said.

"He can go into those

counties Eckerd may have run strong in and they'll remember
busing, not pornography,

in September."

Kirk's actions

also helped propel him ahead of his leading Democratic
challenger.

Attorney General Faircloth failed to fight the

desegregation deadline through the courts, while the
governor twice flew to Washington to present petitions
aimed at delay.

Asked if the attorney general should have

filed those suits, Kirk replied: "If you have an attorney
general, y e s ."

Even Reubin Askew agreed that Kirk had

assumed the role that the state's chief legal officer had
defaulted.32
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Opinion varied as to the governor's political
motivations and actions.

One legislator called Kirk a

"white-collar Wallace," while another denied that the
governor was a racist.

"He's a political opportunist

. . .

earning himself a lot of credits with people who don't read
below the third or fourth paragraph of a news story."
Lloyd Hagaman, one of Kirk's top aides, believed that the
electorate approved of the governor's willingness to take
action.

"We may not be popular with the politicians,"

Hagaman asserted,
the people agreed.
Tallahassee,

"but we are with the people."

Not all

Spicer Gordon, a black activist in

objected to Kirk's suggestion that black

parents did not want their children bused because he was
"for it 101 per cent."

What galled Gordon about Kirk was

that he talked "on one side of his mouth about law and
order and out of the other about defying the court.

There

ain't gonna be many black folks voting for him."33
Kirk's efforts to sway the court and gain more time
for the desegregation plan failed.

In a unanimous

decision, the Court denied Kirk's plea for a rehearing.
"The governor saw this as an opportunity to capitalize on
an emotional situation for his own political advantage,"
said Floyd Christian,

"and it has backfired."

Kirk's failure came as no surprise.

Indeed,

An editorial in the

Tallahassee Democrat admitted that the Supreme Court had
done some strange things in the past,

"but considering
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appeals for rehearing by people who weren't party to the
litigation would be a little too much for it."34
Kirk's exercise in futility continued when he issued
the executive order he had been threatening in Volusia and
Manatee Counties.

The order barred student transfers and

busing to accomplish school desegregation.

The main issue

was busing according to Gerald Mager, Kirk's legal advisor.
"The issue in Volusia,

the issue in Manatee,

the issue

everywhere we've been involved has been busing."

Some

critics countered that the issue involved the governor's
reelection.

"He has preferred to publicly fight with

teachers, with the commissioner of education, and now with
school boards and superintendents,

in order to perpetuate

himself in office," said Wally Johnson, executive secretary
of the Florida Education Association.

Ray Dunne, Volusia

county school superintendent, ordered by a federal district
judge to transfer 2,800 students and 145 teachers to
accomplish school desegregation,

faced contempt charges if

he did not comply and firing from the governor if he did.
"I'm caught between the proverbial rock and hard place."
Attorney General Faircloth informed school officials that
federal orders outranked Kirk's executive orders and
advised them to obey the court.

"Those direct orders may

not be agreeable to u s , " wrote Faircloth,

"but they are of

superior rank in our system of jurisprudence -- under our
government of laws."35
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Kirk faltered in carrying out his threat to fire the
school board members, and criticism poured in from all
sides.

Democratic Representative Jerome Pratt castigated

the governor for playing politics with the school issue.
Pratt called Kirk's failure to call the legislature into a
special session to deal with the matter and his refusal to
meet with other southern governors protesting forced busing
"unexcusable."

Although Pratt had previously promised to

support Kirk for reelection, he now accused Kirk of
"backing water" because he did not carry out his threat to
suspend school board officials who went through with courtordered busing.

Pratt said that he had "no alternative"

but to believe that Kirk acted to gain votes and not to
solve the problems.
governor.

Even Kirk's pastor admonished the

The busing issue that the governor played upon

was "a phony issue," the rector of St. John's Episcopal
church told his congregation.
we've been busing for years.
problem.

"It ought to be known that
It's our racism that is the

. . . Everybody in town, the politicians, the

newspapers and everyone, would have us think that is not
the problem, but it i s ."

After the service the minister

pointed out that the governor's mansion was only a few
blocks from a predominantly black public school, but that
Kirk's daughter attended another school.

The Florida field

director of the NAACP labeled Kirk's stand against busing
as that of a bigot and blamed the violence that accompanied
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the desegregation process in several schools on the state's
"stinking leadership."36
Kirk had experienced the hazards of playing politics
with the volatile busing issue, but he had not yet learned
his lesson. In April the culmination of Kirk's stand
against busing came in Manatee County.

After the Volusia

county warm-up, some feared that Kirk would do something
drastic.

U.S. District Judge Benjamin Krentzman had

ordered an integration plan in Manatee that would have
reorganized its busing patterns so as to eliminate token
integration and provide the same 80-20 white-black ratio in
its schools as prevailed among students in the county.

On

April 2, Education Commissioner Floyd Christian wrote to
Kirk: "I believe when we have exhausted all our legal
remedies and although we are not happy with the Court
decision, we are left no other choices but to obey the law.
. . . I trust that in the exercise of your executive power,
you will not take any precipitous action in attempting to
remove the School Board members and Superintendent for
their compliance with the Federal Court Order."
had good reason for concern.

Christian

Over the next week not only

Florida, but the entire nation watched the governor
challenge the federal judiciary.

The New York Times

carried the story on page one for seven days, while the
national television news reported it among their top
stories for most of the week.37
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On April 6, after the Supreme Court had denied a
delay, Kirk suspended the Manatee County school board and
placed the school system "under the trusteeship and
custodial supervision of the Governor of the State of
Florida."

Calling the school officials "valiant,

courageous and eminently qualified," Kirk maintained that
the takeover would relieve officials from a position that
would force them to implement an "educationally unsound and
illegal" order.

In his new role as superintendent, Kirk

told a meeting of principals that he would stand between
them and the courts "tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow."
Manatee County school board Superintendent Jack Davidson
challenged the suspension, saying that the sudden shift in
plans would produce mass confusion in the schools.

"It's

about time everyone took their hands off our school system,
Judge Krentzman, Governor Kirk and everyone, and let us get
on with the business of educating our children."38
The next day Judge Krentzman ordered Kirk to step down
immediately as head of the school board and to appear in
court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
Calling the order "a horrible illegal act of forced
busing," Kirk claimed that he had acted not in defiance of
the court, but on behalf of the school children of Manatee
County.

"The only man who in any way is in defiance of the

system of justice is Judge Ben Krentzman," Kirk said.
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"Do

not confuse a lawful contest of sovereign authority with
defiance of the courts," the governor told legislators.39
Many in Manatee County applauded Kirk's actions.
Crowds gathered at the school administration building that
Kirk and his aides had commandeered.
signs proclaiming:

Some of them carried

"Manatee County Loves Governor Kirk," "I

Am Proud of my Governor," and "God Bless Governor Kirk."
Comments from area residents also demonstrated support.
"It is very refreshing to find someone as high in
government," one radio caller said of Kirk,
guts to take a stand and hold to it."
Commission Chairman L.H.

"who has enough

Manatee County

"Bud" Fortson declared:

"People

all over the country should start standing up to the
courts.

This numbers game is ridiculous and is unfair to

the taxpayers, the children and everyone."

One of the

suspended school board members resigned and published a
letter supporting the governor and criticizing the federal
courts; another member came to the administration building
to join in the demonstration of local support.

The mayor

of Brandenton, Manatee's county seat, also backed the
governor's actions.

"I certainly don't favor forced busing

and I think the man (Kirk) is acting in the best way he
can," declared the mayor.

One telling comment came from a

resident who provided this bit of hyperbole: "If Claude
Kirk tells the voters of Manatee County he is running for
God, he would get 95 percent of the vote."

One mother who
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sought out newsmen to express her opinion, put the issue
simply:

"Should little kids be bused eight to twelve miles

to school or should they go to school in their own
neighborhoods?"
agreed.

A group of women from local PTA groups

"The majority of the people are not against

integration of the schools," said Mrs. Robert Jones.

"But

we are against forced busing."40
The national and local press did not join in the
praise offered by many of the Manatee County residents.
Newsweek reminded readers of Orval Faubus, Ross Barnett,
George Wallace and other southern segregationist governors
of the past who had sought to capitalize on the emotional
issue of integration.

Defiance had never succeeded in

stopping integration nor had it ever failed to make a hero
of the governor.

Even so, Newsweek contended, the tactic

had never been "trotted out with such heedless opportunism
as it was in Manatee County, Florida."

Even Manatee's

local paper, the Brandenton Herald criticized the
governor's actions.

The S t . Petersburg Times. called

Kirk's actions "totally reprehensible."

In a withering

attack on Kirk, the paper claimed that previous defiant
southern governors had at least believed in their cause.
"When Kirk, who is not a racist, defies the court out of
personal political ambition, both the governor's office and
Florida's tradition for moderation are disgraced."

The

Tallahassee Democrat, conceding that Kirk's stand might win
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him some votes in November, worried about "some alarming
points of power that go beyond popularity."

The paper

editorialized that tyranny usually began with good
intentions but that they must "hew to the Constitution and
law.

Anything else leads to anarchy, which eventually

requires dictatorship."41
Attorney General Paircloth labeled the suspensions
"ineffective," declaring that Kirk's actions had "opened a
legal barrel of snakes."

Reubin Askew called the

suspension order "legally insufficient" and "sheer
demagoguery."

Kirk, he said,

"has once again made himself

part of the problem rather than seeking to be part of the
solution."

Stanley Tait, a Democratic candidate for

secretary of state, labeled Governor Kirk a white panther.
"He is displaying the same contempt for the courts as Rap
Brown, SDS, the Chicago eight and other radicals who
espouse the philosophy that if you don't like a certain law
you don't have to obey it," Tait said.

Although Tait

admitted he agreed that the court order protested by Kirk
was "stupid," he also maintained that Kirk's actions only
further disrupted the school system.

And Rev. Joel Atkins,

state NAACP president, relished the possibility of having
the governor jailed.

"It looks like he has gone a little

too far this time."42
Kirk went even farther.

Judge Krentzman ordered local

officials to take back control of the Manatee County school
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board and ignore any orders to the contrary by the
governor.

Kirk maintained that he had interceded in

Manatee County in order to bring the issue of busing before
the Supreme Court.

The governor criticized newsmen and

"political pantywaists," who accused him of defiance of
court ordered desegregation.
asked rhetorically.

"Thwarting the courts?"

Kirk

"I find myself staring in wide-eyed

disbelief at so ludicrous a charge.

If I am guilty of any

sort of defiance, it comes only in the nature of defiance
of a vicious and illegal concept which, stripped of all its
liberal camouflage, is nothing more than a form of cruel
and unusual punishment heaped upon innocent children."
Kirk went on to say that the state could not "run for
cover" every time there was a confrontation with the
federal government on the question of sovereignty.'*3
The executive branch weighed in with its opinion on
the question.

The Justice Department said that they would

cooperate with the federal court in enforcing the
desegregation order.

But the governor's actions placed the

President in a precarious position.

In developing its so-

called southern strategy, the Nixon administration had
sought to encumber the judiciary with the onus of
desegregation.

Nixon had publicly opposed school

desegregation that required busing at the expense of
neighborhood schools; Kirk's defiance placed the president
in the position of sending in federal marshals to enforce
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just such an order.

And yet, Nixon faced severe criticism

for hypocrisy if he ignored Kirk's actions.

Representative

Abner Mikva of Illinois reminded the House that during the
1968 presidential campaign Richard Nixon delivered
impassioned speeches on how his administration would
provide vigorous law enforcement.

"Where is the President

now when a governor of his own political party openly and
shamelessly flouts the orders of a federal court," Mikva
asked.

The S t . Petersburg Times pointed to the same

contradiction in an editorial saying that Kirk's actions
had "exposed the danger which the Nixon Administration's
'southern strategy' poses for the law of the land.

The

President's silence before such open defiance by a governor
hardly discourages rebellion by others."44

The national

press continued to chide the governor and those who would
resist desegregation.

"The extent of the mischief created

by the architects of the Administration's 'Southern
strategy," wrote the New York T i m e s , "can well be gauged
from the outrageous ouster of the Manatee County school
authorities by Governor Kirk of Florida."

The Wall Street

Journal also blamed the administration's lack of commitment
for encouraging Governor Kirk's actions.

"Southern

segregationist leaders say Washington's slackening of past
efforts to integrate schools has heartened them greatly,"
the paper wrote.

"They see new hope in reasserting old

attitudes of fervent resistance, attitudes that in the past
177

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

couple of years had been abandoned as futile."

Time

magazine noted the Nixon administration's failure to speak
with one voice.

Noting that the Department of Justice had

filed a friend of court brief in the Charlotte Mecklenburg County desegregation case suggesting that a
federal judge had committed "an abuse of discretion" in
ordering busing to achieve desegregation.

"This kind of

undercutting of the federal courts could make it open
season for would-be tree shakers all over the South," wrote
T i m e .45
On Wednesday Kirk repeated his defiance of the federal
district judge by again ousting the Manatee school board
reinstated the day before by the judge.

The governor said

that he was suspending the school board for "malfeasance
and misfeasance" since they had agreed to accept an
"illegal" integration plan that would require forced
busing.46
Kirk ordered aides and sheriff's deputies to take
control of the school board offices.

Judge Krentzman

ordered federal marshals to arrest them.

The governor

threatened that marshals would be fired upon if they
attempted to take control of the schools.

When the

marshals arrived they found the Manatee County sheriff,
several deputies, and about a dozen state troopers in riot
gear forming a barricade outside the superintendent's
office, where the governor's aides had locked themselves in
178

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

and refused to come out.

The sheriff told the marshals

that the governor had ordered his men to use force to
prevent them from taking anyone from the building.

The

marshals served arrest warrants, but took no prisoners,
saying they considered the aides, the sheriff and his
deputies under arrest even though they were not actually in
custody.

U.S. Attorney John Briggs promised that the

federal government would take control of the Manatee County
schools even if force were required.

Late that afternoon

Governor Kirk, surrounded by about seventy policemen,
arrived at the school administration building promising
newsmen:

"Ain't nobody going to lay a hand on Claude Jr.

Anybody who lays a glove on a sovereign is committing an
illegal a c t .

There is nobody who can bodily force the head

of a sovereign state into court."47
Several high level administration officials tried to
reason with the governor.

Attorney General John Mitchell

as well as the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
repeatedly implored Kirk to stop his defiance.
remained unmoved.
with effort."

But Kirk

"We will resist force with force, effort

Kirk's special attorney, former governor

Millard Caldwell, hinted that Kirk might refuse to appear
before Judge Krenzman as ordered.

Caldwell said that Kirk

might say that a dispute between a governor and a federal
court could only be heard by the Supreme C ourt.

And Kirk

himself challenged Judge Krentzman's authority to order the
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head of a sovereign state to appear personally.

"Whoever

wants to arrest the governor must rassle the governor,"
warned Kirk. "One Marine can beat 100 others -- even an old
Marine like me."48
On Friday Kirk warned of a "grave danger of loss of
life," among both federal and state officials involved in
the Manatee confrontation.

In an interview in the school

superintendent's office the governor said that he did not
intend to release control of the school system until the
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of forced busing and
that he would use force if necessary.
man," he said,

"I am a peaceful

"but we propose to stand firm."

Shortly

thereafter Kirk allowed federal marshals past his eighty
guards to serve subpoenas on nine of his aides.
is the way to get to the Supreme Court,
every member of my staff.

"If this

I'll give them

I'll give them everything."

Meanwhile during a hearing before Judge Krentzman, Lloyd
Hagaman, Kirk's senior assistant, broke into tears and sobs
as he reaffirmed his intention to obey the governor rather
than the court.

"I don't want to disobey the court order,

but I have to stand by my governor."49
It would be tough to stand by Governor Kirk.
day Judge Krentzman,

The next

finding Kirk guilty of contempt,

ordered the governor to stop disobeying his school
desegregation orders or pay a fine of $10,000 a day.
Krentzman rejected Kirk's contention that there had been a
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violation of the principle of separation of powers.

The

judge ruled that the conflict was between the judiciary of
the federal government and the executive branch of a state
government, and the precedents were clear that the "state
government must yield."

The judge also pointed out that

the contempt order placed Kirk in the company of earlier
southern governors who had defied the courts concerning
desegregation.

All of whom eventually yielded to federal

authority.50
"The fun and games is over," said C.A. Butler, chief
of field operations for the U.S. Marshal Service.

On

Sunday evening Kirk promised to return control of the
schools to the Manatee County school board and direct its
officials to put the court-ordered integration plan into
effect.

"Basically, Florida and the Department of Justice

are in agreement," said Kirk.

"We agree the solutions to

our problems must lie in the duly constituted courts."
However, Kirk said that he had received a promise from the
Department of Justice that it would join with the governor
in an appeal of the Manatee school plan.

"Disobeying a

District Court and paying a $10,000-a-day fine is not going
to solve anything," the governor said.

"If I thought that

or going to jail would do so, I would be in that jail."51
Although Kirk did not say who in the Justice
Department had given him promises concerning the Manatee
case,

some in the department clearly had not been party to
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those assurances.

Solicitor General Erwin Griswold charged

in a memorandum filed with the Supreme Court that "any
confrontation between the Governor and the United States
would be entirely of his own making."

Griswold opposed

Governor Kirk's effort to remove the Manatee County school
case immediately to the Supreme Court, without going
through the normal appellate steps.

"It is far from clear

that the Governor speaks authentically for the state"
Griswold said of Kirk's efforts to block enforcement of the
lower court's order.

Griswold concluded that the governor

was "in a poor posture" to invoke the Supreme Court's
discretion to speed up its consideration of the case.

"It

is inadmissible that any officer -- high or low -- should
assume the stance that he will not obey the order of any
court but this Court," Griswold wrote.52
Florida newspapers weighed in with their opinions.
The Miami Herald called for Kirk's impeachment.
"Megalomania has no place in a state house," the paper
contended.

Kirk was "no longer a joke," but "a dangerous

and intolerable public nuisance."

The Tampa Tribune

believed the court order unreasonable, but excoriated the
governor for his defiance.

"He has recklessly scattered

coals of emotion in a community already dry and brittle
from the hot winds of racial controversy," the paper said.
"A court order must be respected whether it be directed
against a Governor or a Black Panther.

Otherwise,
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government falters and no man's rights are secure."

The

Orlando Sentinel assessed Kirk's actions more favorably.
The courts and the Congress had treated the South unfairly,
according to the Orlando paper, and Kirk asked only for
equality in integration practices for the South.
Tallahassee Democrat seemed more ambivalent.

The

The paper

contended that the nation needed a ruling on the forced
busing issue and conceded that if the governor's action
secured one he would be performing a service for schools
all over the country.

"However, we must question his

method for the excesses of state constitutional authority
it seems he has indulged.

We can't help but believe that

the issue of forced busing was moving toward resolution in
the courts and federal administrative agencies without the
approach of a bull in a china shop."

The S t . Petersburg

Times. in an editorial entitled "Tragedy for Florida," said
that the "defiant and erratic conduct" of the governor had
"brought embarrassment and danger" to the state.

"Across

the nation have gone reports of Florida's governor defying
law, threatening to 'resist force with force,' and creating
turmoil in the school system."

The Florida Times Union

believed the governor and federal government should settle
their differences in a courtroom rather than the
schoolroom. "The only certainty at the moment is that true
justice in this difficult situation can only be hoped for
by bringing the controversy out of the discredited
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interposition-cum-confrontation procedure and letting the
slow-turning wheels of justice grind."53
Citizens near and far also reacted to Kirk's defiance.
In a Republican poll taken in areas of the state expected
to provide seventy-five percent of the Republican vote in
the upcoming primary, reaction was evenly split between
those who approved of the governor's recent actions and
those who either disapproved or had mixed reactions.

In

Kirk's gubernatorial papers boxes of incoming letters
concerning the governor's busing stand reflect
overwhelmingly favorable reactions, but the large majority
of these letters came from outside the state; most of the
letters from Floridians expressed disapproval of Kirk's
actions.

One woman from Key West wrote that even though

she was a Republican and opposed forced busing she was
ashamed of the governor and believed him to be an
egomaniac,
off."

"a red-neck racist, and a grandstanding show-

Eight school teachers from Lake Worth let the

governor know that his actions disturbed them as did eight
students from Brandenton in Manatee County.

One

Tallahassee woman wrote that it was inexcusable for a
governor to defy a federal court order.

She expressed

concern about law and order in America and believed that
Kirk set a bad example.

One man from Eustis believed that

Kirk should not only be put in jail but itrpeached.

"Your

need for political gain has made thoughtful citizens lose
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respect for you and has made us ashamed of our state," he
wrote.

"You may have gained the vote of die-hard

segregationists who do not recognize the winds of change
but you have certainly lost my vote -- and I hope the vote
of many others who believe in responsible leadership."

One

out-of-stater warned the governor that if he carried out
his defiance of the court that "citizens of your state will
only obey the laws they find agreeable."

One Floridian

writing to the Tallahassee Democrat even wondered about the
governor's sanity.

"Has our Governor gone mad?

In twice

defying a federal court order, and allowing his agents to
make threats of armed violence against marshals, Kirk has
taken a giant step towards destroying the rule of law in
this country."54
Kirk remained unrepentant.

In assessing why he

yielded to the contempt citation, Kirk maintained that he
knew from the beginning that he "could only go so far" in
attempting to block the court-ordered desegregation plan in
Manatee County.

He knew he could "go up to the point of

force, but not beyond."

Kirk called the students and

parents of Manatee the "front line soldiers."
"stick with it," he asserted,

If they

"and if we do our job in the

courts, forced busing will fade away and die."55
Kirk's actions alienated many Floridians who believed
that an effort to g a m e r political favor had inspired his
defiance, and his lack of resolve destroyed whatever
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electoral support he may have built among die-hard
segregationists during the school takeover in Manatee.
"Our Governor Kirk has bent his knee and made peace with
the federal judiciary without reaching his stated goal,"
wrote the Tallahassee Democrat.

"His futile foray into

Manatee county could be his undoing as Governor."

Kirk's

opponent for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, Jack
Eckerd, charged that Kirk "deserted the parents and the
children of Manatee County after bolstering their hopes
with cynical, false promises and flamboyant political
grandstanding."

Another GOP challenger, Skip Bafalis, who

had sought to initiate a constitutional amendment
preventing forced busing, also criticized Kirk's tactics.
"I don't think Governor Kirk has done anything positive at
all," he said.

"I think he was grandstanding.

He stood in

the door of the Supreme Court and shook his fist."

Manatee

representative, Jerome Pratt, who had been cheering Kirk's
action before the governor bowed to the federal court
order, now called Kirk a "political hack" who had "just
chickened out."

Kirk's actions were "the most colossal,

stupendous political hypocrisy I have ever seen displayed
by a political personage, " Pratt declared.56
On Tuesday, April 14, the day after Kirk had abandoned
his position as school board superintendent, Manatee
County's desegregation plan went into effect.

Buses rolled

on double shifts to accommodate the additional student
186

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

load.

Eleven white women marched outside the school board

building carrying signs that read: "Who runs Florida -Kirk or Krentzman," and "Don't Bus, Join Us."

About a

dozen black parents also gathered at a bus stop to
demonstrate their objections to the busing plan.

But by

all accounts the school opening went smoothly with
absenteeism only slightly higher than normal.
superintendent Jack Davidson,

Reinstated

speaking from his office as

workers removed a battery of telephones Kirk had installed
the week before, characterized the transition as "really
going very smoothly.

...

We still have a handful of

mothers who show up every afternoon," Davidson said of
those protesting the busing.

"The people still don't like

forced busing," he admitted.

"I don't like it either, but

the great majority of our people agree that the place to
settle the question is in the courts, not the streets."57
The superintendent's assessment aptly characterized
the feelings of most Floridians.

Governor Kirk's defiance

seemed steeped in political opportunism and reaffirmed the
main criticism of his administration: confrontation without
recourse to remedy.

Kirk believed he could ride the

irresistible force of public resentment over busing, but he
met the immovable object of federally court ordered
desegregation.

Kirk played out the old politics of race in

April, before the campaign really began.

This allowed the

other candidates to scand back and see if defiance could
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translate into votes without participating in the political
melee of school integration.

They could criticize Kirk's

continuing confrontational tactics without taking a firm
stance on busing.
defiance.

Kirk's actions proved the futility of

Not only did he fail in his avowed purpose of

preventing court-ordered busing, he did not gain
significant support from voters who overwhelmingly
disapproved of busing.
The political efficacy of the busing issue had died at
Manatee, but Kirk attempted to revive it and place it at
the center of his bid for re-election.

Florida school

children were being bused around "like pawns in an insane
numbers game played by a handful of irrational federal
judges," Kirk charged.

To reinforce his point, Kirk sought

and received the backing of Vice-President Spiro Agnew.

In

a campaign swing through Florida Agnew labelled Kirk an
"action-oriented . . . stand-up governor."

The vice-

president praised Kirk's defiance in the Manatee school
desegregation incident, saying that Kirk "did a good job
and served a very useful purpose in bringing the situation
to the attention of the people and prodding court action."
Kirk agreed.

In a televised discussion on the issues, Kirk

blamed a "permissive liberal philosophy" for implementation
of compulsory busing of school children to achieve racial
balance.

Every week Kirk reminded voters that he had not

given up in his defiance of court ordered desegregation.
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When the Internal Revenue Service announced that they would
do away with the tax exempt status for private schools,
Kirk said he would be the number one defender of those
schools, many of which had been established to avoid racial
integration.

And Kirk sought to link tax exemption of

private schools with his favorite topic, busing.

Kirk

claimed victory in his Manatee County public school
desegregation fight and said he would not let private
schools be picked off by federal agencies.

"We have

stopped busing in its tracks, and we are winning in Manatee
whether you read about it or n o t ."

Kirk said he would call

a seminar for the heads of private schools throughout the
state to devise a course of action.

Kirk also promised

that Florida would join any school district in suits
fighting what Kirk called "forced busing."

Kirk's leading

Republican opponent, Jack Eckerd accused the governor of
plotting "the most desperate, most reckless, most dangerous
confrontation of his show biz career."
against forced busing, Eckerd contended.

Everyone was
"Do we solve it

or do we exploit it?"50
No matter how hard Kirk tried to focus the campaign on
an

issue of his own choosing, the other GOP candidates

aimed their criticism at Kirk himself.

Eckerd said he

would use Kirk's record, his promises compared to his
performance, to bring down the governor.

Kirk was a liar

and a desperate man who was "stooping to lies and vicious
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character assassinations in an attempt to save his own
political hide," Eckerd charged.

Skip Bafalis believed

that Florida had become the laughing stock of the countryunder Kirk and charged that re-nominating the incumbent
would guarantee a victory for the Democrats in November
because the governor had "unified the Democrats on a single
issue: Kirk himself."

His adversaries not only made public

statements criticizing the governor, they also financed a
political biography meant to embarrass him.

Published in

the midst of the primary campaign, the 124 page paperback
hatchet job entitled Claude Kirk. Man and Myth contended
that Kirk was a "bush-league Huey Long" whose lifestyle was
always "one jump ahead of his income."

Concerning Kirk's

political intrigues in Manatee County and in the Carswell
senate candidacy, the book stated: "In one instance he had
played politics with human life, playing the school bully
and then chickened out.

In the second, he had used a man's

reputation in an attempt to pull his own political
chestnuts out of the fire."*9
Whether he liked it or not, Kirk, rather than his
opponents or the issue of busing, had become the focal
point of the campaign.

Two weeks before the first primary

most voters appeared apathetic and undecided about
gubernatorial candidates with the major exception of Kirk.
One voter said the governor was "too much of a showman.
voted for him last time but never again."

I

Another said he
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liked Kirk's frankness and boldness.”

Even bumper stickers

reflected the electorate's opinions of the governor.
stated:

One

"Kirk for Governor," while another proclaimed:

"Happiness is a New Governor."

One group calling itself

the "Conservative Citizens Committee" mounted a crusade to
defeat the governor because he was too liberal.

Major

Holbrook Scott, a longtime GOP activist and chair of
"Veterans for Kirk" in 1966, headed the group.

Scott

called Kirk "the most extravagant, wasteful spendthrift of
any governor in the history of Florida."

And Scott

believed the incumbent had "been completely disloyal to the
Republican party and the independent Democrats who elected
him."

The group's avowed purpose was to advise the voters

which candidates were truly conservative and which were
liberal, but Scott readily conceded that what he was really
interested in was "defeating Claude Kirk."

Thomas Whol, a

banker, builder and Kirk appointee to a county planning
board announced he would head the Eckerd campaign in his
county.

"I'm disappointed in Governor Kirk," Whol said.

"Its nice to have a flamboyant Governor, but there comes a
time for responsible leadership."60
While Kirk suffered at the hands of his own party,
Democrats began to gear up for their challenge of the
Republican incumbent.

While several well established

political leaders sought to secure their party's
nomination, one obscure Democrat challenged Kirk directly
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and ignored the Democratic frontrunners.

Reubin O'Donovan

Askew believed there was an urgent need for responsible
leadership in Florida.

Kirk had gained the chief

executive's office in 1966 because many Democrats had hoped
to find new leadership but instead got government by
impulse and antics, Askew told people.

"I think the people

are ready for a new leadership, keyed to results rather
than who gets the credit."

Although admitting that he did

not have all the answers to the problems facing the state,
Askew promised to work hard and apply all of his "training,
experience and ability to develop a meaningful partnership
with the people in an earnest attempt to find solutions."
Askew had already earned a reputation as a hard-working
legislator who shunned political expediency in favor of
doing what he believed right.

Even though Askew's remarks

did not differ markedly from that of other politicians
running for office, he delivered them with an air of
believability.

His ability to project sincerity,

particularly over television, would serve him well in the
1970 campaign.61
Askew was b o m
children.

in Muscogee, Oklahoma, the last of six

His father, an itinerant carpenter with a sixth

grade education, left the family when Reubin was b o m .

At

the age of eight his mother moved with the children to
Pensacola, Florida, where she had been raised, and took a
job as a hotel maid.

Reubin's first job was going door-to192
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door taking orders for
night.

pies and cakes his mother baked at

"Mother taught us to hold our heads high and work."

And Reubin's mother said of her youngest son that "he was
the most determined boy I've ever seen, anything he did, he
had to do perfectly,
yard."

even if it was just cleaning the

Askew attended Florida State University, where he

received a degree in public administration, and the
University of Florida, where he earned a law degree.

He

served as a paratrooper in World War II and as an Air Force
officer during the Korean conflict.

Elected to the Florida

Legislature in 1958 and again in 1960, he moved over to the
senate

in 1962 for the first of three terms, eventually

rising to become president pro tern of

that body.

He won

numerous legislative awards, was named one of the
outstanding young men by the state Jaycees, and worked
extensively on behalf of underprivileged and retarded
children.62
Askew had also demonstrated that he belonged to a new
breed of southern politician that shunned racial bigotry.
In 1951 while Askew served as student body president at
Florida State,

the university prevented an integrated

student delegation from colleges around the state from
holding a meeting on that segregated campus.

Askew led a

protest and prepared a resolution that called upon the
legislature to integrate all state graduate schools.

Seven

years later, during his first campaign for the legislature,
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a man called him a "niggerlover."
that was true.

Askew responded that yes

"The difference between you and me is that

I'm trying to overcome my prejudices and you're not."

Even

though his position seemed out of step with that of his
constituents, he won election and reelection.

"01' Rube

[Askew's nickname] got some funny notions 'bout the
colored, but you can't help respecting a man for saying
what he thinks," remarked an old man from Pensacola.

First

elected to the legislature only four years after the Brown
decision, Askew resisted efforts to close public schools
rather than succumb to integration.

"I guess because I was

from Pensacola people just naturally expected I'd be part
of the conservative bloc, but I took the position from the
beginning that I'd never do anything to shut down schools,"
Askew said.

"Without public education I never would have

had any opportunities."63
In 1970 Askew decided to run for governor against very
long odds.

After losing their hold on power, Florida

Democrats seemed unusually united behind the clear frontrunner, Attorney General Earl Faircloth.

In late April a

poll in the Tampa - St. Petersburg area suggested Faircloth
would win easily.

Only four percent of those polled

believed Askew could win the Democratic nomination.

Askew,

however, did not caitpaign as if Faircloth would capture the
Democratic nomination.

On the first of August Askew

contended that the Democratic primary was wide open and
194

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

that he could pose the greatest threat to the incumbent in
the general election.

"Democrats who want a change are

going to vote for the man who has the best chance to beat
Kirk," said Askew.
assessment.

Everyone did not agree with Askew's

Even Askew's hometown newspaper, the Pensacola

News-Journal. endorsed another Democrat.

In am editorial

the paper said senate president John Mathews was better
qualified and more likely to capture the nomination than
Askew.

Most voters in North Florida, according to one

paper there, believed Faircloth or Mathews would be in the
Democratic runoff.

But the paper noted that even though

Reubin Askew was not well known,

several voters commented

that they were leaning toward him.64
Although few voters outside the Pensacola area knew of
Askew,

several political observers soon began to appreciate

the potential of this young, attractive candidate.

In a

report on the Florida gubernatorial race dated 18 June
1970, Harry Dent wrote that Kirk would likely win the
Republican nomination and defeat any prospective Democratic
challenger, but state representative Reubin Askew concerned
him.

Askew, Dent wrote,

"seems to be the front-running

conservative Democrat as Attorney General Faircloth has
faltered."

Oddly enough, the incumbent realized this

before almost anyone else.

When Askew resigned from the

state senate to enter the gubernatorial race Kirk told him:
"I hope the Democrats don't have sense enough to nominate
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you, you're the only one who can beat me." Indeed Kirk had
hoped to run against almost any other Democratic
candidate.65
Askew presented a sharp contrast to the incumbent
governor.

A self-described "non-smoking teetotaler and a

Presbyterian elder," Askew's personality could not be
described as flamboyant nor his rhetoric dramatic, but his
honesty and sincerity came through.

"I'm just glad to see

a candidate have the guts to say what he thinks," one
public official said.
norm.

Askew's campaign differed from the

He sought to run a campaign steeped in optimism.

Askew contended that he had broken all the political rules
in his rise to a spot in the Democratic primary runoff.
"Its a new day, for the poorest and the wealthiest,
black and the white.

for the

We've got to start talking about the

things on which we agree, not our disagreements."66
Askew criticized the incumbent's record.

Kirk let

down all kinds of Floridians from citrus farmers to senior
citizens, Askew charged; he failed to protect the
environment or reduce crime.

Askew emphasized the need for

new leadership and financial responsibility.

When

Democratic candidates agreed on the inevitability of new
taxes, Askew attacked them all.

John Mathews, who proposed

a grocery tax, became "Food Tax Jack."

To accept Mathews

plan was "just another way of saying that we're going to
load more taxes on the middle and low income people and
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leave the special interests alone," said Askew.

"When

someone calls for a tax on groceries which feed our
families,

it is unfair and unthinkable."

Askew railed

against another candidate that favored a personal income
tax and charged that the leading Democratic candidate's
proposed increase in the capital stock tax would endanger
small business.

Instead of listening to consumers, Askew

said, these politicians "are listening to and obeying the
special interests which put money into their fat campaign
treasuries -- and escape their fair share of the cost of
government."

A tax on corporate profits, Askew argued,

would eliminate the need to increase the sales tax on
groceries, medicine and utilities.

The corporate tax would

also eliminate the capital stock tax that Askew called
unfair to business,

and help fight the burgeoning problem

of pollution in the state.
well.

This issue would serve Askew

In recommending Askew for the Democratic nomination

the S t . Petersburg Times contended that "when many others
were catering to prejudices, Askew was talking about tax
reform.

He has kept himself free of the entangling

commitments that entwine Kirk."67
In the first Republican primary, held September 8,
Kirk led the field with 172,888 votes, but Skip Bafalis'
48,378 votes denied Kirk a majority and forced him into a
run-off with Eckerd who polled 137,731 votes.

Kirk's

forty-eight percent fell far short of his predicted sixty
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percent victory.

The incumbent had suffered serious damage

from these two challengers,

indicating a lack of strength

within his own party.68
On the Democratic side, Earl Faircloth led the
polling, while Reubin Askew ascended to a second place
runoff spot in the closing days of the campaign.

Political

observers had from the begining of the campaign season
predicted that Faircloth would become the Democratic choice
for governor, but Askew's upset surge into the runoff
convinced many, including the Kirk camp, that Askew would
capture the nomination.

Faircloth's support had faded

during the busing controversy.

Some voters believed that

Faircloth had shirked his duty as attorney general when
Governor Kirk challenged busing plans in the courts.

While

many did not support all of Kirk's tactics, they did
believe that Faircloth's weak me-too reaction to Kirk's
resistance did not bode well for a gubernatorial candidate.
Kirk believed he had weakened Faircloth's political appeal
and wanted to face him in the general election.
Kirk wanted anybody, but Askew.

In fact,

Some Republicans saw

Askew's rising star as the eclipse of their own.

"The

Democrats have no finer man in Tallahassee than Reubin
Askew," said a top-ranking Kirk aide.

"It's not Jack Eckerd

we have to worry about."69
In 1966 Kirk had been the forlorn Republican running
against entrenched Democratic control, but in 1970 he had
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to answer for his actions while wielding power over the
last four years.

Kirk

became the center of attention and

the target of attack for the entire field of candidates
from both parties.

Jack Eckerd said that if Kirk were

renominated he would drag down GOP candidates all over the
state and erase gains the party had taken a hundred years
to achieve.

The primary, Eckerd's campaign manager noted,

"proved that even a majority of Kirk's own party doesn't
want him."

William Cramer who won the Republican

nomination for the senate worked against Kirk because he
believed that the governor had stabbed him in the back by
pushing Judge Carswell to run against him.

And state

Democratic chairman Anne Cramer worried that the GOP
infighting might spoil their chance to run against Kirk.
"We've been waiting four years for a crack at him, and we
know we can beat him."70
Several newspapers agreed that the elimination of Kirk
would benefit the state.

Two Tampa Bay area newspapers

endorsed Eckerd and Askew for their party's nominations.
"Four more years of Kirk would be bad business for
Florida," according to the Tampa T i m e s .

The S t . Petersburg

Evening Independent wrote that Askew was "known to his
colleagues for his integrity, a welcome virtue for a
governor of Florida."

The Miami Herald, citing the

incumbent governor as the major issue in state politics,
also backed Eckerd and Askew.

Nominating these two would
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"restore sound, honest, dignified government to Florida
after four nightmarish years of buffoonery and turmoil,"
the paper contended.71
But those who hoped to see Kirk eliminated from
Florida politics would have to wait.

Jack Eckerd, Kirk's

Republican challenger who had forced a runoff primary,
proved unequal to the task of driving the incumbent from
office.

On September 29, Kirk won 56.8 percent in the

Republican runoff.

Kirk would face the Democratic nominee

in the general election.72
On the Democratic side, in a move that surprised many,
Secretary of State Tom Adams, who had turned down offers
from two other Democratic contenders,
be Askew's running mate.

accepted an offer to

Adams brought with him perhaps

more ability and experience than any other Democrat in the
state, not to mention a well established political
organization.

Besides governmental experience the Askew-

Adams team could point to grass roots financing.

Askew had

been running on a shoe-string budget and Adams had gone
broke in politics.

Askew praised Adams as the only

political figure who admitted a campaign deficit.

Adams

said he accepted the offer to run for the number two
position because Askew refused "to take a dime unless the
person who gives it wants it reported.

This just ain't so

with other candidates in the election."73
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Although Faircloth led the first primary, his
lackluster campaign could not contend with the refreshing
candidacy of Askew nor the organization of Adams.

Askew

captured the Democratic nomination with a 119,000 vote
margin of victory.

Askew's 400,000 vote total exceeded by

50,000 votes the total Republican vote cast for Kirk and
Eckerd in their runoff.

Kirk had invigorated the

Democratic party by providing competition from the GOP for
the first time since Reconstruction.

It seemed the

Democrats had shaken off the image of the discredited old
order with new faces and new ideas.74
Askew reflected this freshness by calling for a "new
tone” in the governor's office that was "both responsible
and responsive and conducive to finding solutions to the
problems facing Florida."

Calling his run-off win a

"victory for the people," Askew said his fair share tax
reform campaign would be financed solely by the people.
The Democratic nominee expected special interests to extend
offers of assistance now that he had the nomination, but he
promised he would not take any funds with any strings
attached.

"We are going to continue in raising our money

in the same way we've done in the past and that is on an
individual basis."7S
Askew proved appealing to a wide array of voters.
the 1968 presidential campaign George Wallace and Eugene
McCarthy represented the extreme ends of the political
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In

spectrum.

The Florida campaign chairmen for each of these

two 1968 presidential candidates threw their support to
Askew in the 1970 general election.

The former Wallace

campaign director saw Askew as simply the best man for the
job, while the McCarthy chairman compared Askew's appeal to
the old populist political coalition.

"I'd hate to put a

tag on Mr. Askew as far as conservative or liberal," said
the Wallace supporter.
roader."

"He's more of a middle of the

The McCarthy man agreed and pointed to qualities

in the candidate that seemed to reach across ideology,
"he's a very sincere guy that is not owned by the
traditional special interests in Florida.
free man, really."

He's a pretty

These sentiments foreshadowed trouble

for the incumbent who won in 1966 with the help of
thousands of Democrats who came to believe, with Kirk's
help, that their party's candidate, Robert King High, was
too liberal.

Kirk had emphasized High's open endorsement

of integration and the public accommodation section of the
1964 civil rights bill and his tenure as mayor of Miami
when race riots racked that city.

Kirk had also exploited

the widespread frustration of many Floridians with
President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" by linking High
with national Democrats who many associated with the
excesses of liberalism that plagued the 1960s.

But in 1970

Kirk would have a much more difficult task in trying to
label Askew as an extreme liberal.

While High hailed from

202

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Miami, a city that many considered a liberal Sodom and
Gomorrah, Askew grew up in the most conservative part of
the state.

And it was impossible for Kirk to link Askew

with the political problems of the recent past when a
Republican president and Kirk himself had been presiding
over the nation and state.76
These difficulties did not stop Kirk from attempting
to re-implement his earlier strategy.

Kirk claimed that

the New York Times had labeled Askew a liberal.

"And you

can't hardly beat the New York Times for picking out
liberals -- flaming liberals," said Kirk.
permissive liberals to vote for Askew.

"I want all the

I want all the

discerning Democrats and wise Republicans to vote for m e ."
Kirk also attacked Askew's ability to be governor.
called him "Goody Two-Shoes,

...

Kirk

a nice, sweet-looking

fellow," Kirk said, but being governor was "a tough job and
just being a momma's boy won't get the job done."

But

Askew had earned a reputation for taking on tough jobs.

In

the Senate, Askew had often drawn the tedious non-headline
assignments because of his record of accomplishment.

He

had served as chairman of both the Appropriations and
Constitutional Amendments committees and was credited with
doing most of the work on the complicated revision of the
trial court system.77
Kirk seemed unable to sit back and rest on the laurels
of his administration, even though he had accomplished a
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great deal.

He had opened up Florida politics to public

scrutiny, led the fight for governmental reform and
constitutional revision,

sought educational improvements,

took measures to protect the environment,
first state law enforcement agency.

and formed the

But Kirk's brand of

confrontational politics dictated that he attack his
opponent.

In the past slinging the mud of racial

liberalism had served southern politicians well.

By 1970,

however, diverting attention away from the issues by
political invective proved ineffective.

Coupled with the

diminution of the race issue was the fact that Kirk's
adversary in 1970 remained impervious to the incumbent's
attacks of excessive liberalism, corruption or
incompetence.

Askew's earnestness and wholesome image

seemed, to many voters, more suited to governance than the
confrontation and dissension created by the incumbent.
That Askew had entered the race as an unknown in most of
the state enhanced his fresh-face appeal among an
electorate disgusted with politics as u s u a l .
to counter this appeal.
Kirk charged.

Kirk sought

"Askew is not a new face at all,"

"He's been around for twelve years.

The

reason the people knew nothing about him is that he never
did anything."78
If Kirk did not understand the dynamics of this
particular campaign, Askew's campaign manager, Elmer
Rounds, did.

Before the candidates even began running,
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Rounds traveled to sixty counties in the state.
discovered the public was in a foul mood.
at government and politics," Rounds said.

"I

They were angry
"I could see

Reubin would have a good chance because he was unknown.

It

was the same advantage Kirk enjoyed in 1966."79
Askew deftly sidestepped Kirk's criticisms by
reminding voters of the incumbent's antics while in office.
"I think the people are tired of government by crisis,"
Askew said.

"We can't have government by personality.

We

must have government by law, by diligence and by
commitment."

Askew turned Kirk's accusations that he was a

liberal into a joke.

"Kirk's definition of an ultraliberal

is anybody who runs against him," said the Democratic
nominee.

Askew pointed out that Kirk had supported the

1968 presidential bid of Nelson Rockefeller, whom many saw
as representative of the extreme liberal faction of the
GOP.

And Askew produced a 1967 New York Times stOj»y j.n

which Kirk called George Wallace a "flaming liberal."
Askew rejected being positioned on the political spectrum.
He said that labels were not important.
fearful to take a stand on any issue.
men you are putting into office.
one of inefficiency."

"I have never been
Look instead at the

The governor's record is

After the election even GOP Senator

Edward Gurney conceded that Republican efforts to label
Democratic candidates as liberal had not succeeded.

"There

was no clear-cut liberal-conservative battle," Gurney said.
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"The candidates tried to make it that way but it didn't
work o u t ."80
The Kirk campaign even sought to link Askew's tax
reforms to liberalism.

Kirk's campaign manager, Robert

Lee, charged that Askew had "surrounded himself with the
most wild-eyed liberal elements in Florida."

Lee claimed

that Askew and a Miami state senator were "co-architects of
the new pork chop liberalism," that was "just a new
disguise for the old liberal Democrat tax and spend,
philosophy."

Lee charged that Askew's "alleged tax reform

package" would increase taxes and spending.
also accused Askew of favoring big spending.

Governor Kirk
While in the

legislature the Democratic nominee "never failed to vote
for more spending," Kirk claimed.
solve anything.

"Big spending doesn't

When he talks about tax reform,

know whether to laugh or cry."

I don't

The governor saw dangers in

Askew's proposed corporate income tax.

"I enjoy this game

that we're involved in -- free enterprise and democracy,"
said Kirk. "My adversary is trying to kick around the
corporations.

Ain't nobody going to kick around the

corporations."81
Askew supporters had warned him from the beginning
that his campaign should not advocate a corporate income
tax.

"Any kind of tax proposal, my friends assured me, was

political suicide," the candidate admitted.

Many political

observers had predicted that after his primary victory
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Askew would downplay his corporate income tax since it
would open him up to Republican charges of being anti
business, but the Democratic nominee continued to
emphasize, and even clarify his plans for tax reform.

Kirk

renamed his opponent "Reubin Taxyou," contending that
Askew's reforms would cost each household in the state at
least $150 per year.

"The working man is realizing,

finally, that this is not a tax on corporations; it is a
tax on him.
audience,

If 'Taxyou' is elected," Kirk told a breakfast

"all of these eggs and grits and gravy and

biscuits will carry a tax."

Askew struck back at Kirk's

criticism of his tax program by labeling the incumbent as
"Tax-Fraud Claude."

Askew reminded a gathering in Miami

that in 1966 Kirk had been totally opposed to any advance
or increase in the sales or gasoline tax.

"But two years

later he proposed the largest single increase in taxes in
history - - a five percent sales tax."

Askew also reminded

his audience that Kirk still advocated a one-cent increase
in gasoline taxes after the legislature had rejected it in
a special session.

Askew denied that his proposed

corporate tax was anti-business, as Kirk had charged, and
contended that it would merely require corporations to pay
a fair share of the tax load.

"Florida ranks forty-sixth

in the nation in the amount of taxes corporation pay, but
we've got one of the highest consumer taxes in the
nation. "82
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As the election neared Florida newspapers made
endorsements. Jacksonville's Florida Times Union supported
Kirk whom the paper characterized as "controversial,
colorful and sometimes downright cantankerous."

The paper

contended that the incumbent had been good for the state.
"He didn't cave in under every pressure that was brought to
bear on state government.
some and he lost some.

That's not his way.

...

He backed away from none.

got the people more involved."

He won

...

He

Most of the state's

newspapers, however, did not like what the governor got the
people involved in.

Calling the Kirk administration "four

years of divisive and destructive buffoonery," the S t .
Petersburg Times endorsed Askew for governor.

"Governor

Kirk's tenure has been a lark for the governor but an
albatross for the state," said the editorial.

"The Askew

record on the other hand portrays quiet, responsible,
progressive leadership."

The Tampa Tribune said that

Florida was "too important a state and too proud a state to
have to endure four more years of a governor who turned
this high office into a traveling circus."

The paper

praised Askew for conducting himself honorably and for his
stand on the corporate income tax.
supported Askew.

The Miami Herald also

"It is time in Florida . . . for a new

generation of leadership," said the paper.
breath of fresh air in Florida politics

Askew is "a

...

he has

captured the imagination of a state which plainly desires
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new leadership."

According to Kirk it only made sense that

the state's newspapers supported his opponent.

Askew was a

tool of Florida's "foreign-controlled, permissive-liberal
press," Kirk charged.83
Voters weighed in with their own opinions.

At a

defense plant one employee believed that Kirk had "stood up
against many obstacles.
tried."

He didn't accomplish much but he

A black employee said that Kirk was "an extremist

on the right."

State senator Verle Pope of S t . Augustine

considered Askew a man of great ability and courage.

"We

are starting with a product we know is good," Pope said.
"He can lead the state out of the wilderness we have been
in for the past four years."84
In the final days of the campaign Kirk used pollution
as a metaphor for all the ills he claimed Askew
represented.

While campaigning in Askew's home county of

Escambia, Kirk pointed to an executive order that he had
issued to clean up Escambia Bay.

Kirk claimed that if he

remained in the governor's office there would be no more
fish kills.

If his opponent won the election, however,

the

contamination would return because Askew was a "patsy of
the polluters."

Kirk then launched into a wide-ranging

litany of charges against Askew.

"He wants to pollute your

homes with forced housing. He wants to pollute education
with forced busing.
pornography.

He wants to pollute your minds with

He favors those who pollute your b a y s ."
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Askew responded to Kirk's charges by reminding voters that
the two men were running for the state's highest office.
"You would think he is running against me for state
senator, rather than me running against him for governor,"
the Democratic nominee said.

"From the way he is talking,

everything wrong in Florida is my fault."

One older man at

a campaign rally agreed telling the Democratic challenger
that he was going to win because he refused to indulge in
the same type of politics as the governor.
tired of that type of politics."

"The state's

Rather than hurling

insults back at the governor, Askew labelled Kirk's charges
"the politics of a desperate man who knows he's fixing to
lose.1,85
Polls seemed to bear out Askew's assessment.

In a

Miami Herald poll of 600 registered voters statewide taken
in late October, Askew led with sixty-two percent to Kirk's
thirty-five percent.

Kirk scoffed at the poll.

"I bet my

last buck a third of the voters out there haven't made up
their minds," Kirk said.

But the incumbent also admitted

that winning reelection would not be easy.
fight," Kirk said.

"It's an uphill

"But I have confidence.

uphill every day I have been in Tallahassee."

It's been
And the

governor's campaign efforts gave no indication that he was
engaged in a losing effort.

He pursued a relentless

campaign schedule, while maintaining his enthusiasm and
optimism.

Typically his campaign DC-3 took off close to
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dawn with bleary eyed campaign workers and journalists
stumbling aboard to find the candidate for reelection
fresh,

immaculately dressed and upbeat.

Kirk would criss

cross the state attacking his opponent as a liberal in
sixteen to twenty hour days, while conducting the affairs
of the state with occasional stops at the capital.86
All of Kirk's campaigning, however, failed to sway
nearly enough voters to give him four more years in office.
On election day voters sent a resounding message to their
confrontational governor.

Askew won fifty-seven percent of

the vote, a landslide margin of 291,083 votes.87
When the primary season began most political observers
considered the incumbent unbeatable, but after four years
of confrontation the electorate opted for a less colorful
candidate and a more cooperative government.

Askew had

stressed his desire to work with the popularly elected
cabinet,

that his predecessor had sought to abolish, and

the legislature, that the governor had battled with during
nine special sessions he called during his tenure.

Kirk's

confrontational tactics had solidified opposition against
him.

One of the few successful GOP candidates in the

election called Kirk a "unifying force for the Democrats."
Many blamed Kirk for not only uniting the Democrats, but
for dividing the GOP during a four-year battle to establish
personal control of the party.

"He's tried to set up his

own party," one Republican leader complained.88
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Kirk's defiance of court-ordered desegregation that
required busing also contributed to his political demise.
After the election Kirk conceded that the racial emphasis
of his campaign probably cost him the election.

The

governor sought to place himself between the federal
government and the school systems attempting to implement
court orders.

Kirk's challenge harkened back to the old

southern notion of interposition; the states had created
the constitution by compact, so when the federal government
overstepped its authority,

the states had the right and the

duty to interpose themselves between the offending action
and its execution.

Southern governors had attempted to

justify their resistance to federal mandates in the past
with interposition and failed.

Although polls showed that

nearly ninety percent of Florida's voters disapproved of
busing, very few had any illusions that they could
successfully resist federal court orders.

That Kirk's

motivations seemed transparently political further reduced
the popularity of his stand.

Furthermore the tumultuous

decade of the 1960s illustrated the social upheaval that
resulted from defiance of the law and strained the
willingness of most southerners to mimic the protestors and
rioters they had so roundly castigated.

Indeed much of the

criticism of Kirk's actions pointed to militants of the
recent past who broke the law in testing aspects of society
they considered unjust.

Kirk had fallen out of step with
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the mood of the electorate.

His philosophy of governance

did not reflect the feelings of the voters.89
Reubin Askew, on the other hand, mirrored the concerns
of Floridians.

Askew opposed busing.

He was not against

integration, but believed the issue was too divisive and
disruptive.

Askew had not been forced to take a strong

stand for or against busing as Kirk's showdown at Manatee
occurred before Askew became a serious candidate.

While

avoiding disruptive racial issues, Askew's reliance on
populist issues served him well in 1970.

Askew ran on a

shoestring budget, provided full disclosure of his
contributions and refused special interest money.

Running

a campaign financed solely by the people added credibility
to his main campaign theme of taxing the corporations in
the state in order to reduce personal income taxes.

When

Kirk tried to portray Askew as a tax-and-spend liberal
Democrat, the charges did not ring true.

Askew had

established a conservative fiscal record during his years
in the legislature even voting against the legislative pay
raise that Governor Kirk had made such a fuss over early in
his administration.

Kirk also had public problems with his

personal, and campaign finances and his proposals to raise
gas and sales taxes did not fare well with the electorate.
The personal contrast between the two candidates also
contributed the electoral success of Askew.

Kirk showed up

at his own inaugural with an attractive woman he would only
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refer to as Madame X, the governor had a reputation as a
hard drinker, his language could be coarse, and his
appetite for confrontation was legendary.

Askew on the

other had was a self-described non-smoking teetotaler and
Presbyterian elder who had married his high school
sweetheart and most important, he had a convincing air of
honesty and sincerity that he communicated to the public.
Askew seemed to speak for a New South.

In his

inaugural he spoke of the need to do more than "give pious
lip service to the justifiably urgent needs of our black
citizens."

After the election he expressed hope that a New

South might lead the country into a new era of racial
accommodation.

"The rest of the nation has tried to teach

us justice in the South by mandate and court order," Reubin
Askew would later tell his constituents.

"Now perhaps it

is up to us to try to teach them in a much more effective
way -- by example."90
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTH CAROLINA

In his classic work of 1949, Southern Politics in
State and Nation. V.O. Key contended that the preoccupation
with race in South Carolina supplanted political conflict.
"In part, issues are deliberately repressed,

for, at least

in the long run, concern with genuine issues would bring an
end to the consensus by which the Negro is kept out of
politics.
his vote."

One crowd or another would be tempted to seek
By 1970 the consensus concerning black

involvement in politics had ended.

As Key had predicted,

only one crowd sought the black vote while the other sought
to mobilize the fears of the majority of white voters
concerning federal pressures to achieve racial balances in
schools and the perception that blacks could exercise undue
influence by voting as a "bloc."1
Five years after the publication of Key's book the
Supreme Court ruled that segregated schools must end.
South Carolina, like other southern states, fought
desegregation through the courts, but unlike some of them,
when it came, South Carolina acquiesced,

if not

enthusiastically at least with a modicum of decorum.
without irony integration began at Clemson University,
built on the cotton plantation of John C. Calhoun the
antebellum South's leading spokesman for slavery and
states' rights.
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Not

In 1963 as his tenure in office drew to an end, rather
than leaving his successor to deal with the problems that
integration posed, outgoing governor Ernest Hollings set
the tone for the transition by telling the legislature:
we meet, South Carolina is running out of courts.

"As

If and

when every legal remedy has been exhausted, this General
Assembly must make clear South Carolina's choice, a
government of laws rather than a government of men.

As

determined as we are, we of today must realize the lesson
of 100 years ago, and move on for the good of South
Carolina and our United States.
and order."

It must be done with law

The incoming governor, Donald Russell,

continued these efforts at easing the transition by opening
up the inaugural barbecue to black citizens for the first
time.2
At the same time that South Carolina struggled to
accept these changes, other southern states determined to
resist them.

Alabama's new governor in 1963, George

Wallace, courted confrontation in his inaugural address
promising "segregation today, segregation tomorrow,
segregation forever."

And Wallace sought to prevent

integration of higher education in his state when he stood
in the doorway of the University of Alabama.

At the

University of Mississippi when integration threatened, full
scale rioting ensued requiring federal troops to restore
order.

These incidents generated unfavorable publicity for
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the South focusing national and international attention on
a region that was struggling desperately to emerge from
decades of social stigma and economic difficulties.
In 1968 South Carolina sent its first integrated
delegation to the National Democratic Convention.

It was

the only Deep South delegation that went unchallenged.

In

1970 as part of the three-hundredth birthday of South
Carolina "Porgy and Bess" was performed in Charleston,

the

first performance of native son, Dubose Heyward's musical
play in the city in which it was set.

A decade earlier

city officials had barred even the movie version.

Also in

1970, when four southern governors pledged to defy federal
desegregation plans that included student busing
arrangements in their home states, Governor Robert McNair
promised South Carolina would obey the law.

The 58,000

pupil Greenville County school system faced a mid-year
desegregation order that involved extensive busing.
governor received over 15,000 telegrams.

The

"Everybody wants

the governor to do something," an aide said,

"but nobody

has any suggestions for what he could do that would be
legal."
telecast:

McNair told his constituents in a statewide
"We've run out of courts, and we've run out of

time, and we must adjust to new circumstances."

The

governor said he would oppose any attempts to close schools
or abolish compulsory school attendance laws.
what defiance will lead to," McNair said.

"We've seen

"I don't think
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the people of this state would want to defy the order of
the court after we've run the course legally.
want federal troops in South Carolina.

We don't

We've built a

reputation for obedience to the law."3
The example set by the chief executive facilitated
community leaders in accomplishing complete integration
with "grace and dignity," as one national wire service
characterized it.

Even though McNair saw his popularity

decline as a result of the conciliatory speech, most South
Carolinians had moved into the ranks of moderation.

"The

people down here know they've lost the battle," observed
one Democrat.

"They'd like to continue fighting, but they

realize they can't win.
up."

So they don't want trouble stirred

This seemed to sum up the attitude of white

moderation in the state.

Resistance had proven disruptive

and most whites seemed willing to live with integration in
exchange for tranquility.4
By 1970, then, South Carolina seemed poised to accept
integration, even in that most jealously defended bastion
of southern segregation, schools.

"White folks feel

they're becoming more moderate," explained M. Hayes Mizell,
a white civil rights activist who scored an upset victory
in a 1970 Columbia school board election.

"They are doing

things they didn't do a few years ago, like sitting down
with Negroes at lunch counters, participating at meetings
where Negroes are present, their kids are going to school
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with at least some Negroes.
tranquility,
liberal."

With all this peace, and

they think everything is OK, that they're more

More than 50,000 white children in 1970 were

attending formerly all-black schools in the state.
Although the movement to establish new private schools to
circumvent integration reached its peak in 1970, public
school enrollment declined by only two percent that year.
The University of South Carolina included 400 black
undergraduates in the fall of 1970.5
In anticipation of the upcoming election of 1970 two
South Carolina college students sought, by employing census
figures, to find the county most representative of the
state and survey one hundred random vo t e r s .

The search

indicated that Laurens county with a population of 47,609
was the average county in the state.

Laurens county lies

in the northwestern quadrant of the state midway between
Greenville and Columbia.

The county contained a seventy--

thirty percent racial split, and a sixty--forty percent
urban to rural ratio.

Politically the county had followed

the state pattern in its choice for presidential candidates
in the past three national elections,
Goldwater and Nixon.

supporting Kennedy,

Of the one hundred voters employed

for the survey eighty were white and twenty black.

The

party affiliation of the white respondents included thirtyeight independents, fourteen Republicans and twenty-eight
Democrats.

All the blacks participating in the survey with
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the exception of one independent and one Republican
indicated a preference for the Democratic Party.

Of the

total number of respondents eighty-three considered
themselves members of the "Silent Majority" that Richard
Nixon had appealed to.

Eighty-eight read a newspaper and

eighty-four watched television news.

Forty-nine said that

the news media influenced their political thinking more
than family, friends or fellow employees.

Fifty-eight

viewed public officials as "basically honest and
effective," while sixty-seven believed the situation in the
state was hopeful.

The one hundred random respondents in

this most average county in South Carolina designated two
problems that most concerned them on the national and state
level.

Of national issues, thirty-one worried about crime,

twenty-nine Vietnam, and twenty-seven race relations.

Of

state issues sixty-eight expressed concern over education,
twenty-six taxes, and twenty-one crime.

The authors of the

study noted that the overwhelming response to education was
because of race-mixing and student busing associated with a
recent desegregation court order of "intense concern to
respondents" in neighboring Greenville county.

The study

concluded by pointing to the possibility of Republican
gains in South Carolina because of two popular Republicans
-- Albert Watson and Richard Nixon.6
A Republican had not sat in the governor's chair in
South Carolina since Reconstruction, but 1970 seemed to
226

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

hold great promise for the Grand Old Party.

While token

school desegregation had proceeded smoothly under freedom
of choice plans, new and drastic changes threatened the
state.

Several South Carolina school districts faced

termination of federal funding due to failure to
desegregate,

and the 58,000 student Greenville County

school district struggled in January 1970 with a mid-year
desegregation order that included extensive busing.

Some

Republicans sought to exploit what they considered drastic
and intrusive federal desegregation orders.
Republicans,

These

led by Congressman Albert Watson and Senator

Strom Thurmond, believed that the McNair administration's
moderate approach to integration exhibited weakness that
had encouraged more stringent federal desegregation
measures.

Closely associated with the McNair policies,

lieutenant governor, John West, appeared certain to capture
the Democratic nomination.
vulnerable candidate.

Many Republicans saw West as a

They believed he could be attacked

as more liberal than the electorate, and they saw him
lacking the personal charisma of popular Republican
congressman, Albert Watson.
Albert Watson had begun his political career as a
Democrat serving in the South Carolina House before moving
up to the U.S. Congress in 1962.

In 1960 Watson headed up

Democrats for Nixon and in 1964 supported Senator Barry
Goldwater,

the Republican nominee for President.
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As a

result of his support for Goldwater, Democrats in the House
of Representatives stripped him of his seniority, Watson
resigned his seat and entered a special election as a
Republican.

Watson re-captured the seat with seventy

percent of the vote and still held on to it in 1970.

This

led many Republicans to see Watson as the strongest
potential Republican candidate in the state and they urged
him to run.

Republican Senator Strom Thurmond, who had

also left the Democratic party after supporting Goldwater
in 1964, saw Watson as a kindred spirit.

He introduced

Watson at a November 1969 Republican gathering of 900 party
contributors addressed by Senator Barry Goldwater as the
"future Governor of South Carolina."7
Many hoped that Watson could combine the strong
Republican support spearheaded by Senator Thurmond with an
appeal to those voters who had voted for Wallace in 1968.
Richard Nixon had carried the state in 1968 with thirtynine percent of the vote, largely through the efforts of
Senator Thurmond, while Wallace had received thirty-two
p ercent.

Distress over desegregation measures that

included busing seemed to permeate the state, and Watson
looked like the perfect candidate to take advantage of the
issue.

Watson had once campaigned for congress wearing a

white tie that he privately admitted was a symbol of his
support.

Watson accused Governor McNair of "surrender" for

advising compliance with court ordered desegregation and
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described himself as "an ardent fighter for the rights of
the majority against the vocal, violent minority."8
But Watson did not speak for all Republicans.

Arthur

Ravenel, Jr., a racial moderate from Charleston seeking his
party's nomination in 1970, thought a different approach
could win the governor's chair.

Senator Thurmond's

endorsement of Watson left Ravenel "very disappointed."
December 1969 Ravenel,

In

responding to the touting of Watson

as the Republican nominee for the upcoming governor's race,
said that the South Carolina GOP was "racist oriented" and
on the "unrealistic or ridiculous right" and should follow
him to a position closer to the center of the political
spectrum.9
Ravenel believed that the Republican party had to
reach out to black voters in order to have any hope of
success in statewide races.

"How can we win elections by

appealing to only sixty-five percent of the voters?"
Ravenel asked.

"I believe you've got to openly appeal to

the black voters.

. . . I'm going to do it openly, not

sneaking around in alleys."

Ravenel had been advocating

this approach of racial accommodation for some time.

In

1968 serving as the GOP district chairman in Charleston, he
had promised' that as long as he held that position "this
will not be a racist party."
notice.

The Greenville News took

Under an article entitled "GOP Should Take

Ravenel's C u e ," the paper pointed to Ravenel's open door
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approach as the only way to "break the Democratic party's
virtual monopoly on the growing Negro vote."10
Ravenel could point to two southern Republicans,
Lynwood Holton in Virginia and Winthrop Rockefeller in
Arkansas, who had gained the governor's chair because of
black support.

"And all Black people want," wrote Ravenel

to one Republican activist in the state,
White people want.

"is the same thing

And what's wrong with that?"

It all

seemed so simple to Ravenel that the direction of his own
party in 1970 confounded and upset him.

Ravenel believed

that "polarization forces" were pushing Watson into the
gubernatorial race.

Ravenel contended that this "bunch"

included "reactionaries" whose cause was hopeless.

"Not

being able to get any Black or moderate support, they're
going to have to push harder for the seg and racist
v o t e .1,11
Those close to Ravenel shared his alarm at the
possibility of a Watson nomination.

James Duffy, who

became Ravenel's campaign manager in 1970, after hearing
Watson suggest that parents keep their children from
attending court-ordered desegregated schools,

in spite of

the state compulsory education law, asked an associate
incrdulously:

"A governor who will not uphold the law?"

And in reaction to Watson's tactics of urging resistance,
Duffy expressed his candidate's attitude regarding the
latest round of court-ordered desegregation in South
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Carolina.

"It is an issue that might have some political

appeal," wrote Duffy to a supporter,

"but has no room for

legitimate problem solving because it has all been tried
since 1954.1,12
And the Ravenel camp was not alone.

A moderate group

of Republicans had emerged who objected to the racial
message Watson would send to the state and nation.

Like

Ravenel and Duffy, James Henderson, the GOP candidate for
lieutenant governor, advocated a very different approach
from that of his party's top candidate.

"If I have

anything to do with it, we're going to pay attention to all
the races," Henderson promised.

"No party can hold public

office without recognizing that one-third of South
Carolina's population is black."13
Some young people in South Carolina, who had no doubt
been affected by the civil rights movement,
political menace.

saw Watson as a

In the February 20th issue of Clemson

University's student newspaper, the Tiger, an editorial
proclaimed Watson's election would be a political disaster.
"His slick rhetoric and reactionary non-thought," wrote the
paper, would confuse the uninformed voter,

"and the key to

his campaign is a raucous, negative attack on the forces of
progress in our state government."

Although the state had

not suffered the disgrace of electing a George Wallace or a
Lester Maddox,

the editorial contended, Watson had "the

charisma, oratorical expertise and Thurmondesque to capture
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the votes of masses of South Carolinians.

Watson . . .

preys off the fears and frustrations of people caught up in
America's social revolution."1*
Even Republicans who could barely vote saw the need
for black support.

"As a concerned Republican," the

president of the Clemson Young Republicans wrote,

"you are

no doubt aware of the acute need for our party to gain a
part of the Negro vote in this state."

In January 1970 the

group organized a meeting and invited several prominent
political figures including blacks, GOP members, and
Ravenel's campaign manager.

The forum focused on the

"future of the Negro in the South Carolina Republican
Party.1,15
An issue of even more immediate concern to Ravenel
than reaching out to black voters concerned how the party
should choose their candidate.

A small but determined

cadre advocated an open primary rather than the customary
convention in which the candidate would be chosen by the
party leadership.

Those who supported Arthur Ravenel

believed that their candidate could win the nomination if
allowed to compete in an open primary.

But the powers that

controlled the state GOP, led by Thurmond, party chairman
Ray Harris, and Republican national committeeman Drake
Edens, believed that Watson had a good chance to capture
the executive office and did not want to diminish
Republican strength in primary battles.

In correspondence
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the party faithful often referred to what they called the
eleventh commandment: "Thou shalt not criticize thy fellow
Republican. ”16
One South Carolinian in the Nixon administration was
keeping close tabs on the political situation in his home
state.

Harry Dent, counsel to President Nixon for southern

political affairs, was a former state GOP chairman and an
aide to Senator Thurmond who maintained an active
correspondence with Republican leaders in the state.

In

January Ravenel offered Dent his assessment of the state's
upcoming elections.

"Polarization forces" according to

Ravenel, were pushing Watson into the race.

"The Democrats

are licking their chops at the prospect of eating him up in
the f a l l .

He can get absolutely no Black vote and very

little support from the White moderates whose numbers are
rapidly increasing."

And if Watson ran for governor,

Ravenel feared, the Republicans had no one who could hold
the congressional seat that Watson would vacate.

Ravenel

argued that the party, not to mention his own chances for
the nomination, would be better served by selecting the
Republican candidate by means of a primary rather than a
"controlled convention."

Ravenel knew that if Senator

Thurmond gave his approval the state GOP chairman would set
the mechanics for a primary in motion.

Ravenel believed

that he could win the Republican nomination in a "free and
open primary" and that having accomplished this his chances
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would be "excellent of winning in the fall as we believe we
can get with honor and without any deals as much as 40% of
the Black vote and most of the moderates."11
The GOP moderates, however, would not gain the
sympathy of South Carolina's senior senator in this
election.

In 1970 Strom Thurmond abandoned his tradition

of remaining neutral in state elections and threw the full
force of his considerable influence behind Albert Watson.
James Duffy had participated in Republican politics long
enough to see which way the wind was blowing.

He wrote to

Ravenel with the news that Thurmond had released one of his
assistants to run the Watson campaign.
how that works.

"So we now [sic]

The Thurmond people and our official Party

leaders are about the land getting the convention firmed
up."

Thurmond's support seemed obvious to most political

observers.

"Thurmond ran harder for Albert than Albert

did," said John West years later.

Thurmond's papers prove

the accuracy of this assessment, revealing that he
solicited dozens of his own supporters to get behind
Watson.

In dozens of phone calls and letters he asked for

contributions to "Citizens for Watson," and thank you notes
from the senator acknowledged thousands of dollars worth of
contributions.

Thurmond appealed to multi-millionaire H.

L. Hunt in Texas for financial assistance to Watson, and he
asked the actor John Wayne, a Republican activist, to sign
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a letter that would be sent to potential Watson
contributors.18
In February lieutenant governor, John West, as
expected, entered the gubernatorial race.

Facing no

serious Democratic opposition, West began his campaign
running against Watson without having to worry about a
primary adversary.
sharply from Watson.

W e s t ' s style and background contrasted
While Watson employed fiery rhetoric,

West spoke in moderated tones.

In interviews Watson gave

short answers designed to grab headlines, West gave
detailed,

candid, at times rambling replies.

The background of the two men also differed.

Watson

had abandoned his party and gravitated to those elements of
the Republican party in the South that sought to resist
federal pressures to desegregate.

John West, on the other

hand, had been among those southern politicians who led the
way toward a slow adjustment to the changing racial
situation.

West had been elected to the state senate in

1954 shortly after the Brown decision and continued to
serve for twelve years in that body.

West would look back

years later and remember that the legislature in those
years had measured every action against the effect on
schools and segregation.

Nevertheless, West fought against

the Ku Klux Klan and in 1961 cast one of only two votes
against a measure that would require the closure of any
college or university that was forced to integrate.
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West

also stood almost alone against repeal of the compulsory
school attendance law designed to assist parents opposed to
integration.

Elected lieutenant governor in 1966, West did

something no white politician in South Carolina had ever
done.

In 1969 he attended and spoke at a South Carolina

dinner in honor of NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins.
West's political career had sought inclusion of all South
Carolina's citizens, but 1970 would test those notions of
acceptance.19
After having ruled that "freedom of choice"
desegregation plans would not satisfy federal requirements,
federal courts began to demand immediate massive school
desegregation throughout the South in the middle of the
school year.

These court orders would test the growing

body of white moderates in the state.

Although token

desegregation had gone smoothly in South Carolina, many
whites wanted these changes to proceed slowly, thereby
allowing time to adjust.

The prospect of trouble bothered

most moderates more than moral qualms about equal
educational opportunities.

The black student who

integrated Clemson University in 1963, Harvey Gantt,
accurately characterized the core of moderation in his
state when he said that "if you can't appeal to the morals
of a South Carolinian, you can appeal to his manners."
mid-year desegregation orders tested even their manners.
To many these seemed unreasonable.

They argued that the
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The

integrate "at once" orders forced an unusual strain on both
schools and the children that attended them.

And to make

matters worse many of the plans included busing to achieve
racial balances.

Busing inspired overwhelming opposition

combining a wide spectrum of friends and foes of
integration.

Those whites who did not want integration at

all naturally oppossed busing, but more moderate whites
also saw these plans as disruptive of the neighborhood
school concept and local control of education.

Little

wonder that some believed that resistance to desegregation
would yield political dividends.

John West who had built a

career of counseling patience seemed at times to back away
from his past, advocating,

if not outright resistance, at

least reluctance to obey federal desegregation orders.20
West announced his candidacy before an all-white
audience.

He drew his only applause when he declared

"freedom of choice is the best possible plan to save our
schools, and I promise you that I will continue to do
everything I can to see that we get it."

West, while

supporting freedom of choice, refused to be pulled into a
tug of war over desegregation.

He called Watson's remarks

"emotional rhetoric" that sought to derive "political
capital out of a difficult situation, but does nothing to
solve it.

I shall leave that path to others.

The lives

and future of our children are far too important to be used
as political footballs."21
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While West threw his hat into the ring, Watson drew a
line in the sand.

On February 22, Albert Watson spoke in

Lamar, South Carolina, where 2,500 whites gathered and
circulated petitions calling for freedom of choice
desegregation plans.

The Darlington County school system,

that included Lamar, had recently come under a federal
court-ordered desegregation plan that increased the number
of black students from 400, under the freedom of choice
plan, to 7,000 attending integrated schools.

"I have been

called a racist, a bigot and a political buzzard," Watson
told the rally,

"but I intend to tell the people where I

stand and tell it like it i s . . . . Every section of this
state is in for it," said Watson,

"unless you stand up and

use every means at your disposal to defend [against] what I
consider an illegal order."

Among cheers and applause

Watson said that he had been criticized for speaking to
this group of "hard core rednecks."
criticisms he told the gathering:
interested in their children.

In answer to those
"God bless anyone

I applaud you.

I stand with

you. "22
The day after the Lamar rally James Duffy wrote a memo
to Arthur Ravenel.

"Watson has had a field day with the

school situation and West sounded like a weak 'me too.'"
Duffy recommended that Ravenel make a statement enumerating
his beliefs.

The candidate should say that he supported

freedom of choice and disapproved of the timing of the
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recent court orders because they created such a rush in
allocating students to schools.

But he also should say

that he opposed any school boycotts and point to the
success of Greenville County in meeting the court ordered
desegregation schedule and continuing the education of
their children.

Ravenel should promise that as governor he

would oppose any federal law that was alien to the beliefs
of the state, would strive to alter those laws, but would
nevertheless support and uphold the law.

"To do otherwise

would be deceitful to those that elected m e , " Duffy
suggested Ravenel say.23
Shortly after Watson's appearance in Lamar an ugly
incident there captured the attention of the entire nation.
While protesting the implementation of the court-ordered
desegregation plan, an angry mob of whites attacked and
overturned two buses that had carried black children to
school.

This spectacle of white violence aroused criticism

and disdain.

Governor McNair condemned the protest.

In a

news release Senator Strom Thurmond said that "the
spectacle of a school bus filled with students being
attacked by adults has sickened South Carolina and the
nation."

Even Albert Watson spoke out.

thinking South Carolinians," said Watson,

"As do all
"I deplore

violence and there is no justification for it whatsoever."
A state senator from the Lamar area attributed the trouble
to a small minority who had hurt themselves by their
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actions,

"when you talk about maybe hurting children --

black or white -- decent people won't stand for it."
general public,

The

in the words of one local official, were

"appalled and a little scared" by the Lamar incident.24
The largest newspaper in South Carolina,

the State

condemned the actions at Lamar in an editorial.

While

opposing "drastic measures ordered by federal courts," the
editorial demanded that criminal charges be brought against
those who incited and participated in the r i o t .

The paper

pointed to two decades of responsibility and reason by the
people of the state which set them apart from some of their
fellow southerners.

"The truth is," the paper said,

"violent reactions not only do not delay desegregation,

in

many instances they hasten i t . . . . It is demonstrably
stupid to invite retribution and punitive federal
legislation by breaking laws, breaking heads, or breaking
down buses and buildings.”25
On the night of March 2, 1970, all three national
network news programs led off their broadcasts with
coverage of the incident and closely followed events
stemming from the Lamar incident over the next two days.
Eric Severeid of CBS delivered an editorial warning that
other southerners might follow the example of Lamar if the
government did not take strong measures.

The Atlanta

Constitution blamed Nixon's desegregation vacillations for
the Lamar disturbance.

The government's southern director
240

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

for civil rights enforcement resigned, accusing the
administration of a failure of leadership.

Two HEW

regional heads, one in Atlanta and one in Dallas, did so as
well, declaring ineffectiveness on the part of the
administration in handling civil rights.26
While some pointed to the Nixon administration, others
placed the blame much closer to home.

Many in South

Carolina could not forget that Albert Watson had addressed
the "freedom of choice" rally in Lamar the week before the
mob had attacked the school buses.

The local NAACP

president said that Watson's appearance at the rally
"poured gasoline on the fire."

The editor of the weekly

newspaper in the neighboring town of Hartsville wrote that
Watson's appearance at the rally "lent an air of
respectability" that the protestors did not have before.
Governor McNair's press spokesman claimed that Watson
caused the incident.
that led to this."

"He helped create the public attitude
Senator Thurmond countered by blaming

the governor who was responsible for maintaining law and
order, said Thurmond.

If the governor could not control a

mob of 150 people, he should have requested federal
assistance.

"Those in the state who seek to parcel out

blame by suggesting that Republicans caused the disturbance
by speaking out strongly for freedom of choice fail to
realize an important element of human psychology," said
Thurmond.

"People are less likely to resort to violence if
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they have faith that their leaders will stand up for them
by using every legal resource provided within our system."
Drake Edens, the GOP national committeeman for the state,
also blamed the Democratic administration.

"If the action

of any public official brought this thing on," Edens said,
referring to Lamar,

"it was probably the surrender

statement by Governor McNair when he said 'we've run out of
courts, we've run out of time.'

That left a group of

frustrated and hopeless people with no place to go, no way
to seek relief."27
Not all Republicans, however,

could forget Watson's

role in fanning the fires of racial frustration.

One woman

from nearby Darlington wrote to a party official describing
her disappointment at the handling of the school situation
by her fellow Republicans.

The woman asserted that she

knew of no one who would not have preferred to keep freedom
of choice.

"However, a force has grown up in our county

that upsets the vast majority as much as forcing
integration."

She singled out Watson who inspired the

local "rabble rouser" leading the protests.

"They advocate

closing the schools, boycotting to force this and have now
resorted to violence by stopping school buses from taking
children to school," she complained.

"If these people are

representative of the State Republican Party then I want no
part of the State Republican Party and have begun to let
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others know how I feel."

Her letter went on to assess the

mood of her community.
The majority in our county are people who want
their children in school while our state and county
leaders try sensibly to solve this problem.
I feel
we would be on the road to normal now if these few
men had not continuously kept stirring up crowds.
In
Watson's speech to this crowd in Lamar a week before
the outbreak, he . . . advocated openly forcing the
schools to close.
Had he not further incited this
already emotional filled crown [sic] -- the buses may
not have been overturned. . . . Please tell me how
the Republican Party can support men such as this?
They are as guilty in my mind as the ones who wielded
the axe handles, chains and overturned the buses.
They have encouraged, prodded and condoned this same
mob.
How can they say they do not advocate
violence?"28
One woman active in GOP political circles assigned
both the blame and the appropriate spin for the Lamar
incident

in a letter to James Duffy. "If there's

any rope

to be pulled you can bet I want in on the Albert Watson
lynching.

...

If there's any way to do it, I think that

the Lamar tragedy should be deposited on the back of one
state Democratic administration of which Mr. John West is
such an 'integral' part."29
Ten days after the buses were overturned, James Duffy
sent a memo to Ravenel and his top advisors.

"Each of us

have heard from people, personally and by mail, who are
appalled over the Lamar incident."

Duffy stated that the

situation was encouraged by Watson and that other party
leaders supported him.

"This puts . . . the Republican

Party stamp of approval on the affair.

The issue is
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racism.

We can define it as bussing,

freedom of choice,

supreme court interference, etc., but the truth is simply
race.

That the process followed by the court was difficult

and unreasonable might well be defended.

However, it was

the law."30
Duffy further expressed his disgust in a letter to a
political consultant in Birmingham, Alabama, working for
the campaign.

"Our Party leadership has definitely gone to

the racist format of a campaign and it remains to be seen
how successful this strategy will be.

Regardless of how

effective it does not seem to be a basis for building the
Party,

state, or nation."31

Ravenel spelled out his own feelings in a letter to a
GOP supporter.

"Quite frankly,

I am appalled at the

prospect of our party running a racist campaign with Albert
Watson heading our ticket.

Whether such a ticket could win

or not is immaterial to me, for I believe that this type
appeal would be wrong for South Carolina."32
Arthur Ravenel failed in his bid for a state-wide
primary to select the party's nominee; Albert Watson gained
the nomination at the state Republican convention held
March 21, 1970.

Ravenel also failed to steer his party

toward a more moderate racial course.

The statement of

principles adopted at the convention reflected the hard
line stance of the Watson forces.

Under education the

principles statement read: "We believe that education in
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South Carolina is undergoing a grave crisis.

The

requirements of massive integration are creating burdens
which are always difficult and often inpossible."

The

statement condemned "the vacillation and defeatism of the
McNair-West Administration on the issue," and urged that
the Federal government maintain the tax exempt status for
private schools.

The statement also recommended that

elected officials "speak out firmly and in protest against
unwarranted Court orders, and that every legal avenue to
upset these orders

...

be explored to the fullest."33

After Watson garnered the Republican nomination, Harry
Dent offered the candidate suggestions on strategy that
were reminiscent of George Wallace's tactics.

"Go hard for

the country music-working man vote," Dent wrote in a memo.
Watson should travel with a country music band and visit
country music radio stations to do campaign spots.

Dent

also told Watson that the average man, who "feels a little
alienated . . . will like your 'square' virtues.

. . .

Remember, he is 40, earns less than $7,000, didn't finish
high school, likes bowling and stock car racing, and is a
Baptist."

Dent also advised Watson to emphasize his

relationship with Nixon-Agnew and stress that he could do
more for the state because of access to a friendly
administration.

On the other hand, Watson should tie West

to Governor McNair, paint West as a national Democrat and
link him to Hubert Hurrphrey.34
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Watson and the Republicans took much of Dent's advice
to heart.

In September the state Republican Newsletter

wrote that the voters would have to decide if they wanted
to be led by John West "who supported liberals like
Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey or someone like Albert
Watson who has consistently supported conservatives right
down the line from Nixon in '60 to Goldwater in '64 and
Nixon again in '68.

Watson has the conservatism of

Thurmond and West has the liberalism of Hubert Horatio
Humphrey."

The Republicans also tried to link West with

the NAACP.

They criticized West for publicly praising the

NAACP's Roy Wilkins.

And a campaign flyer blamed the NAACP

for the rejection of South Carolina judge Clement
Haynsworth's appointment to the Supreme Court and for
"destruction of freedom of choice in our public schools,"
then admonished West for using "the prestige of his high
office to dignify the aims and activities of this
organization."
kind of man."

Watson employed the campaign slogan "Your
He also ran newspaper advertising under the

caption: "Which men are your kind of men?"

The left column

of the advertisement stacked pictures of liberal Democrats
with little support in the state, Hubert Humphrey, Edmund
Muskie, Lyndon Johnson, and Birch Bayh, a Democratic
Senator blamed for leading the successful fights against
Haynesworth and another southern jurist, Harold Carswell,
nominated by Nixon to fill seats on the Supreme Court.
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Below these "liberals" West was pictured and, lest anyone
missed the point, the advertisement added that West had
supported all these men, while South Carolina had rejected
them.

In the right column Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew,

Barry Goldwater and Strom Thurmond, all popular figures in
the state, were pictured above Watson.3S
West responded in kind, running an ad of the same
format with different pictures.

Popular Democrats such as

South Carolina Congressman Mendel Rivers, Representative
Wilbur Mills, and Senators Richard Russell and Sam Ervin
were pictured above West.

On the other side were

photographs of New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits
said to have an "anti-South bias," former Supreme Court
Chief Justice Earl Warren widely blamed in the South for
his role in the Brown decision, Robert Finch the HEW
secretary "who helped kill freedom of choice in the South,"
and Jerris Leonard the assistant Attorney General for civil
rights who openly declared "freedom of choice is dead."
Albert Watson was pictured below these men above the
caption "Yes, indeed! Which man will best represent you as
Governor?

Elect a good man governor -- John West."36

The West advertisement sought to parry the Watson
thrust by appealing to the same type voter; it also served
to point out the inconsistency of Watson and Thurmond's
claims that they and the Republicans had done anything to
turn back the assault on the South and southern
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desegregation progress.

The danger in this ploy lay in the

inconsistency of the Democratic message.

By favoring the

discounted freedom of choice and continuing to claim
adherence to the law, Democrats participated in a type of
hypocrisy of their own.
While the Republicans sought to associate West with
liberal Democrats and themselves with a popular president
and vice-president,

the actions of some in the Nixon

administration created political havoc for South Carolina
Republicans.

Officials in HEW and the Justice Department

charged with implementing desegregation had targeted South
Carolina, as well as other southern states that had not
fully complied with federal mandates.

This posed problems

for those South Carolinians who had sought to make the
gubernatorial campaign a test of the so-called southern
strategy of the Nixon administration.

Senator Thurmond

wrote to the President on April 30, 1970 complaining that
Jerris Leonard,

the assistant Attorney General for civil

rights, had visited South Carolina to inform school
officials of the "ramifications" of a law suit being
threatened against the state by the Justice Department.
Senator Thurmond related that he had called half a dozen
people in the administration who oversaw desegregation
matters and advised them that the trip was ill advised and
that it would "be detrimental to the Republican cause in
South Carolina."

The meeting as Thurmond predicted,
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generated unfavorable publicity.

At the meeting one school

board chairman told Leonard that in the 1968 campaign Nixon
had given them the impression that the state would have
freedom of choice.

"That was a political statement,"

Leonard responded, according to Thurmond.

Then Leonard

went on to make a point of saying that freedom of choice
was dead.

"This undercutting was not only harmful to you,

it also hurts Congressman Watson, who is running for
Governor," Thurmond complained.

"The repercussions of this

visit and to these statements have been severe and will be
difficult to overcome between now and election day."37
Vice President Spiro Agnew also let the president know
that the administration's actions might jeopardize the
South Carolina political races.

"Therefore we should have

HEW and Justice do everything possible to settle these
school negotiations in a very reasonable manner," said
Agnew.

"The Party leaders, Congressman Watson and Senator

Thurmond feel that the school superintendents have the
impression there has been no change at HEW.

They say they

are having difficulty getting proper cooperation at HEW.”38
Watson also pleaded with the administration concerning
the backlash to Leonard's visit.

Writing directly to the

president, Watson quoted extensively from a columnist
identified as "an experienced, astute, highly respected and
usually conservative writer."

The article described Watson

as being stabbed in the back by presumed friends.
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"Whether

he can recover only time and events will te l l ."

The writer

contended that Jerris Leonard and Robert Mardian, executive
director of the vice president's task force on school
desegregation, had delivered the blows as they "alternately
bullied and cajoled" school leaders in the state to
"knuckle under to 'unitary' integrated classrooms by
September 1 or face a statewide desegregation suit."

The

decision was "a monumental blunder that may rob Nixon of
the southern votes he will need for a second term and
Watson of any real chance to win the governor's office.

. .

. With such 'friends,' the hapless Watson has no need of
any enemies."

The writer suggested that Watson's only hope

for political survival would be to disavow and disassociate
himself from Nixon and his administration.

Watson assured

the President that "such a suggestion is both abhorrent and
shocking to me, but even the public suggestion by a
responsible columnist should disturb us a l l ."

Watson

warned the President that "unless help is forthcoming,

the

political harvest for 1970 and '72 will be mighty lean."39
By July the Democrats had tired of Republican efforts
to blame them for desegregation and tried to take advantage
of the Republican administration's enforcement of
integration in the state.

HEW had recently filed suits

against ten South Carolina school districts.

State

Democratic Chairman, Harry Lightsey, pointed out that
Republicans had failed to come through with promises to
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slow down federal encroachment on local school systems.
The Republicans responded by claiming that the HEW took
these actions because radicals from previous Democratic
administrations dominated the agency.40
Governor McNair defended his administration's record
of opposing federal efforts to impose racial integration on
South Carolina's public schools.

When Greenville and

Darlington school districts faced "instant" desegregation
in January 1970 and McNair had made his statement that the
state had run out of courts and run out of time, the
governor asserted that further resistance would have
invited the courts to extend an "instant" order statewide.
McNair called on Republicans to admit that they had
"intentionally misled" the people of the state.

"Freedom

of choice prevailed until this administration came into
office."41
West also got into the act of pointing out the failure
of Republicans to deliver on their promises.

Prior to July

West had attempted to deliver a positive message
emphasizing the importance of maintaining quality education
rather than criticizing desegregation.

But West and his

campaign advisors now believed that he must make his
opposition clear and place the responsibility for the
recent spate of school desegregation rulings on the
Republicans.

So West hedged his statements and even

attacked the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
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for "social experimentation."
middle ground on the issue.

West sought to claim the
If elected he would resist

federal pressure to integrate schools, but West would not
guarantee ultimate success, promising only to obey the law.
The Nixon administration and state Republicans had extended
false hopes. West vowed that the state would continue to
fight desegregation suits in the courts.

"We have

succeeded in gradually adjusting to what was forced upon us
in a way that did not divide our people or destroy their
respect for law and order,"

West said.

He accused the

Nixon administration of extending false hope by promising
freedom of choice.
asserted,

The so-called southern strategy, West

consisted of "soft words and hard deeds" meaning

"massive integration of every facet of our education system
this year so all the broken promises will be forgotten by
1972. "<2
West and the Democrats gleefully reminded South
Carolinians of Senator Thurmond's "broken promises" in
television advertisements.

These commercials replayed

speeches of Senator Thurmond campaigning for Nixon in 1968
promising that the state would have a sympathetic ear
concerning desegregation pressures in Washington.

The

advertising ploy reminded voters that Thurmond and the
Republicans had made commitments that they did not keep and
demonstrated the futility of resisting federal
desegregation pressures.

Thurmond vented his anger by
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threatening that the Federal Communications Commission
would revoke the licenses of the television stations that
ran the ads.'*3
The mid-summer decision to move closer to the Watson
position on race relations made West feel uncomfortable;
years later he would call this the low-point of his
campaign.

Not only did West feel bad, but he received

criticism from both ends of the political spectrum.

Watson

accused West of making a "180 degree turn" and coming over
to his position, which both West and McNair had criticized
Watson for earlier.

On the other end of the political

spectrum, the state NAACP field representative,

Isaac

Williams, believed that West had "torn his pants" with
black voters.

West's statement attacking desegregation

seemed "designed to appease white bigots and racists," said
Williams reminding the candidate that black voters made up
a quarter of the electorate in the state.44
The black segment of the electorate had not escaped
the attention of West or of the Republicans.

In 1968 the

Nixon campaign had used the so-called southern strategy to
entice white voters in the region to support a presidential
candidate who would ease federal desegregation pressures
that had steadily increased since the mid 1960s.

Once in

office the Nixon administration could do little to stop the
inevitable.

The implementation of the southern strategy

degenerated into blaming the judiciary.

These face-saving

253

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

measures did little to fool southerners.

In South Carolina

the Republicans suffered disproportionately because of the
efforts of Senator Thurmond to elect Nixon.

So as the

gubernatorial election neared Republicans attacked one
element of the Democratic coalition.

Since the Republicans

had attempted to focus resentments concerning desegregation
they did not expect to g a m e r any of the black vote, and
for that reason began to identify this group as a "bloc
vote."

The master of southern political efficacy, George

Wallace, had recently saved his political career by using
this ploy.

In 1970, throughout the South, whichever

candidate or party that could not count on the black vote
sought to demonize i t .

The state Republican Newsletter

wrote of a bloc vote in South Carolina that would support
the Democrats.
you.

"Don't let any 3rd or 4th party effort fool

Both are a hoax.

...

In the final analysis, 90% of

the Negro voters in this state will remain 'political
slaves' . . . .

All of these bloc voters will be told how to

vote Sunday night prior to the general election on November
3."

In an effort to counteract this so-called bloc vote

going to West, the Republicans encouraged a fledgling black
oriented third party.

West's campaign strategy had placed

him in a precarious position.

While he desperately needed

black votes as part of a winning coalition, he feared
aligning himself too closely with black voters would
alienate the white majority in the state.

Although black
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leaders criticized West's hedging statements, they also
realized the pragmatism of supporting him.

Not to do so

would guarantee a governor opposed to the interests of
black citizens.

And so the same black leaders who had

publicly criticized West quietly went about the state
convincing black voters that supporting Republican-inspired
third party efforts would elect Watson by draining off
support from John West.45
Although West had raised the ire of friend and foe
alike, he had hit close to home with his labeling of the
southern strategy as "soft words and hard deeds."

An open

rebellion among state and national Republicans had erupted
over federal desegregation pressures.

On July 17, 1970 CBS

led off the evening news with coverage of Senator Thurmond
publicly criticizing the Nixon administration's handling of
school desegregation.

Nixon's "breach of faith," warned

Thurmond, could cost the president the election in 1972.
Two moves by the administration had spurred these
criticisms.

One involved the reversal of the IRS policy of

extending tax exemptions for private academies that were
springing up around the South to avoid integration; the
other was the "proposed invasion of one hundred
carpetbagging Justice Department lawyers" ordered South to
monitor school desegregation.

"I condemn these actions,"

Thurmond said.

"I strongly condemn them; without end I

condemn them.

They are wrong as social policy, and they
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are wrong as law.

This is the sort of program we would

expect to get from a Democratic administration.
breach of faith with the people of the South."

They are a
Nixon's

southern point man, Harry Dent, went to work smoothing the
feathers of Thurmond, his former boss.

But just as Dent

believed he and the President had gotten Senator Thurmond
back on track, an HEW official leaked a story that Thurmond
had in effect helped to integrate South Carolina schools
for the purpose of avoiding a state-wide lawsuit that would
hurt him politically.

Although Thurmond publicly called

the story "absolutely false," he blasted Dent and demanded
to know who sprang the leak.

Dent sent a memo to Bob

Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, asking that the leak be
traced and "someone properly chastised."
used, Dent explained,

The leak would be

to "hurt Thurmond and the Watson for

Governor campaign effort."

The pressure from Thurmond

compelled Nixon to backtrack.

On the last day of July he

announced that southern desegregation would not be forced,
and that justice department desegregation monitors would be
sent into the South only upon request.

Justice department

officials, responsible for implementing the policy,
admitted confusion as to exactly what the current
administration position demanded or allowed.46
The administration's actions and the president's
vacilations had rendered Nixon so unpopular in the South,
said Thurmond, that he would not want the president
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campaigning for him in South Carolina.

Neither did Watson.

The president's popularity, according to a high source in
the Watson campaign, had declined in the state due to the
school situation.

The gubernatorial candidate arranged for

Vice-President Spiro Agnew to make several stops in the
state.

Agnew visited Greenville in October and denied that

the Nixon administration had raised false hopes with its
opposition to busing.

"I don't think there's much doubt in

the minds of the people of the South how Judge Haynsworth
or Judge Carswell would have felt about compulsory busing,"
Agnew said. "If we are given a Senate where the Republicans
have a majority," he continued,

"we should be able to get a

southern strict constructionist on the Supreme Court."47
In September, in response to West's efforts to move
closer to his opponent's position, Albert Watson moved
farther to the right.

He ran a five-minute television

commercial in which the candidate narrated over footage of
black rioters.
asked Watson.

"Are we going to be ruled by the bloc?"
"Look what it did in Watts . . .

nation's capital."

in the

Following Watson's question,

film clips

showed clashes between police and black rioters.

In the

wake of criticisms Watson refused to "label" the
commercial.

Watson said at a news conference that the

people of the state could decide for themselves if his
campaign was "racist."

The usually conservative Greenville

News expressed its decision clearly in an editorial that
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said "the Republican campaign has to be regarded as racist
to a disturbing degree."

The Republican mayor of

Greenville, South Carolina, R. Cooper White Jr., also made
up his mind when he accused Watson of conducting a campaign
that was "polarizing the races" and refused to greet Watson
and Vice President Agnew during a campaign stop in his
city.

In the midst of the controversy Senator Thurmond

recorded a radio and television spot in support of the
Republican candidate.

"Albert Watson will stand up and

fight for the people," said Thurmond.

"The South is under

attack and we need a man who will exert positive leadership
in this time of crisis."

And in an interview Thurmond

rejected charges of racism in Watson's campaign.

"I know

of nothing Watson has said that he could be accused of
being a racist," said Thurmond in an interview.

"But the

Democrats down here have tried to accuse him of t h a t .
of the liberal press has.
to do that.

Some

It is purely expedient politics

But I'm confident he has not done or said

anything which would make him guilty of racism.
The South Carolina Republican Newsletter blamed the
injection of race into the campaign on the opposition.
"Democratic leaders in this state will stop at nothing to
win this election . . . even to the point of calling our
candidate a racist," asserted the newsletter in October.
The opposition party had "used, abused, and manipulated the
Negroes in this state for their own personal political and
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economic gain.

Every knowledgeable person is aware of

t his.”49
The Greenville Piedmont condemned Watson's
concentration on the bloc vote in the campaign and his
commercial question:
bloc?"

"Are we going to be ruled by the

The paper asked voters if they would want a person

in a position of statewide power "who would make such a
prurient TV appeal to racism? "so
Harry Dent circulated an internal memo at the White
House

[for Bryce Harlow]

refuting accusations of racist

intent in Watson's campaign.

Dent criticized a feature

article in the Los Angeles Times on the South Carolina
gubernatorial campaign as badly slanted against Watson.
The reporter even tried to portray the Republican candidate
as further to the right on the race question than George
Wallace,

complained Dent.

"This is simply not so."

Dent

said that the writer had taken Watson's comments concerning
racism out of context and included a transcript of Watson
being questioned on a South Carolina telecast. While
alluding to the five-minute television program that
concentrated on a bloc vote in the state, Dent claimed that
it had been "done in haste" and without the candidate's
"prior review as I understand it," and Dent pointed out
that it had been pulled off the air almost immediately.51
When accused of racist campaign tactics Watson
replied:

"If they're calling me 'racist' then they're
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calling the majority of the people of this state 'racist.'.
. . I'll stand with the people."

Watson believed that the

Democrats were "trying the same liberal trick against me
that is daily used against our courageous Vice President,
who continues, as I am doing,
charged Watson.

to tell it like it is,"

"Just as his liberal critics have not

silenced Vice President Agnew,
mine."

I will not be silenced by

Watson's fiery rhetoric of resistance spoke to the

frustration of many whites in the state.

And Watson did

little to discourage this identification.

"Only thing

folks are talking about is if the colored are gonna run our
schools or if we are," one white South Carolina truck
driver told the New York T i m e s .

"For my money only one man

is standing up for white folks, and that's Albert Watson."
Indeed Watson's approach seemed effective among some South
Carolinians.

In October the 1968 George Wallace campaign

leadership in the state endorsed Watson.

This endorsement

came despite the fact that Wallace's own American
Independent party had a candidate running for governor who
claimed George Wallace's unannounced support.52
In October Watson called for a probe into school
disrupt."

' 5fter a racial fight erupted at Flora High

School in Columbia while two of his aides happened to be
there with a cameraman.

Watson called an "emergency" news

conference where he strongly urged the state legislature to
pass an anti-busing bill.

Senator Thurmond praised Watson
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for "doing his duty" in speaking out about school trouble
in Columbia.

David Eisenhower,

son of one former

Republican president and son-in-law of the current one,
visiting South Carolina at the time, added his praise for
Watson as one who recognized that "law and order is not a
code word for racism but a legitimate demand for every
American citizen."53
Governor McNair angrily accused Watson of inciting the
incident and exploiting racial trouble at the high school.
So too did the Columbia police department.

John West made

no mention of Watson but issued a statement calling the
"safety and future of children" too important for partisan
politics.

In an editorial,

the State took Watson to task

for commandeering the school integration issue.

The

candidate had perhaps struck "political oil," but the
editorial warned of explosive gases,

i.e. human emotions.

"Mr. Watson is a polished political performer with a keen
appreciation of what people want to h e a r ."

The editorial

pointed out that Watson had supported freedom of choice,
anti-busing legislation and stronger discipline in schools
and that these matters had struck responsive chords among
most citizens.

But the newspaper pointed out that freedom

of choice had been ruled out by the Supreme Court and that
unless it changed or Congress and the states approved a
Constitutional amendment then the state could do nothing to
restore freedom of choice integration plans.

On the issue

261

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

of busing to achieve racial balance the paper pointed out
that the Supreme Court had the issue under consideration
and that the South Carolina legislature could do nothing to
influence the outcome.

The State expressed the hope that

in the emotional atmosphere surrounding these issues that
Watson and all other candidates would "guard against
letting exploitation develop into explosion.1,54
While Watson's rhetoric and actions suggested that if
elected he would do something about unpopular methods of
mixing the races, West made no promises.
and political rhetoric," said West,

"False promises

"have complicated

problems in newly integrated schools."

And busing,

according to West, was a "phony issue.

We are all against

busing," West maintained.

Earlier that year the largely

Democratic state legislature had passed a law that forbid
the assignment of children to schools to meet racial
quotas.

"It is not in the scope of your governor to do any

more than has now been d o n e ."

Only the Supreme Court or

Congress could decide the issue and regardless of what they
decided, West maintained,

"we've got to provide quality

education for every black and white child despite the
disenchantment, disappointment, and frustration.

We can't

afford to withdraw one iota of our support of public
education.

The future of South Carolina depends on it.”

And in a state wide mailing West wrote: "Right now, our
state has no greater challenge than the preservation and
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defense of our public school system.

There are no easy

solutions and politicians who promise them only compound
the problems by deluding the people."55
Relying on survey data shortly before the election,
Republicans believed that their candidate led among those
committed voters but that more than thirty percent of the
voters had not made up their minds as to how they would
vote in the upcoming governor's race.

"This is an

unusually high percentage of undecided voters at this
stage."

During the first two weeks of October the

Republicans commissioned pollsters to ask the opinions of
480 white voters in twenty-eight counties and forty-six
precincts that voted within a few percentage points of the
way the entire state had voted in previous elections.

When

asked about problems facing the state, thirty-nine percent
responded that racial problems concerned them most while
twenty-nine percent believed that education and school
problems

(presumably meaning recent integration orders)

topped the list.

When asked what they thought about recent

large-scale public school integration,

sixty-four percent

characterized these actions as bad while only eighteen
percent called them good.

But when asked the results of

the integration measures thirty-eight percent said things
had gone better than they expected while only nine percent
said it had been worse than they thought it would be.5*
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Indeed integration had gone quite well in South
Carolina's ninety-three school districts.

Even Strom

Thurmond High School in Edgefield County had been
desegregated.

M. Hayes Mizell a white civil rights

activist contended that the school districts had done
"pretty much what they're supposed to do," he said.
no feedback from blacks of chicanery."

"I get

James K lybume,

head of the state's committee on farm workers, and the
first black member of the state legislature, believed the
revulsion to the violence at Lamar in March had contributed
to the peaceful school integration that fall.

"The sight

on national television of parents overturning a bus was too
much for South Carolinians," said K l y b u m e .
determined not to let it happen again."

"They were

Robert S. Davis,

head of the state's Education Advisory Committee set up by
the Nixon administration to help smooth the desegregation
process believed that businessmen were largely responsible.
"We sold the business community on the idea that if public
education goes down the drain, then business goes down the
drain," said Davis.

"We didn't tell them desegregation was

right or humane or Christian.1,57
Rather than applauding the success of South
Carolinians for gracefully acquiescing to a difficult
situation, Albert Watson sought to stir up feelings of
resentment resulting from school integration.

Watson

wrapped up his campaign concentrating on the three largest
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cities of the state which happened to be those areas
hardest hit by desegregation: Columbia, Charleston and
Greenville.

He boiled his message down into a "neatly

packaged twenty-minute talk stressing economy, school
discipline and crime."

Watson tied school discipline and

lawlessness together and then proclaimed this "the issue in
the campaign."58
With more than 220,000 registered black voters among
the state total of almost 900,000, John West was counting
on a coalition of white and black voters to seat him in the
governor's chair.

West, stumping the state in the last

week of the election, outlined the progress the state had
made under Democratic rule and proclaimed that "the real
issue" in the election was "whether we continue our
progress of recent years or stop, change directions and
turn back the clock."59
Most newspapers in South Carolina endorsed John West.
The largest daily newspaper, the State, did so even though
the editor of the newspaper had run for the United States
Senate as a Republican in 1962, and the paper had endorsed
Richard Nixon in 1968.

Readers of the State contributed

their opinions to the newspaper concerning the candidates a
few days before the election.

"I am particularly impressed

with the calm, reasonable manner in which Mr. West has
approached the problems in our schools," said one reader
from Blythewood.

"His refusal to resort to emotional
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appeals, but to firmly stand up for quality education and
law and order has captured my respect.

I agree with his

opposition to busing to achieve racial equality and his
support of the neighborhood school concept."

Noting the

recent visit by Spiro Agnew to the state, a man from
Blackville believed that voters would demand a governor who
"can offer more than an echo of the rhetoric of the Vice
President. . . .

Let us not fool ourselves.

There are no

simple answers to the problems that confront our state and
nation.

. . . The issue, then, is one of leadership versus

destructive and reckless rhetoric."60
Robert McNair, the outgoing governor also feared what
a Watson victory could bring.

"I can see all the good

we've done in handling the school situation, under adverse
conditions, just being lost."

McNair need not have

worried, his lieutenant governor won over fifty-two percent
of the vote.

Watson received almost forty-six percent, and

A. w. Bethea of Wallace's American Independent party
received only two percent of the vote.

West garnered over

ninety percent of the black vote accounting for fifty-six
percent of his total.

That made him the first South

Carolina governor to receive more black votes than white.
But he also pulled support from both Nixon and Wallace
voters.

For example, in the upper middle-class suburban

Arcadia precinct near Columbia, Nixon in 1968 had received
667 votes, compared with 132 for Humphrey and 69 for
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Wallace.

Watson won this precinct, but only by 23 votes

out of 843 votes cast.

Wallace carried Anderson County in

1968 with a majority of 6,419 votes, while Nixon and
Humphrey achieved a combined total of 5,043.

West defeated

Watson in Anderson County by almost a two to one margin,
10,532 to 5,362.

In Columbia's Ward Nine, where all but 24

of the 1,904 registered voters were black,
1,006 and Watson 19.

it was West

Even Nixon voters reacted against

Watson's raucous rhetoric of resistance, and Wallace
voters, many of them traditional Democrats,
improvement in the Nixon administration.

saw little

And the influence

of Strom Thurmond was greatly diminished by the actions of
the Nixon administration and the airing of the "broken
promises" commercials by the West campaign.61
There was no shortage of Republicans offering
evaluations of Watson's loss.

Arthur Ravenel wrote to

Harry Dent after the election with harsh words for the GOP
in the state.

"The idiocy of this 'the Party will not

change direction' is astounding.

The only direction we

need to change is not from conservative to liberal, as
Harris implies,

[Ray Harris, state party chairman] but from

negative, which Watson proved bankrupt,

to positive."62

Harry Dent summed up the election from his vantage
point in Washington.

"Obviously, the entire school problem

was of great concern, but to my knowledge," Dent said,

"it

was never determined exactly what the average voter wanted
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done -- or not done -- about i t ."

Dent maintained that the

Watson campaign was labelled as racist because of the
television ads and the last minute appeal for school
discipline.
themselves,

"Carefully considered, however, these, in
could not be considered 'racist'.

. ."

The

Watson campaign suffered the onus of racism, Dent believed,
because of its inability to define any other issue.

"We

did not hit long enough on the right to be creditable, nor
were we . . . palatable to the center.

Although the

incumbent Administration was attacked for its wrongs, we
offered virtually no positive programs to offset these
wrongs.

. . . To my knowledge,

there was no conscious

development or study of issues, but rather reaction to
isolated events.63
The South Carolina R^pnhl ican Newsletter claimed
unrepentently that Democratic accusations of racism leveled
at their party for mentioning the "bloc vote" had cost them
the election.

"Yet, during the final days of the campaign,

the news media consistently reported on the importance of
the Negro vote in John West's campaign.

What Republicans

were accused of promoting became a fact of life in the end.
. . . The news media reported that 97 percent of the Negro
vote went for the Democrat ticket.

It wasn't the 'silent

majority' that elected Mr. West as he claimed, but rather a
vocal minority."

Moderate white voters "who in previous

elections voted Republican gave support this year to the
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Democrat ticket," claimed the newsletter.

"This can be

credited to two things: a)the unfounded 'racism' charges
against Republicans; and b)unfair treatment by the news
media.

Democrats exploited the 'racism' charge, and the

news media gave them all the support they needed."64
One prominent Republican pointed the finger of blame
at his own party.

James Duffy evaluated Republican efforts

bluntly in a letter to Harry Dent.

"The campaign was lost

because our party ran a stupid race.
excuses, stem from this one base.
immediately gain the black vote.

All other reasons, or

...

We will not

. . . If we never are

positive, and we certainly have not been, we will never
take the first step.

Better to lose an election by

appealing to all and then win the next election then [sic]
to never make an appeal and never win."

In another letter

to a political consultant who had worked with the Ravenel
campaign, Duffy said that the state GOP "managed to take a
certain winner and blow the election.

. . . The story is a

long one but essentially it was racist oriented and that
would not wash with too many non-party Republicans who
would not vote for what they considered to be the Wallace
image."

And in a letter to the failed Republican

lieutenant gubernatorial candidate, Duffy wrote:

"No one

suggests making a deal for any votes, bloc or otherwise.
But by the same token it is absolutely necessary that we
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counteract the negative image some of our leadership is
burdened with."6S
Another Republican intimately involved in the race
gave his own assessment of the campaign.

On election night

Senator Thurmond put his arm around the defeated candidate
and said: "Well, Albert, this proves we can't win elections
any more by cussin' Nigras."

Not long after this election

Strom Thurmond began to develop a new image.

In February

1971 Harry Dent discussed plans in an interview with a
South Carolina newspaper to build a new image for the
senator.

"We've got to get him on the high ground of

fairness on the race question," Dent said.

"We've got to

get him in a position where he can't be attacked like
Watson was attacked by liberals as being a racist."
Shortly thereafter Thurmond took his former aide's advise
and hired a black staff member,

former Voter Education

Project official Thomas Moss, to help coordinate race
relations between the senator and his state's electorate.
Others in the Republican party also saw the need for
change.

The new state GOP chairman said that the party

would seek to attract black voters by convincing them that
conservative principles will provide the best government
for all the people.

And in a memo from the Republican

executive committee to GOP officers at all levels around
the state was this advice:

"We shouldn't talk about seeking

black votes and vice versa we should stop talking about
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block votes.

...

As Republicans we should offer all

voters the same -- the opportunity to participate.
all - - n o more, no less.

That's

As Republicans, we should make no

special public plea -- just let everybody know this party
is open."66
By not welcoming South Carolina blacks into the GOP in
1970, the party made sure that West would receive the black
vote with very little effort or accommodation.

The extreme

Republican position on busing allowed West to promise
little more than compliance with the law.

Although West

moved to the right in the course of the campaign, he could
always answer the wild rhetoric of Watson with calm and
dignified assurances that he would resist federal
desegregation pressures while maintaining law and order and
providing quality education for all the state's children.
This played well on television.

West drove home the

futility of defiance, advocated by the Republicans, with an
effective television advertising campaign that pointed to
the broken promises of the Nixon administration and Senator
Thurmond in slowing the pace of desegregation.

While

Watson's fiery speeches and the resulting mob violence
embarassed South Carolinians and reminded them of the
turbulent disruptions of the previous decade, West urged
voters to "Elect A Good Man Governor."

After he won the

election West demonstrated that he meant to live up to his
slogan with statements promising an end to racial politics.
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"We in the South have too long been concerned with the
problem of race," said the new governor.

"For the last 30

years it has been the burning issue in political campaigns.
It has taken most of the thoughts and energies of
candidates. . . .

I would hope last fall's campaign would

be the last time race will be the issue in the governor's
r a c e ."

In his inaugural address West signalled a change in

his state.

"The politics of race and divisiveness

fortunately have been soundly repudiated in South
Carolina," West said.

"We pledge to minority groups no

special status other than full-fledged responsibility in a
government that is totally color-blind.1,67
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CHAPTER 6
GEORGIA

Georgia, a deep-South state that had often served as a
bellwether for the region as a whole, reflected the
ambivalence of the South.

Before 1970, the state had more

difficulty with race relations than much of the upper
South, but seldom demonstrated the defiance of the other
deep-South states.

The civil rights movement had persuaded

many Georgians of the injustice of de jure segregation
while strict federal enforcement convinced others that
defiance of civil rights laws was futile.

Yet the pace of

integration and the threat of busing school children out of
their neighborhoods tempered the newly formed moderation
among the state's largely white electorate.

In 1970

Georgia, like the other southern states which elected
governors that year, chose a young, moderate,
looking governor.

forward-

But the methods of the campaign in

Georgia differed from those other states.

In Arkansas,

Florida and South Carolina, the successful candidates spoke
in the quiet tones of moderation and assiduously avoided
giving voice to the rhetoric of desegregation defiance,
while their noisy opponents, all of whom either represented
the demagogic past, or at least its tactics, proved that
blatant racial politics no longer appealed to the bulk of
white voters.

In Georgia a figure from the past who as

governor had introduced the tactics of political moderation
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in the early 1960s sought to reclaim the governor's chair.
But the successful candidate would master new techniques
for binding a diverse and ambivalent coalition by tapping
into class resentments that included race antagonisms
without calling direct attention to race.
By 1970 certain prominent features of Georgia's
political landscape were becoming clear.

On the one hand,

Georgia was going to have the first black candidate for
governor in its history, and black voters constituted
twenty percent of the electorate.

On the other hand, 1970

would be the first gubernatorial election since George
Wallace carried Georgia in his 1968 bid for the presidency,
and the state's electorate remained highly receptive to his
brand of anti-establishment, anti-integration rhetoric.
complicate matters further, the Republican party,

To

for the

first time since Reconstruction, had a good chance of
capturing Georgia's governorship.

In 1966 the Republican

candidate had actually received a plurality of the votes in
the general election, but had lost when the lack of a
majority for any candidate threw the election into the
heavily Democratic state legislature.

The outcome of that

decision placed Lester Maddox in the governor's chair, who
before entering politics had gained national notoriety by
using axe-handles to prevent blacks from entering the
Atlanta chicken restaurant he owned.
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In other words, Georgia would be standing at a
crossroads in 1970.

In which direction would it go?

Did

Lester Maddox's election in 1966 indicate a trend, or was
it just a fluke?

If the Georgia political scene just prior

to Maddox's election was any indication, the state had
stumbled off its path and would probably resume its
previous course.

The state's governor from 1963 to 1967,

Carl Sanders, had been one of the first southern
politicians to stake out and hold to a moderate position on
racial matters.

Sanders promised to use "every legal means

to preserve segregation of the races in Georgia," but he
also vowed that he would govern with dignity.

"I won't

cause you and your state to be spread across headlines all
over the nation, and cause you embarrassment."

According

to the Christian Science Monitor. Sanders was "one of the
South's most moderate, progressive chief executives."

He

ran promising to keep public schools open even if it meant
integrating them, and as governor, he stuck to his promise.
Moreover, he kept a tight reign on the legislature and
never allowed it to influence public opinion with anything
like the series of anti-integration enactments passed by
many southern state legislatures of the time.

At the end

of his term Sanders remained immensely popular; had Georgia
law not prevented successive gubernatorial terms, he would
almost certainly have been reelected in 1966.

During his

four years out of office Sanders continued to have strong
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political and financial support; virtually all political
observers considered him the odds-on favorite to win in
1970.

Sanders' popularity and strong support suggested

that Georgia in 1970 would resume her moderate-liberal
course, after a four-year Maddox aberration.1
On the other hand, the enormous popularity Maddox had
gained during his four years in office could not be
ignored.

Some Georgians had wildly applauded his branding

of integration as "un-American, un-Godly and even criminal"
and had responded to his criticism of busing with a zeal
not seen in the state for many years.

Maddox's popularity,

taken in conjunction with the 1968 Wallace-for-president
vote in the state,

could well be read as an indication that

in 1970, Georgia was destined for another Maddox-like
Democrat or even a like-minded Republican.2
With Maddox prevented by constitutional provision from
succeeding himself and with no fiery segregationist of
prominence, Carl Sanders would be the man to beat.

William

Hamilton, a Washington pollster hired by another candidate,
Jimmy Carter, conducted five polls between September 1969
and October 1970.

The first of these surveys confirmed

what most political observers already suspected.

Eighty-

four percent of Georgia voters had a favorable view of
Sanders' governorship, and twenty percent rated him
"excellent."

Hamilton noted in his report to Carter that

"this is one of the best job ratings I have ever seen given
280

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

a former governor after three years out of office."

If the

election were held immediately, Hamilton's poll indicated,
Sanders would get fifty-three percent of the vote and
Carter only twenty-one percent.

But the report also

pointed out that no one had started "shooting at" Sanders
yet and that Carter had plenty of time to build a
"favorable image" among voters who did not yet know him.3
Moreover, Hamilton's report stressed, there were a few
chinks in Sanders' armor.

From twenty to twenty-five

percent of Sanders' support was "soft," meaning there was
something about him that his supporters did not like: his
affluence since leaving the governor's office, his ties to
the "Atlanta bigwigs", his closeness to Washington.

The

poll echoed a 1968 memo to an aide scribbled by Carter:
"Some images to be projected regarding Carl Sanders . . .
refuses to let Georgia Democrats have a voice in the
Democratic party . . . Atlanta-oriented . . . pretty . . .
nouveau riche . . . excluded George Wallace from state . .
. right now we just need to collect all these rough ideas
we can.
him."

Later we can start driving a wedge between me and
Hamilton's poll, therefore, confirmed Carter's

earlier assessment of Sanders and convinced Carter to
portray Sanders as a rich "brash, young, eager man who
doesn't deserve to be governor" and himself as a humble
country boy who was "not going to let him be."4
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The 1970 race was not Carter's first try for Georgia's
governorship.

He had run four years earlier,

in 1966.

Carter did not like being positioned on the left or right
of the political spectrum,

saying "I believe that I'm a

more complicated person than that."

But in 1966 Carter

appealed to moderate-liberal voters and conducted a
gentlemanly, non-racist campaign.

Bruce Galphin of the

Atlanta Constitution wrote at the time that it was hard to
meet Jimmy Carter and hear him talk without "admiring his
integrity."

Carter, Galphin went on to say, was a breed of

politician new to Georgia,

subdued, frank even about his

deficiencies, and unwilling "to torture the traditional
whipping boys."

In 1966, race was still Georgia's most

readily exploitable political issue.
refused to use it.

But Jimmy Carter had

He was not a racist.

Years earlier in

his hometown of Plains, Carter had refused, in the face of
considerable pressure,

to join the White Citizens Council,

and in a heated congregational squabble he made an
impassioned speech in favor of allowing blacks to worship
in his church.

As a state senator, he made one of his

first speeches in opposition to Georgia's infamous "thirty
questions" law used to disqualify black voters.5
Though he finished a surprisingly close third in the
1966 race, Lester Maddox's victory convinced Jimmy Carter
that the racial issue, like it or not, could not be
ignored.

After his 1966 loss, therefore, Carter began some
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hard thinking and decided two things.
again in 1970.

One, he would run

That surprised no one who knew him or had

watched him closely.

As one journalist observed,

"to go

out and make nice speeches and lose is not Jimmy Carter's
style."

The other thing Jimmy Carter decided was, as he

later wrote in his autobiography, that he "did not intend
to lose again."

That meant he was going to have to make a

third decision.6
Eight years earlier, George Wallace, like Jimmy
Carter, had lost his 1958 bid for Alabama's governorship
because he was perceived as more moderate than his racebaiting opponent, John Patterson.
decided, and declared,
again."

As a result, Wallace had

that he would never be "out-nigguhed

Jimmy Carter was going to have to decide if he

would go in the same direction,

and if so, how far.

Before

he made that decision, he waited to see how the Georgia
political situation would shape up in 1970.7
Not surprisingly, Carl Sanders' candidacy dominated
the political landscape.

A reputation as a racial moderate

coupled with the widespread backing of the growing moderate
electorate along with his record of progressive governance
made Sanders the man to b e a t .

If a candidate expected to

be successful his strategy must cut into Sanders' appeal.
Jimmy Carter realized this instinctively and looked toward
another candidate to assist him in that task.

One

contender in the Democratic primary who might cut into
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Sanders' constituency was the black candidate, C. B. King.
King was an Albany lawyer (one of only three black
attorneys in the state outside Atlanta in the early 1960s)
who had played a prominent role in the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference's Albany movement in 1962.
candidacy,

King's

it should be noted, was legitimate and had no

connection with Carter's machinations.

Some black leaders

and political organizations endorsed King, but most of the
others, believing that he could not win, even if he made
the Democratic run-off election, supported Sanders.
black voters supported the largely unknown Carter.
Carter that was a blessing.

Few
But for

King could not possibly make

the run-off, but he might draw enough black voters to keep
Sanders from winning on the first ballot, giving Carter a
good chance of being in a run-off with Sanders.8
But where would Carter get enough votes to make it
into a run-off?
moderates,

With his natural constituency of

liberals, and blacks preempted by Sanders and

King, Carter's only hope lay with the Maddox-Wallace camp.
Getting their votes would be tricky.

He would need to make

himself attractive to Georgia's "lower status whites" as
Numan Bartley called them in his From Thurmond to Wallace,
the state's "most politically conservative people . . .
racists in social attitudes,
provincial in outlook."

fundamentalist in religion,

At the same time, Carter could not

make himself so attractive to the Maddox and Wallace people
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as to permanently alienate Georgia's moderate, liberal and
black voters.

If he managed to win the Democratic

nomination, he would need their support in the general
election,

in which he would face a Republican.

The GOP had

revealed its character by inviting Lester Maddox to join
its ranks and by opening remarks in the state convention
assuring newsmen that C. B. King would not be welcome in
the Republican primary.9
Carter's plan to paint Sanders as a smug, citified
dandy would sell well in poor rural Georgia.
had.

It always

Sanders would be an easy target, for after his term

expired he had remained in Atlanta to become a rich lawyer.
Looking back on the campaign twenty years later, Carl
Sanders admitted that Carter succeeded in drawing "more of
a class distinction than a race distinction.

I think he

postured himself as a peanut farmer from outside of Atlanta
and . . .

he pictured me as a corporate lawyer in Atlanta

who had capitalized on being governor and who was now
representing the fat cats and he was out there representing
the average citizen.
overcome."

That's a pretty tough thing to

Indeed it was.

Carter even criticized Sanders'

wife claiming that while his own wife shook hands with
factory workers, Mrs. Sanders attended a fashion show.
actions of the wives were, Carter suggested,
the interests of the candidates:
working man."

The

"symbolic" of

"high society versus the

Caricaturing Sanders and his wife, however,
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would not be enough.

Carter would also have to appeal to

the Maddox-Wallace people on issues.

In the memo he

dictated in 1966, Carter had noted that he might need to
portray Sanders as too liberal for Georgia voters,
liberal" was his exact phrase.

"more

And William Hamilton's poll

of 1969 had confirmed that hunch.

Hamilton noted that

Sanders had "a slight problem with his liberal image."10
Carter decided that to win the support of the MaddoxWallace followers, he was going to have to place himself to
the right of Sanders.

Although Carter was, in fact, the

more liberal of the two, his record was not as well known
as Sanders'.

That fact made the scheme possible.

As a

first step in portraying himself as more conservative than
Sanders, Carter made his cousin, Hugh Carter, his campaign
manager.

Hugh Carter was a good-old-boy politician with

solid conservative credentials.

His job was to reassure

conservatives in the state that "Jimmy Carter was a safe
man."

Jimmy Carter could easily combine his planned

portrayal of Sanders as too rich to understand the average
man, too citified, too sophisticated and too liberal for
Georgians, with attacks on his ties to "big government," to
"the power elite," and to "the Washington establishment,"
all phrases George Wallace had made popular.

In short,

Carter would make Sanders into a "limousine liberal."11
But even that would not be enough.

While it was true,

as Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver pointed out in The Southern
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Strategy, that "liberal" and "conservative" were racial
code words in the South,

"liberal" meaning integrationist

and "conservative" meaning segregationist,

such code words

alone would not convince the Maddox-Wallace camp.

As much

as he may have wished to, Jimmy Carter could not escape
dealing with the integration issue.

According to one poll,

public sentiment that integration was moving too fast rose
from thirty-five percent in March 1968 to fifty-four
percent in April 1970.

As Jim Gillis, Jr., a county

commissioner and son of Georgia's powerful highway
department director said at the time: "The school thing is
like a funeral.

The family knows you can't bring the body

back to life, but they want you there holding their hands."
Although Jimmy Carter never heard Gillis' analogy, he
understood it well, and he determined to be there, holding
the hands of Georgia's segregationists.12
At the same time he was holding hands with
conservatives and segregationists, Jimmy Carter had to
reach out to liberal and black voters.

This was an awkward

posture, to say the least, but one Carter found necessary
both to assuage his conscience as well as to insure liberal
and black support against the Republican nominee in the
later general election.

In effect, Carter's campaign plan

called for a two-faceted -- his critics would say a twofaced -- campaign: one facet designed to appeal to
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segregationists and the other to give heart to liberals and
blacks.
To obscure the inconsistencies in his two-faceted
strategy and to excuse his personal attacks on Sanders,
Carter cloaked the whole of his campaign in the guise of
"populism."

According to one of the early polls Hamilton

did for Carter, eighty-one percent of the Georgia
electorate felt alienated from government.

In addition to

integration coming too fast, they were most concerned about
high taxes and the welfare system,
forgotten man, middle America."

"the issues of Nixon's

Political pragmatism

dictated that Carter must appeal to racist elements in
Georgia's electorate, but he would run a "redneck"
campaign, emphasizing class rather than race distinctions.
He would embrace all workers in the rhetoric of populism,
while carefully avoiding any overt appeal to racism.
way he could perhaps deflate the race issues.

That

"Jimmy is a

populist," asserted Charles Kirbo, a long-time Carter
friend and political advisor.

"Jimmy can and does appeal

to the Wallace voter, but not on the racial thing."13
There was nothing unusual, much less unique, about
Jimmy Carter's appeal to "populism."

What James Perry of

the National Observer called a "new populism" was sweeping
the South in 1970.

New faces in the Democratic party were

winning elections to governors' and senators' seats by
refocusing their party objectives in terms of the common
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man.

"More important for the Democrats than specific

issues was the successful selling of the populist symbols,"
wrote James Clotfelter and William Hamilton (Carter's
pollster)

in South Today.

"The common ingredient was

voters believing the candidate cared about what they cared
about, that he was one of their own and would not forget
them."14
When Carter announced his candidacy in early April
1970, he mapped out his strategy for Steve Ball, political
editor of the Atlanta Journal.

He would aim his campaign

at a coalition of Georgians in the middle and low-income
brackets.

This included Nixon's silent majority, the poor,

both black and white, and the conservative Georgians who
had voted for Lester Maddox in 1966 and for George Wallace
in 1968.

His appeal, he went on to say, would be to

"average working people" who wanted "someone in the
governor's office who understands their problems."15
Jimmy Carter succeeded, to be sure.

But his success

proved to be both gruesomely hard and soul-taxing.

The

only easy part was adopting, adapting, and inventing his
own brand of "populism."

In the minds of rural and urban '

blue-collar Georgia voters, nothing better represented the
wealth and power of the establishment than the Atlanta
press.

"The people in the state," said one long-time

politico,
against."

"whatever the Atlanta newspapers are for, they're
Successful Georgia politicians had been
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haranguing "those lying Atlanta newspapers" since the
campaigns of Eugene Talmadge in the 1930s.
simply continued the tradition.

Jimmy Carter

He did not want, he

insisted, the support of "the big-shots that own the
Atlanta newspapers."

He charged that the Atlanta

Constitution made a "major editorial commitment" to smear
him, particularly in its political cartoons.

Carter's

press aide, Bill Pope, said after the campaign: "We loved
all those scurrilous cartoons.
stop."

We just didn't want it to

Bill Shipp was right when he later wrote that

Carter had "calculatedly incurred the wrath of the big city
daily press."16
At the same time, Jimmy Carter made himself look as
ordinary and colorless as he could, or at least his
political image packager, Gerald Rafshoon, did.

Billboards

and brochures carried the ugliest photograph of Carter his
staff could find.

"It made Jimmy look like an average

working man," a Carter campaign aide said.

The picture

made him look like "he had a little fear in him . . .
little wary perhaps."

a

That Carter made sure he looked like

a populist was significant because, in the words of his own
pollster, William Hamilton,

Carter was a "stylistic

populist" whose success derived not from changing specific
policies, but from "personal campaign style."17
More uniquely his own was Jimmy Carter's ability at
personal campaigning.

He traveled the state on the civic
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club speech-making circuit; kept active in the Baptist
church, farm organizations, business groups, and the Lions
Club; and had himself made state chairman of the March of
Dimes.

By the time he announced his candidacy Jimmy Carter

had visited more than 400 towns, made more than 1,800
speeches, and met 600,000 Georgians.

Once the campaign

began in earnest, he shook thousands of hands in factory
shift lines at five A.M. and again at midnight.

Eighteen-

hour days of non-stop campaigning were typical.

In many

small counties a visit from someone running for governor
was rar e .

Carter visited most of the small counties not

once but two or three times, and shook every hand he could
find.

Numerous observers noted the effectiveness of this

person-to-person campaigning:

"It is a peculiar thing,

involving human warmth, and not relating at all to issues,"
wrote the Atlanta Journal's Steve Ball.
everywhere."

"It works for him

Even Reg Murphy, editor of the Atlanta

Constitution and one of Carter's severest critics, admitted
that "one-on-one, he's probably as convincing as anybody
I've ever seen."18
Carter found the personal campaigning natural, did not
mind the toning down of his looks, and managed the populist
rhetoric easily because,

in his heart, he believed it.

But

Carter would also have to draw sharp class distinctions
between himself and Carl Sanders.

Carter's polls indicated

that average voters watched television but did not read
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newspapers, which dictated a TV crusade against Sanders.
That crusade focused on portraying Jimmy Carter as the
candidate of the working man, and Carl Sanders as the
candidate of the ultra-rich.
harvesting peanuts.

One commercial showed Carter

The voice-over asked,

"can you imagine

any of the other candidates for governor working in the hot
August sun?

Isn't it time someone spoke up for you?"

Carter's fund-raising ads said other candidates were
supported by "big money asking for big favors," but that
"Jimmy Carter made it the hard way."

Perhaps Carter's most

effective commercial opened with the camera panning in on a
closed door.

Voice-over:

"This is the door to an exclusive

country club where the big-money boys play cards, drink
cocktails, and raise money for their candidate, Carl
Sanders."

Country club door swings open; close-up of man

writing check.

Voice-over:

"People like us aren't invited.

We're too busy working for a living."
talking with an "average man."

Footage of Carter

Voice-over:

votes are going for Jimmy Carter.

"That's why our

Vote for Jimmy Carter,

our kind of man, our kind of governor."19
"Carter used television effectively," remembered Bill
Shipp,

"with Gerry Rafshoon doing a whole series of some of

the best negative advertising I've ever seen aimed at
Sanders.

And Sanders' own advertising played right into

their hands."

Sanders' advertising campaign actually

benefited Carter.

His ads were expensive,

slick, and
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elitist.

Sanders was pictured jogging, boating, and flying

his plane.

Sanders avoided appealing to the common man and

portrayed himself as prosperous and prestigious.

Even the

Sanders campaign slogan did not sit well with many
Georgians.

"Carl Sanders ought to be governor again."

Two

of Sanders' own campaign aides later admitted that the
slogan sounded like Sanders had a right to be governor, as
if it were a "monarchial privilege."20
Carter saw his opportunity and made the most of it.
He immediately began portraying Sanders as a king who had
robbed his subjects.

In one of Carter's televised spots

Sanders, whom Carter always called "Cuff Links Carl," was
shown boarding a Lear jet; then the camera quickly cut to a
close-up of a man's hand taking hold of a brief case full
of money.

At the wrists were huge cuff links.

Throughout

the campaign Carter harped on the theme that Sanders had
"used secret-information to get rich."

Over and over,

Carter proclaimed that "Georgians never again want a
governor who will use the tremendous power and prestige of
office for his own personal wealth."

And once, while

campaigning at a bank, Carter stuck his head into a vault
and quipped:

"Looks like Carl Sanders' basement."

When

Sanders retorted by calling Carter a penny-ante politician,
Carter again bested him.

Yes, he said,

based on peanuts, pennies, and people.

"my campaign is
That's better than

one based on bucks, banks, and boondogles."21
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In fact, Carl Sanders' administration had not had a
hint of scandal about it.

And Carter's own polling

information indicated that only one percent of the
electorate believed Sanders had used the governor's office
for personal gain.

But Jimmy Carter would make sure that

by election day a great many more voters believed i t .
Carter attacked Sanders daily and promised the press that
he had proof of Sanders' misdeeds that he would release in
due course.

At the same time, Carter put Sanders on the

defensive by repeatedly calling for public disclosure of
his personal finances.

Sanders lamely protested that his

personal finances were not part of the campaign.22
Two weeks before the primary Carter released his long
awaited "proof" that Carl Sanders had abused the powers of
the governor's office.

He charged that Sanders, while

governor, had used his influence with the Federal
Communications Commission to help a friend and business
associate acquire several television and radio stations.
Carter handed out copies of papers filed with the FCC.

The

documents listed Sanders as secretary of his friend's firm,
gave his occupation as governor of Georgia, and listed his
address as the governor's mansion.

But the documents also

showed that Sanders owned no stock in the company.23
Carter's bombshell had proven a dud, and the
newspapers had a field day.

Carter had, in the words of

the Macon Telegraph, "over-promised and under-delivered."
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The Macon News labeled Carter "a classic example of a good
man whose high standards have been undermined by political
ambition."

And the Atlanta Constitution wrote that Carter

had gone at Sanders with a "vengeance."

While Jimmy Carter

admitted that there was no proof of illegality, he insisted
that the facts showed "a consistent pattern of combining
political and business interests on behalf of Mr. Sanders."
The weakness of the response did not matter,
to Sanders had been done.

for the damage

The dirty trick had worked.

But

discrediting Sanders amounted to blackening the former
governor's character and Carter was beginning to pay the
price of conscience.

According to Phil Gardner, editor of

the Atlanta Journal. Jimmy Carter, at the time, agonized
over "whether he should have used the tactic in the first
p l a c e ."2“
But Carter played far more and dirtier tricks on
Sanders.

Early in the summer the Carter campaign put out a

series of anonymous pamphlets and "fact-sheets" that hit
Sanders from all sides.

One of the most effective was a

photograph of Carl Sanders being doused with champagne by a
black Atlanta Hawks basketball player during a victory
celebration.
shampoo."

The picture became known as the "champagne

Copies were mailed to small-town barbershops,

rural churches, service stations, and country stores, and
were passed out at Ku Klux Klan rallies.

Sanders was part

owner of the Atlanta Hawks and the photograph originally
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had run on the sports page of the Atlanta Constitution.
But as a political flyer it reminded people that Sanders
was rich and associated him with high-living and alcohol,
both still bugaboos in puritanical and teetotaling rural
Georgia.25
Most important, the photograph associated Sanders,
a close personal way, with blacks.

in

That association was

carried further by "fact-sheets" that said or implied that
Sanders was a close ally of the controversial black state
representative, Julian Bond (actually the two detested each
other), that Sanders had attended the funeral of Martin
Luther King, Jr.,

(which in fact, he had) and that as

governor Sanders had conspired to keep George Wallace out
of Georgia (Sanders did).

Bill Pope, Carter's press

secretary, prepared the leaflets and Carter's top campaign
aide, Hamilton Jordon, directed their mailing.

Such

tactics were all part of an operation Carter campaign
workers called the "stink tank."2*
In order to win the Democratic nomination, Jimmy
Carter needed to draw as much black support away from
Sanders as possible.

But at the same time, he needed to

string black voters along, for he would need their support
in the general election in which he would face a
Republican.

The two-faceted campaign was again in play.

The "stink tank" was once again put to work.
Carter campaign created a fictitious "Black Concern
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The

Committee."

The "committee" sent pamphlets that charged

Sanders had not kept his 1962 campaign promises to black
voters and even implied that Sanders had been responsible
for the death of a black prison inmate.

These sheets were

mailed to black barber shops, funeral homes, and pool
halls.

Simultaneously, the Rafshoon agency, in order to

draw black voters away from Sanders, prepared and paid for
radio spots for C. B. King.

At the same time Carter

consistently asserted that he had "excellent support from
the NAACP and Negro churchmen across the state," and he
told black Atlanta leader Vernon Jordon,

"You won't like my

campaign, but you will like my administration."27
Carter also went directly to black voters.

Although

Carter's staff advised against it, he was the only white
candidate to campaign openly in black communities.

"I've

been to see 'em in their filling stations, in their
churches," Carter would be able to say.

"I've been to see

'em in their drugstores and in their homes."

On one

occasion, for example, Carter walked to the back of a small
town drugstore to shake hands with a black janitor whom he
could easily have ignored, while three whites he had just
been talking to looked on disapprovingly.

Carter promised

to appoint black citizens to high-level state offices and
constitutional boards:

"the state ought to set the example

in its employment," he explained.28
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In stringing black voters along even as he appealed to
Georgia's segregationists, Carter employed dual purpose
rhetoric with acumen.

While he never outright said he was

a segregationist, he managed to leave that impression with
a great many voters.

Hamilton Jordon told the Atlanta

Journal that in some counties the Carter campaign actually
set up two organizations, one designed to cultivate the
backing of Wallace-Maddox supporters and the other to
appeal to more moderate voters.

Similarly, Republican

candidate Hal Suit said that Carter had one brochure for
use in extreme segregationist-minded areas of south
Georgia, and another one for distribution in the rest of
the state.

And during the campaign Carter, on several

occasions, gave different answers to the same questions,
depending on where and to whom he was speaking.

On one

occasion Carter had said he was against giving a "single
dime" to private schools; on another occasion and in a
different place -- this time at one of the many private
schools being established in order to avoid integration -he told an audience,

"you can rest assured I'll do

everything I can for private schools."

More often and more

typically when asked about forced integration, he
sidestepped the question with responses such as "I don't
like being pushed around."29
Throughout the primary Carter sought to identify
himself with George Wallace, even incorporating Wallace's
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campaign slogan,
advertising.

"our kind of ma n , " into his own

He said he expected "to have particularly

strong support from the people who voted for George Wallace
for President and the ones who voted for Lester Maddox."
And he repeatedly promised he would invite George Wallace
to Georgia to right the slight done the Alabama governor by
Sanders, who had refused to allow Wallace to speak to the
Georgia state legislature.

ABC-TV's fact-book on the

election concluded that Carter largely "confined his
campaign promises to one issue -- if elected governor he
would invite George Wallace to Georgia."30
Five days before the primary Carter visited the
Augusta police station in order to show support for two
policemen charged in the shooting of two blacks during
riots in Augusta.
speech.

There he made a tough law-and-order

"The main thing I want you to know," Carter told

the assembled police force,

"is that when I am governor of

Georgia, you need not ever fear I will pull the rug out
from under you when you try to enforce the law against any
sort of rioters or lawbreakers.
hundred percent."

I'll back you up one

Press Secretary Bill Pope summed it all

up after the election when he told the Washington Post that
he had run a" "nigger campaign" for Carter.31
In the Democratic primary on September 9, Carter won
handily, with 388,280 votes or 48.6 percent of the total.
Sanders came in second with 301,179 votes, or 37.7 percent.
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Carter had missed winning without a run-off by only 10,000
votes.

Carter's strategy had worked.

He had swept the

rural areas and small towns and left Sanders only urban and
black voters to draw from.

In the counties where Lester

Maddox did well, Carter also did well.

Maddox, running for

lieutenant governor, was the only Democrat in a multi
candidate race to win without a run-off.

In 1966 Jimmy

Carter's liberal image served him well in the city and in
the state's northern, generally liberal to moderate
counties.

In 1970 these were Carter's weakest areas of

support.32
Carter still faced a run-off election with Sanders.
But Carter's unexpectedly large, 87,000-vote margin called
for a change in tactics.

In the run-off Carter would no

longer attack Sanders, who, no longer forced to be
defensive, would probably take the offensive and start
attacking.

Carter would then play the part of the "little

man" being put upon by the rich and powerful Sanders.
As expected, Sanders came out swinging.

Two days

after the primary, he called a press conference and
launched into the first of a series of attacks on Carter as
a liar, a "smiling hypocrite," an oppressor of tenant
farmers, and an ultra-liberal who was trying to pass
himself off as a hard-working farmer.

"The last time

Carter worked in the fields in the hot August sun," Sanders
shouted,

"was when his slick advertising agency took the
300

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

pictures you see on television every day."

Carter had

worked to delete the word "God" from the Georgia
constitution, had voted against old and disabled persons,
and had sided with organized crime, Sanders charged.
Carter was an "unprincipled grinning chameleon."

Jimmy

Carter responded by labeling Mr. Sanders "an embittered and
desperate man . . . waging a smear campaign."33
In spite of repeated challenges by Sanders, Carter
ruled out a debate with such a "bad loser."
is with the people," he said,
time with them."

"and I intend to spend my

In desperation Sanders had a television

debate anyway, with an empty chair.
him again.

"My strength

But Carter one-upped

"Some folks," he quipped,

"said the chair was

ahead.1134
C. B. King, the black candidate who placed third in
the Democratic primary, accused both Sanders and Carter of
running racist campaigns.

Asked for comment, Carter

replied in a typical two-faceted statement, that he would
appreciate any Negro votes, but added,

"I can win this

election without a single black vote."

One day later

Carter met with Roy Harris, the former chairman of
Georgia's White Citizens Council, George Wallace's 1968
Georgia campaign director, and editor of the racist Augusta
Courier.

At the end of the private, but much speculated

upon meeting, Carter emerged with an endorsement from
Harris.

The Sanders camp was delighted.

They immediately
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distributed a flyer featuring a cartoon of Carter climbing
into bed with Roy Harris and saying:
You're right!

"...

Who needs black votes."

move over, Roy.

Shortly afterward,

the Sanders people released another flyer that had pictures
of run-down tenant houses on Carter's farm, captioned with
a slightly altered version of the Carter campaign slogan:
"Isn't it time someone spoke up for these people?"35
Carter immediately fired off memos to all his county
campaign chairmen telling them to get the word out that
Sanders was mailing "smear sheets" that attacked him
personally and stirred up racial hatreds.

He was right.

During the final days of the run-off the Sanders campaign
launched what amounted to a massive "smear sheet airlift."
But Carter again outmaneuvered Carl Sanders.

Local Carter

campaign people simply met the incoming planes, posed as
Sanders' campaign workers, picked up the "smear sheets,"
and had bonfires.36
On election day Sanders got his old supporters back to
the polls, plus most of C. B. King's, who gave him ninetythree percent of the black vote.

But Carter won three out

of every four white votes and carried 135 of 159 counties
for a sixty percent win.

In rural counties he had

routinely triumphed with three to one margins.37
Almost as good news for the Carter camp was that the
Republican nominee was Hal Suit.

If Suit's nomination

surprised virtually everyone in the state, it delighted
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Carter and his people.

Like everyone else, they had

expected the Republicans to run James Bentley, and they
dreaded the prospect.

State Comptroller Jimmy Bentley was

the Georgia GOP's most able politician and one of the most
conservative political figures in the state.
Democrat, Bentley switched parties in 1968.

Elected as a
Bentley had

sent out $1,600 worth of telegrams to public officials
warning that Earth Day was also Lennin's birthday and
suggesting that the observances were somehow Communist
affiliated.

Like Carter, he saw that the Maddox-Wallace

vote in Georgia would be the deciding factor in the 1970
governor's race.

Three months before the Republican

primary Bill Shipp had written that Bentley was already
"taking a campaign cue from George Wallace's victory in
Alabama and is taking a hard, perhaps even vicious turn to
the r i g h t ."

Bentley had begun running a television

commercial that opened with the camera focused on an
oncoming school bus.

Voice over:

"This year this bus and

the laws that drive it threaten to change the life of your
child.

. . ."

The bus roared closer and closer and loomed

larger and larger until the screen was filled, then
obliterated, by its front bumper and radiator grill.
Carter had placed Sanders to his left with little
difficulty, but it would be impossible to move to the right
of Jimmy Bentley.38
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Hal Suit, on the other hand, an Atlanta broadcaster
virtually unknown outside the urban area, was a political
novice.

More important from the Carter camp's point of

view, he had no established, much less well-known,
reputation as a hard-liner on segregation.
Gingrich,
wrote:

And as Newt

then a history professor at West Georgia College,

"Suit had only about one-fourth as much money as

Carter, and about one-tenth as much organization."39
Compared to Bentley, Suit would be a pushover.

But even

that would require careful planning and a lot of work.
Carter would need to continue to portray himself as
"conservative" and brand Suit a "liberal."

That meant

continued courting of the Maddox-Wallace vote.

But at the

same time, Carter wanted to appeal to moderates, urban and
black voters.
Suit recognized the importance of a conservative label
as well as Carter did but, in fact, there were few issues
on which the two candidates really differed.

So the two

candidates hurled accusations of "ultra-liberal" and
"counterfeit conservative" at each other.

"The big issue

in the lackluster contest," the Atlanta Journal observed,
"boiled down to who is the 'liberal.'"40
In the liberal-hurling contest, Suit proved no match
for Carter.

For example, although Suit knew of Carter's

voting for the integration of his own church in Plains, he
considered it irrelevant to the campaign, and did not
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mention it.

In retrospect he realized he should have.

The

problem, as Newt Gingrich wrote, was that Suit "lacked the
experience to tear away at the phony image and reveal the
liberal heart under the blue collar picture."41
At the same time, Carter began to cut into Suit's
urban constituency by shifting his target from the Atlanta
establishment to the Washington power structure and the
Republican Party which was, he repeatedly charged,
"controlled by a handful of big-shots."

Instead of going

to the Georgia voters for support, Suit had, Carter said,
"snuck off to Washington" for help from President Nixon.
But all Suit got, he added, was "a ballpoint pen and an
autographed golf b a l l ."42
Even though Hal Suit was not the staunch
segregationist he had expected to face in the general
election, Carter followed his original plan of trying to
retrieve the black support he had relinquished to Sanders
in the primary.

He began to soften his segregationist

image and talk again in terms, however vague, of a
colorblind "populist" coalition:

"I got the vote of a lot

of segregationists and integrationists" in the primary,
Carter maintained, and "I never did ask their philosophy
when I sought their vote."

To a group of farmers in

Abraham, Georgia, as in other towns around the state, he
began saying that conservatism no longer meant,
another person because he is different from us."

"hatred of
Nor did
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it mean "a lack of passion or foresight, but simply an
insistence that individuals be left alone as much as
possible to guide their own destinies."43
Despite his new moderation, Jimmy Carter's earlier
courtship with segregationists paid off big in late
September.

Lester Maddox at that point endorsed him and

praised him for "running a Maddox-type campaign."

And

Maddox kept up his support; two weeks later, at a state
Democratic meeting, he promised that as lieutenant governor
he would be watching to make sure Carter kept his campaign
promises,

"When I put my money into a peanut machine,

I

don't expect to get bubble gum, and neither do the people."
Carter at the same meeting,
Maddox:

swallowed his pride and praised

"He has brought a standard of forthright

expression and personal honesty to the governor's office
and I hope to measure up to this standard."

And on the

last day of the campaign Carter announced he was going to
vote for Maddox as lieutenant governor.44
In Las Vegas, Jimmy the Greek set the odds for the
Georgia election: Carter to win at two-and-a-half to one.
The Greek was right.

On November 3, 1970, Carter won

sixty-two percent of the vote and became the seventy-sixth
governor of Georgia.45
The 1970 election represented a watershed in Georgia's
history, but the fact that Jimmy Carter won it did not.
Even if Carl Sanders won, it would have been a major
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turning point in the state's political history because both
he and Carter were a new breed of political leaders
emerging in the South at the time.

Race as a campaign

issue, at least as a public campaign issue, would have
ended with a Sanders victory as surely as it did with
Carter's victory.
For any newcomer to stand a chance of winning, he
would have had to steal Maddox's thunder and make himself
the candidate of the state's segregationist camp.

At the

same time, because Sanders' record was unassailable, any
newcomer would have had to bring the former governor down
by tarring him with personal attacks.
The newcomer in this case was, of course, the
personally honorable and politically liberal and
integrationist-minded Jimmy Carter.

No one but Jimmy

Carter knew then, or knows now, how hard it was for him to
decide to do what was necessary to win.

But what is clear

is that actually doing what he decided to do caused him
great personal suffering.

It was immediately obvious to

others that Jimmy Carter had not run a campaign he could be
proud of.

Shortly after the election,

state senator Leroy

Johnson, Sanders' black campaign leader for the Atlanta
area, made a poignant observation: "I understand why he ran
that kind of ultra-conservative campaign . . . you have to
do that to win.

And that's the main thing."46
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But Carter had far more trouble justifying his actions
to himself.

After the election, Carter was distraught.

He

immediately telephoned Carl Sanders to apologize for the
personal attacks and began confiding to close friends that
he "felt bad" about some of the things he had said and
done.

He confessed "to the Lord" and "prayed for

forgiveness," and told Rosalynn that he would never go
through such a campaign again.

When he began his campaign

for the presidency in 1976 he employed the slogan,

"I'll

never lie to you."47
In his famous 1976 Playboy interview Carter said that
when he looked on women with lust he was committing
adultery in his heart.

For born-again Jimmy Carter, the

thought was equivalent to the action.

Although he

convinced himself that the subterfuge of his campaign did
not make him a racist, Carter's personal anguish over the
campaign of 1970 had profound consequences for the politics
of the South.

Upon winning his election he immediately

began to build bridges to black citizens with his inaugural
address.

"I say to you quite frankly that the time for

racial discrimination is over," he declared.

"Our people

have already made this major and difficult decision.

No

poor, rural, weak or black person should ever have to bear
the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity
for an education, a job, or simple justice."48

This

pronouncement by a deep South governor that racism was dead
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created front page news in the national media.

Carter's

speech and the campaigns and speeches of the other moderate
southern governors signalled an end to racial politics and
allowed the region to rejoin the nation in a way heretofore
impossible since the Civil War.

The fact that Carter found

it necessary to conduct a campaign that was less than
forthright affected him not only as a politician, but as a
moral, religious man who believed in the powers of
redemption.

Carter believed that his campaign and his

experience as a southerner could heal the racial divide.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The four 1970 gubernatorial campaigns reveal a great
deal about the men who won them, the southern body politic,
and the changing politics of race.

Each campaign, of

course, exhibited distinctive characteristics,
history,

shaped by

issues and political developments peculiar to each

different state.

Republican incumbents dominated the

political contests in Arkansas and Florida, while in the
other two states, no incumbent was eligible to run.

In

Arkansas and Georgia, the toughest test came from a former
governor in the Democratic primary.
neither party held primary contests.

In South Carolina,
These differences

dictated candidates' strategies and tactics as they
marshalled their forces according to the strength and
number of their opponents.
Nevertheless, Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter had
taken several common characteristics into the campaign.
All the candidates were whites from rural areas and modest
backgrounds.

Each of the candidates were active in their

Protestant churches.

All four had served in the military;

two of them, West and Carter, attended military academies.
All had been b o m during the Depression of the 1930s but
had come of age during a time of prosperity and optimism.
They represented a new generation of southerners who saw
the corrosive effects of racism on the region.
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These four gubernatorial candidates pursued office
with an attitude of personal confidence and idealism.

They

believed that if given the chance, they could accomplish
great things.

They campaigned,

therefore, emphasizing

their personal qualities rather than focusing on issues.
All four of the successful gubernatorial candidates in 1970
avoided controversial issues by selling themselves.

All

sought to portray themselves as good people whom voters
could trust.

A powerful new medium in southern politics

facilitated this approach.
television generation.

These young men were of the

They had seen the changes the new

medium wrought in public perceptions.

They had observed

the power of televised images of the civil rights movement
-- pictures of the persecution of people seeking justice
and the negative images of segregationist leaders who
opposed them.

They had witnessed the impact televised

images had had in national political campaigns during the
previous decade.

Television presented the perfect tool for

avoiding controversial issues and presenting personal
qualities.

Image replaced substance.

The power of images benefitted all four of these men.
Bumpers effectively employed television in presenting
himself as a leader the people could trust.

Even though

Askew could not afford an extensive television advertising
campaign, he made the most of the coverage he received.
His single most important asset in the 1970 campaign,
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according to a New York Times Magazine feature article, was
"the ability to project the image of complete sincerity
over television."

Askew also benefitted in the general

election because of the negative images produced by
Governor Kirk when he seized a school district in defiance
of court orders.

John West also profited indirectly by the

televised images of overturned school buses provoked by his
opponent's speeches.

And West employed an effective

advertising campaign pointing out the futility of defiance
by playing back Republican Senator Strom Thurmond's "broken
promises" to ease federal desegregation pressure.

Jimmy

Carter utilized the medium to cast his opponent as a rich,
corrupt politician who could not understand the problems of
common folk while portraying himself as a man of the
people.1
The medium of television allowed the successful
candidates of 1970 to emphasize their personal qualities
without dwelling on the issues.

The candidates knew,

however, that they must seek favor from a diverse and
ambivalent electorate.

All four men shared an appreciation

of how the environment in which they competed had changed.
The civil rights movement had convinced many southerners
that the abuses heaped upon black southerners in the past
must cease.

While many did not like integration, they came

to accept it, even if only because they believed that
defiance only generated more stringent measures and federal
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intrusion.

This coupled with the turbulence of the

previous decade compelled many to embrace those candidates
who seemed sincere in their efforts to find solutions that
would not cause undue disruptions.
One issue that threatened the resilience of this new
found moderation, however, was busing.

In every campaign

in 1970, at least one candidate unsuccessfully sought to
play on the racial misgivings of southern w hites.

The

rejection of political pandering to racial antagonisms
takes on added significance when one considers the furor
over busing in the South and elsewhere in the nation.

To

their credit, the successful candidates did not try to
exploit the busing issue.

Busing seemed to many to involve

issues that went beyond simple justice.

Roundly opposed by

a wide spectrum of voters, busing offered tremendous
political appeal.

Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter did a

great service to the South by not jumping on the antibusing bandwagon at a critical time in the South's
political and racial development.

Growing racial

moderation among the people of the region could have
deteriorated into the racial intolerance of old, especially
with an issue as unpopular as busing.

The men who would

ultimately represent the New South, however, refused to
encourage the furor over busing.
While Orval Faubus ranted about busing, Dale Bumpers
calmly pointed out that all the candidates opposed busing,
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but that until the Supreme Court ruled none of them could
do anything about it.

Bumpers expressed the sentiments of

many in the southern electorate in his willingness to abide
by the law.

He also assured voters that they could trust

him to do the right thing, without ever saying exactly what
that might be.
Reubin Askew refused to enter the busing brawl
initiated by Kirk.

While conceding that Kirk may have

voiced the sentiments of the majority of the people
concerning busing, he emphasized that Kirk's goal was to
g a m e r headlines rather than solve the dilemmas of
desegregation.

ft.skew himself refused to compete in the

busing melee created by Kirk, later saying that he could
not allow "the emotions of the hour to become the legacy of
a generation."

Askew disapproved of busing, even though

he, more than any other southern governor, would defend the
necessity of busing.

Governor Askew would later tell

parents of his state:
"Nobody really wants [busing] . . . yet the
law demands, and rightly so, that we put an end
to segregation in our society. We must demonstrate
good faith in doing just that . . . we must stop
inviting, by our own intransigence, devices which
are repugnant to us.
In this way and this way only
will we stop massive busing . . . only in this way
will we put the divisive and self-defeating issue of
race behind us once and for a l l . And only in this
way can we redirect our energies to our real guest
-- that of providing an equal opportunity for quality
education to all of our children."2
In the campaign, however, Askew said very little about
racial problems facing the state.

Like Bumpers, he said
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only that he would work for solutions and not cause more
problems.
In South Carolina, Albert Watson, a political protege
of Strom Thurmond,

sought to test the limits of the

Republican southern strategy.

Albert Watson called on the

electorate to reject the more moderate stance of recent
Democratic administrations.
southern states,

Like candidates in the other

Watson chose busing as an issue through

which to exploit the ambivalence of many whites over the
pace of integration.

An impassioned anti-busing speech by

Watson led to violence.

Pictures broadcast around the

world of a white mob overturning buses that had carried
black school children in Lamar, South Carolina, allowed
John West to portray himself as someone who sought peaceful
solutions to the integration problems without really
offering what those solutions might be.

Calling busing a

"phony issue" West conceded that "we are all against
busing, " but he reminded voters that only the Supreme Court
or Congress, and not the governor,

could decide the issue.

West promised that whatever was decided, his administration
would not take any action that might harm public schools.
West's approach reflected the sentiments of an electorate
opposed to busing, but committed to education.3
In Georgia the strongest opponent of busing would be
eliminated in the Republican primary.

Jimmy Carter did not

want to become embroiled in the busing debate.

Because of

319

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

the political realities he faced in that campaign Carter
had to ease the current fears of the segregationists
without calling the racial shibboleths of the past out by
name.

He focused on resentments of class and avoided

blatant racial appeals.

In political forums when other

candidates concentrated on busing, Carter pointed to
estrangement of the common man from government decisions.
He subtly appealed to the rancor of those whose wishes were
ignored in racial matters, without alienating the growing
moderate body of voters who saw the necessity for
integration.

The two-faceted campaign cost the moral

minded Jimmy Carter.

But Carter, like the other New South

candidates, knew he did not hold racist views and would, if
elected, right many of the wrongs done to black citizens.
Carter may have eased his moral dilemma by taking refuge in
Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that in democracies perfection
is never possible and the moral, i.e., Christian, man must
content himself with accepting a necessary amount of
compromise.

Carter opened his autobiography, Why Not the

Best? with a quotation from Niebuhr:

"The sad duty of

politics is to establish justice in a sinful world."4
All of the South's successful gubernatorial
candidates,

in sum, refused to exploit the busing issue in

1970 and then delivered inaugural speeches announcing an
end to exclusionary efforts by state governments toward
black citizens.

National ambitions shared by these young
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politicians militated against pandering to racial politics.
Their elections helped sustain the improving image of the
South and thereby improved their national political
prospects.

The success of these four New South governors

also demonstrated the durability of moderation in the
region.

And finally, the elections signalled an end to the

politics of persecution and defiance.
And yet, none of these men took firm stands on racial
justice as candidates.

Never publicly acknowledging racial

antagonisms during their campaigns, all the successful
southern gubernatorial candidates of 1970 tacitly
acknowledged those fears by neglecting to reach out to
black voters.

The candidates realized that they could not

alienate the large number of white voters who held
reservations about busing and that the issue could destroy
the region's new-found moderation.

Although good

intentions may have lain behind dodging issues such as
busing, the efforts also precluded any real effort to
incorporate racial justice into their platforms.

After

examining the successful campaigns of 1970, one might
applaud the transformation of southern politics, or one
might come away saddened by the missed opportunity to end
racial politics.

Even though all these men issued a

repudiation in their inaugural addresses, their campaigns
set a precedent of obfuscation that future politicians
followed nationwide -- and may have even propelled some of
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these New South governors into the national political
arena.

Real racial progress missed its chance.

None of

these men met the challenge to renounce revived attempts to
unite the white electorate in the name of resistance to
integration.

In the future, electoral success would lay in

subliminal appeals.
Rather than reaching out in an effort to unite, the
representatives of the New South had finessed the issues
and rested their appeal on their image.

They called on

voters to elect them because they could trust them to do
the right thing; whatever the right thing might be.
Different voters had different right things in mind.

One

of the losing candidates who sought to challenge the busing
issue may have been prescient in his observations.

Claude

Kirk called Reubin Askew, his opponent in the Florida
gubernatorial campaign, a "middle-of-the-road, don't-doanything individual."

Kirk asserted that the smiling

"trust me" image that proved so successful for Askew, and
the other New South candidates of 1970, masked an avoidance
of controversy and damaged democracy.
that Askew "went in with

[Jimmy] Carter -- another smiling,

'Trust me' type of character.
governor.

Kirk would later say

One shouldn't have been

The other shouldn't have been president.

. . .

Anytime you just sit around, eat hamburgers, and act like a
good guy, you are letting cancers grow.

...

If you stand

around and watch a bank robbery, you're not going to jail,
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but you ought to be ashamed of not picking up the
telephone."
Kirk's mixed metaphor rings true.

Perhaps

malignancies were growing undetected within the body
politic of the South.

Maybe the voters were being robbed

of the value that comes out of facing up to responsibility
while these new politicians stood by silently.

The days of

the yelling southern demagogic race-baiter had ended.
White southerners' desire to shed the image of noisy,
violent resistance and the soft, smooth medium of
television had changed the nature of politics.

After 1970

most political operatives focused on these campaigns and
saw the practical benefits of evasion.

Subtle avoidance of

racially charged issues appealed to an electorate that had
grown weary of upheaval.

In the long run, the new trend of

political avoidance of race, of trying to mollify a
moderate electorate that would accept integration as long
as it did not lead to disruptions, may have encouraged
attractive candidates with soothing voices to say nothing
and exacerbate racial harmony by smoothing over festering
problems.5
This work began with the words of a retired Georgia
farmer.

"Always before, you could tell right easy how

somebody stood on the nigras," said the farmer, puzzled by
the racial stance of the gubernatorial candidates during
the campaign in 1970.

"I don't say it isn't a good thing,
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but it does make for a mighty peculiar election."

The

farmer's statement reflected not only the ambivalence of
the region in regard to racial moderation, but also the
obfuscation of the politicians who sought to manipulate
that ambivalence.

Mighty peculiar elections indeed.
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